


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THE AMERICAN NATION:
ITS PROBLEMS AND PSYCHOLOGY



BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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THE GROUP MIND

IS AMERICA SAFE FOR
DEMOCRACY?

THE PAGAN TRIBES OF BORNEO
BODY AND MIND

THE AMERICAN NATION: ITS PROBLEMS AND PSYCHOLOGY

BY

WILLIAM McDOUGALL

PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY IN HARVARD COLLEGE

LONDON : GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
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FOREWORD

THE foundations of American national life, like that of any enduring society, are psychological. There are deep-running currents of thought, emotion, and idealism which vitalize a people and make them one. In order to understand the importance of the United States as a world power one must appreciate the tremendous significance of this unity. This is the indispensable condition of any real nationalism.

Here in the second of the volumes telling the story of American Nationalism Professor McDougall has described for his readers the characteristics of a true nation, has appreciatively shown how those characteristics are portrayed in our own American experience of nation-building, and with frank sincerity has indicated wherein we have fallen short of the full stature we should attain.

HENRY BASS HALL,
General Editor.

“That the history of the United States, rich with the record of high human purposes, and of faith in the destiny of the common man under freedom, filled with the promises of a better world, may not become the lost and tragic story of a futile dream.”

—FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER

“Patriotism and religion are the only two motives in the world which can permanently direct the whole of a body politic to one end.”

—ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

PREFACE

WHEN I was invited by the editor of this series to contribute a volume, I had grave misgivings. Would it not be impertinent for a foreigner to write for Americans about America and American problems? However, I accepted the task, remembering that two great books, perhaps the two greatest books, upon America have been written by foreigners, namely, Alexis de Tocqueville and the late Lord Bryce. For, if great foreigners may write great books on America, may not a lesser one attempt a smaller book with some hope of performing a service, however slight, to a people from which he has received much kindness?

I have chosen as my topic the nationhood of America; for the creation of the American Nation is the work of the spirit of nationalism. The American Nation is not the fortuitous by-product of various geographic, biologic, and economic influences. Nor can it hope to endure and prosper through the blind working of such forces. The American Nation is the creation of men who have desired that it should exist, who have been filled with the vision of a nation greater than all others in all that makes the greatness

of a nation, and who have striven with all their strength, and surely not altogether vainly, to make of that vision a reality. They have succeeded in making of many States one Nation. The spirit of enlightened and ennobling nationalism has become, through their efforts, widely diffused throughout the people. But the creative work of nationalism never can attain to a final goal. The complete and perfect nation never yet has been created and presumably never will be. The foundations of the American Nation have been well and truly laid, and upon them a magnificent framework has been built. It remains for the spirit of nationalism to carry on the great work; not to completion, for there can be no completion. The simile is at fault; a nation is not a mechanical structure but a moral organism: an organism is not built; it grows, develops, evolves. And the organism which is a nation differs from all others in that it has no natural period, no maturity that passes over inevitably into decline, but rather is capable of continued development without limit. Yet, though the growth of a nation does not inevitably pass over into decline and senility, it does pass through stages which we may distinguish as those of youth, adolescence, and maturity. The American Nation is now entering upon its maturity: America is assuming the responsibilities of an adult, of a self-conscious self-directing moral organism.

Such is the theme of this little book. I cannot

hope to have succeeded in writing with strict impartiality on all the many questions I have touched. I must confess to a conservative bias. I have a great admiration for and sympathy with America as it was in the bygone years; and I am conscious of a desire that the America of the future shall retain some semblance of the America of the past. This prejudice, which I thus frankly avow, is perhaps constitutional with me. On one side I come of Puritan ancestors, and since boyhood I have felt that, but for the accident that I was born three centuries too late, my natural place in the world would have been in the neighborhood of Plymouth Rock.

W. McD.

SILVER LAKE, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
September, 1924.

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THE INDESTRUCTIBLE UNION

CHAPTER ONE

THE NATURE OF A NATION

“**N**ATION” is a word that we use in common speech without feeling the need to define it more nearly. We speak of the American, the English, the French, the Dutch, or the Italian nation, with little risk of being misunderstood. But, if we are asked to say just what the word means, we find some difficulty in giving a satisfactory answer. We naturally and properly seek to define the word by pointing to examples, to this nation and to that, saying — there and there is what I mean by “a nation.” And if the questioner pushes us along this line of definition, we soon meet with difficulties. Is there a Russian nation? A Chinese, an Indian, a Jewish, a Turkish, an Arabian, an Egyptian, an Australian, a Haytian, a Philippine, a Javan nation? In all or most of these instances, we may feel some doubt as to what answer we should give. In each such instance some of us will say “Yes”; others will say “No.”

If we ask the same question concerning the populations of certain other areas, most of us will agree in denying them the right to be called nations; e.g.,

the population of Massachusetts, of California, or of Utah, of Nigeria, of Borneo, of New Guinea, or of Palestine. None of these would commonly be regarded as a nation.

We cannot then sufficiently define a "nation" by pointing to instances; in language of the logicians, we cannot satisfactorily define the word by denotation. But there is another great method of definition, namely, the method of connotation. We may ask — "What does the word 'nation' connote? What are the essential attributes of that which is properly called a nation?" If we pursue this method, the task of clear definition proves no less difficult. We make in imagination an array of nations; and then we seek to point out what attributes are common to all these instances. If we can find a number of such attributes, we may say, "These are the essential marks of a nation." And if, further, we should find that no population that lacks any of these attributes can properly be called a nation, our conclusion would be confirmed. Unfortunately, the attempt to define by this method yields, like the former, no clear-cut result. We can say that a nation is a large number of human beings. And that seems to be the only general statement that is true of all nations.

Political philosophers have sought to make other general statements that shall be true of all nations; but in vain. One such philosopher has recently reached the conclusion that a nation may be defined

as a population animated by a common desire to be a nation. Yet it is notorious that such a desire is apt to be most strongly felt and expressed by populations which, realizing that they are not nations and are not recognized as such by the world, desire to become nations. There is, however, one important element of truth implied in this proposed definition; the truth, namely, that the being of a nation is not merely a physical or a biological fact, but rather a psychological fact; that those attributes of any population which constitute it a nation are in the main mental attributes; or, if you prefer the expression, a nation is a spiritual being; its existence is a mental or spiritual fact, though it requires certain physical and biological conditions.

The Ideal of a Nation

In view of these difficulties, we shall do wisely to avoid the attempt to define a nation in a way that shall mark off nations from populations that are not nations. Let us instead try to picture a nation in the fullest sense of the word, a population that combines all the attributes of nationhood, each in a high degree. This will be the ideal type of a nation, the high-water mark of nationhood. We might then attempt to place the nations of the past and of the present time in a scale of nationhood, according as each one presents to our inspection more or fewer of these marks or attributes, and according as the at-

tributes of nationhood which it possesses are more or less completely developed.

The ideal nation, a nation in the fullest sense of the word, would consist of a population exclusively occupying a territory sufficiently large and sufficiently rich and varied in natural resources to supply its primary needs. The population would be large enough and fertile enough to perpetuate itself, and to assert its rights against other peoples. They would speak a common language, would be swayed by one religion and by one body of moral traditions, and would obey one body of laws. They would be descended from common ancestors, whom they would regard with piety, with respect, admiration and gratitude, and perhaps with some pride in their achievements. They would feel some obligation to perpetuate, even though striving to improve, the traditions and institutions created and handed down by the ancestors. They would be conscious of themselves as a nation; they would desire to continue to be a nation; and this consciousness and this desire would express themselves in — and in turn be fostered by — a unified political organization, accepted by the mass of the people as in the main well suited to their nature and their needs; this political organization, and the body of laws which it would administer and adapt to its changing needs, would be in harmony with, and in fact be the formal expression of, the accepted moral traditions.

Primary Conditions favorable to Nationhood

These, I think, are the main essentials of nationhood in its completest form. We may further point to certain conditions which, while not perhaps essential to perfect nationhood, contribute towards or facilitate the attainment and maintenance of that state.

First, well-defined natural boundaries of the national territory. A large island, a peninsula, a continent, or a segment of a continent shut off from others by mountains, great rivers, or deserts, is the natural and most favorable seat of a nation.

Secondly, a certain degree of similarity of all parts of the territory in respect of climate and natural products. A territory of which one half was arctic, the other half of tropical climate, could hardly nourish one harmonious nation. And less extreme differences, such as that between an arid desert region and a moist forest zone, or between one adapted solely to pasturage and another fitted by rich deposits of minerals to be a great industrial hive, such differences, engendering wide differences of custom, institution, and material interests between the populations of the two parts, may give rise to serious difficulties. Though some considerable diversities of the national territory in respect of climatic and other physical conditions are, no doubt, favorable to national life, it is where these diversities are intermingled in a pattern of small scale, rather than spread over vast

uniform areas, that the territory is most favorable to national development.

Great Britain illustrates in the clearest manner these two principles: an island of moderate size, of almost uniform climate, and of geological structure so diversified on a small scale that within the single island every one of the great geological formations, from the most ancient to the most recent, takes part in the formation of the soil.

Thirdly, freedom and ease of communication between all parts of the national territory. The presence of great natural barriers between one area and another of any territory was in earlier times sufficient to prevent the growth of a single nation within such a territory. But in the present age the development of the mechanisms of transportation and communication has well-nigh deprived all such barriers of their divisive influence.

The importance of these three territorial conditions is well illustrated by the fact that the earliest civilizations and the beginnings of national life arose in each instance (Babylonia and Egypt) in a plain, bounded by deserts on all sides, fertilized and watered by a great river which served as a great highway.

Fourthly, racial similarity or sameness of the population. I do not mean to imply that the people must be of "pure race." For no such people exists in the extreme sense of those words. And it is possible, even probable, that a population blended from a

number of allied stocks is better material for nation-building than one of strictly "pure race." I mean rather that the population shall comprise no large proportion of persons so different in physical type from the rest that their foreign racial origin is obvious to the eye, springs at once to the mind of the observer, and cannot be forgotten, marking them as members of a distinctive and alien branch of the human race. For it is unquestionable that such wide physical difference is apt to occasion an aversion which, by rendering intermarriage of the two stocks less frequent, tends to perpetuate the difference and to become the ground of social conflicts. It is probable also that racial differences so wide as to reveal themselves strikingly in the physical type are in all cases accompanied by differences of mental constitution great enough to militate against mutual understanding, sympathy, and social harmony.

Fifthly, a geographical position such that the territory, though clearly marked off by nature, is yet adjacent to other similar areas in which other nations may take shape and, developing on parallel lines, may afford opportunities for stimulating and fruitful international contacts. Without such intercourse between one people and another, national life is apt to become stagnant and will hardly progress beyond a primitive stage. For the development of civilization has been in the main a continual process of cross-fertilization of cultures.

A population which displayed these essential attributes of nationhood and which had enjoyed for a long period these geographical and biological conditions favorable to national development could hardly fail to have advanced far in the scale of nationhood.



Conditions that must be Attained

But, in order that a people shall be a nation in the fullest richest sense of the word, something more is needed, other conditions must be realized. Of these the most important, perhaps, is that the nation shall also be an independent State; that is to say, it shall not only be politically organized, but shall also be politically independent, shall enjoy full sovereignty, shall have the power to make its own laws, to regulate and control all the affairs of its citizens and all its relations with other States, without suffering interference from any power outside itself, and shall stand in relations with other States that are defined only by the universal principles of justice, humanity, and mutual respect, and by such understandings with them as it may have voluntarily entered upon.

Secondly, the perfected nation will have developed a rich civilization involving a great variety of arts and industries and occupations, each of which demands specialized skill and knowledge on the part of those who follow it. Such differentiation of occu-

pations and specialization of human capacities inevitably result in a high degree of mutual dependence between individuals and classes; a dependence upon reciprocal services which, being felt by every citizen in all relations and in all activities, binds them all together with a thousand links no less strong than the primary natural bonds of human sympathy, kindness, and mutual esteem.

Thirdly, the perfected nation will have produced, and will continue to produce in every age, a number of men and women of genius or great talent, persons who become great leaders in all public affairs, who write great books, produce great works of art, make scientific discoveries and inventions, or organize the labor of multitudes in such ways as render that labor immensely more efficient in the production of all the material bases of its civilization.

Fourthly, the perfected nation will be democratic, and that in both the principal senses of the word, the social and the political. It will recognize or permit no absolute distinctions of class or caste; every member will be regarded as potentially the equal of every other, until he shall have proved his superiority in some respect or have displayed his lack of normal capacity in the intellectual or moral sphere. And it will be democratic in the political sense, in that its government will be founded upon, and sensitively responsive to, public opinion.

This last condition is perhaps the one which is

most open to dispute. In America, where the democratic principle has long been openly proclaimed and proudly practiced, there will be few to dispute it. But others may point to examples of nations recorded in the pages of history which have reached a high level of national life and achievement under forms of government not distinctively democratic. And they may seriously question, and often have questioned, whether any people may hope, under the forms of democracy, to rise to an equally high level. Here is a difference of honest and well-informed opinions. The future course of history alone can decide in favor of one or the other. But we are now sketching in imagination the features of an ideal type; and we may assert, without fear of contradiction, that any nation, democratic in both the social and the political senses of the word, if it can prove itself the equal of less democratic nations in respect of all other standards of national greatness, must be awarded a higher place than these. And for this reason: in a democratic nation, the mass of the people, taking an active part in the maintenance and the control of government, sharing in its responsibilities, its achievements, and its failures, thereby take part in an educative process which none other can equal in the intensity and continuity of its incidence upon individuals, and in the universality of its stimulating influence, both moral and intellectual.

The Greatness of a Nation

The greatness of a nation is to be measured by two great standards, the public and the private, the collective and the individual. A nation may be great in the sense that it is a great power among the other nations, that it uses this power nobly to advance the general welfare of mankind, and that it is also (as indeed it must be, if it is so to bear itself in the community of nations) the seat of a civilization rich in great moral traditions and productive of men of great achievements in many lines of effort. That is public or collective greatness. But, if such a nation comprises, beneath the strata of highly cultured and enlightened persons who conduct its affairs and produce the great works which adorn the age and bring renown to their country, a mass of toilers, morally inert or trivial, ignorant and content with their condition; still more, if these masses be degraded by physical hardships that forbid the rudiments of the higher life to stir among them, then that nation falls short of greatness. It fails when measured by the private or individual standard. Such was the French nation under the reign of Louis XIV; and such was every great State founded upon serfdom or slavery.

On the other hand, a nation might attain a very high level of material prosperity and of general education; all its members might enjoy the common comforts and practice the common decencies of life; they

might have ample opportunities of education and of bettering their condition; and yet, if that nation showed itself ignoble in its relations with the outside world, if it showed itself greedy, if it used its power oppressively and wholly selfishly for its own further enrichment, if it shrank from taking its due share of responsibility for the orderly development of civilization throughout the world, if it refused the risks of international coöperation, and, further, if it failed to produce great works of art and literature and science commensurate with its material resources and development, that nation also would fall short of greatness. It would be great by the private standard, but not when measured by the public standard.

The perfected nation must combine greatness in public affairs and in creative activity with universal diffusion among its members of all the essentials of the good life. Now, only a democratic nation can hope to combine in itself excellence of these two kinds. An autocratically governed nation may, perhaps, attain to public greatness more readily than a democracy. And a democracy will more easily achieve that uniform diffusion of opportunities for the good life which constitutes the private greatness of a nation. And there is nothing to prove that a democratic nation may not succeed in combining both forms of excellence. But an autocratically governed nation that had attained to public greatness could achieve private greatness only by con-

verting itself to a democracy; for only by so doing, only by throwing open the doors of opportunity to all and by laying upon all some share of responsibility for the national life, could it give to the mass of its people a sufficient stimulus to self-development and moral effort; only so could it make them true participators in its greatness. It follows that, however high a level of excellence the public life of an autocracy¹ may attain, such a nation is at the best but passing through a phase in the development of perfect nationhood; it must subject itself to vast changes before it can become a truly great nation. On the other hand, a democratic nation that has already attained private greatness may hope to attain public greatness also by intensifying its efforts, by cultivating to the utmost the qualities of the people.

Democratic Organization

It is commonly agreed that a nation may properly be said to be a democracy in the political sense if, and in so far as, it is so organized that the State is controlled in all its actions by public opinion. Another common way of stating this truth is to say that in a political democracy all actions of the State are expressions of the will of the people. A third way of stating the same truth is to say that in a democracy sovereignty resides in the people, or that

¹ I use this term in a comprehensive sense to denote all forms of government and political organization other than the democratic,

the people is sovereign. Yet a fourth definition of a political democracy is conveyed in Lincoln's famous words "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." The first statement is, perhaps, the best; for every one knows in a general way what is meant by the pressure of public opinion.

But it is worth while to dwell for a moment on the fact that these four definitions of political democracy are but four different statements of one truth.

The phrases "will of the people" and "sovereignty of the people" have a metaphysical flavor. Both have given rise to an immense amount of profitless discussion, the inevitable result of stating familiar facts in terms of abstract entities such as "sovereignty." It is the great merit of Lincoln's language that it avoids this danger or reduces it to a minimum. Yet the terms "government" and "State" are not incapable of ambiguity. Wherever a community is ruled, wherever its members are constrained to obey common rules, to do certain things and to abstain from others, there is government. When this power to control the actions of all members of a community resides within it and affects, or is capable of affecting, every form of activity within the community (whether it is wielded by a single individual or by a single organized group of individuals) there is a State. If the State acknowledges obedience or allegiance to no power outside its boundaries, it is an independent State; it enjoys or

claims absolute sovereignty. But many States are not independent and sovereign. They exercise only a limited or partial sovereignty; because they submit in certain matters to the superior power, authority, or sovereignty of some other State. Such were the several kingdoms and principalities of the late German Empire; and such are the States of the American Union. With the doubtful exception of the brief revolutionary period, the States of the American Union never have been completely sovereign or independent States; for, very soon after they had asserted their independence of the British Crown, they established the Federal Government, granting it certain rights and powers affecting all the States; in so doing, they constituted a super-State, at the cost of their own sovereignty.

State and Nation

It is to be noted that the words "State" and "Nation" are by no means synonymous. The independent self-governing nation is a State. But there have been and still are many States which are not nations. And there are nations, or peoples claiming to be nations, which stand by no means at the bottom of the scale of nationhood, and which nevertheless are not States. The late Turkish and Austrian empires were States; but they were not nations. Each of these States ruled over several communities, each of which had some claim to be called a nation;

e.g., the Armenian, the Arab, the Bosnian, and the Albanian peoples. But there was no Armenian State. Statehood and nationhood, then, do not necessarily coincide. The State is the ruling power; and where that power is an absolute monarch whose ministers execute his will alone, it is true to say, as was said by Louis XIV, that the monarch is the State. In such a State, statehood and nationhood are entirely distinct. Under Louis XIV, the French people had many of the attributes of a nation; but, though they might justly be called a nation, that nation was not the State: for it was not or had not the ruling power.

On the other hand, in a nation which is a political democracy in the fullest sense, the nation is the State; State and nation coincide and cannot be distinguished: for some share in the ruling power is enjoyed by every citizen; every man is a part of the State.

In this respect, the States of the American Union and the Federal State which is the United States are peculiar. From their inception, the constitutions of all these States have been so thoroughly democratic that each community has been identical with the State; the citizenry of the whole country has been identical with the Federal State; the nation is identical, or almost identical, with the Federal State, the United States of America.¹

¹ The existence of "territories" not yet admitted to statehood has been and still is a fact which prevents the complete identification of State and nation.

There are several other existing nations in which nation and State coincide, or very nearly do so, more especially perhaps the French nation. In the British Commonwealth, on the other hand, the political complications are so many and so varied that it is impossible to make any clear-cut statements as to the relations of statehood to nationhood.

Nationalism Defined

There prevails in the present age a very general tendency, a tendency which has asserted itself in the last half century with constantly increasing force, to bring about the identification of States with nations. This tendency is identical with the tendency to render governments more democratic. It has recently received definite expression and widespread acceptance under the formula "the right of nations to self-determination."

This tendency to bring about coincidence of States with nations seems to be a natural and well-nigh inevitable consequence of the increasingly wide diffusion of political knowledge and understanding. As any population becomes conscious of its natural community of interests and of its attributes of nationhood, it desires to be a nation, it desires to acquire a democratic organization, and it desires to be a State. This tendency is what is called "nationalism." It is notorious that nationalism has been throughout the last century, and still is, the greatest

of all political forces, a force which more than any other has shaped the history of the modern world.

Nationalism, the tendency to make State and nation coincide, has worked in very different degrees in the various parts of the world. In all peoples, save the most backward and primitive, it has manifested itself and made some progress towards its goal.

All will agree that a nation stands higher in the scale of nationhood, nearer to complete nationhood, the more completely nationalism has done its work within it, the more nearly the nation coincides with the State and the State with the nation; that is to say, the more completely the ruling power is diffused among all its citizens, the more democratic is its political organization. And it will also be agreed that the nation of the completest kind will be not only a self-governing State, but also an independent State, owing obedience or allegiance to no other State.

History of Nationalism

The Nation-State, now that it has been realized in many instances, may seem so natural and so rational a political form that any one, regarding the rational nature of man and ignorant of the history of mankind, might well suppose that it would have been manifested from the earliest dawn of civilization, and would have steadily developed and rapidly extended itself over all the civilized world. But the history of nationalism has been one of very slow prog-

ress, extending through thousands of years and interrupted by long periods in which the national principle seemed to be well-nigh extinct. The modern triumph of democracy and nationalism is the victory of reason and humanity over the cruder instincts of the race.

The gregarious animals live in herds among which instinct determines that the strongest male shall rule. It is probable that primitive men, who also were gregarious animals, lived in such herds, each ruled by a monarch whose superior strength and cunning secured the instinctive submission of all members of the herd. The survival of monarchy for long ages throughout almost every part of the world is, perhaps, the most striking of all evidences of the power of instinct to defy the guidance of reason in human affairs. For the king is the herd leader; his power is founded upon that instinctive submission before superior power and prestige which gives the strongest bull-bison the leadership of his herd and makes him monarch of a wide stretch of prairie.¹

Europe may, perhaps, be called the home of nationalism, the scene of its earliest and its most intense manifestations; and in Europe nationalism has gone further towards completion of its work than in any other continent. The Nation-State is an

¹ This is not to say that monarchy has not played a useful part in the development of nations; and it remains still a disputable question whether any people has advanced so far that it can dispense with monarchy without loss.

achievement of the modern age. It was unknown to, and was not even imagined by, the ancient philosophers, deeply interested as many of them were in political problems and institutions. The States in which Hellenic civilization bloomed were City-States; and although some of them, notably Athens, tended towards democracy, all of them fell far short, in two respects, of becoming Nation-States. The democracy they achieved was very partial and imperfect; it was rather a form of aristocracy, under which a large aristocratic class ruled over a much larger class that had no political rights. Athens, even in its prime, was governed by such an aristocracy; and its prosperity was founded upon the labor of a multitude of slaves, many of whom lived in great misery. And each of the Greek City-States represented only a fragment of a nation. There was, in a sense, a nation of Hellenes; a people which was conscious of itself as a natural unity. But this rudimentary nation was scattered and divided among a multitude of States, in each of which it formed a ruling aristocracy.

This system was favorable to a rapid blooming of culture; for it induced a very intense patriotism and a keen rivalry in excellence of many kinds among the many States. But it was essentially evanescent; it contained the seeds of its own decay. The rivalry too often developed into destructive warfare which exhausted the ruling aristocracies; these aristocratic

strains were soon swallowed up and submerged in the heterogeneous masses of slave population.

The Roman Republic made, during a short period, some approximation to a Nation-State. But it also rapidly developed into an aristocracy ruling over a much larger population that did not share in the government; and, as it expanded into an empire, it became an absolute monarchy, administered by an efficient bureaucracy but without the rudiments of democratic institutions.

In all other parts of the ancient world, absolute monarchy was the prevailing political form under which civilization developed. There existed incipient nations among which democratic institutions had begun to take form. Such were the Teutonic tribes that emerged from the northern wildernesses to fight, with varying success, against the legions of Julius Caesar and his successors, until they overwhelmed the Roman Empire. In the long conflict with that Empire, these rudimentary nations lost their cohesion and their identity; they lost also almost all traces of their democratic organization. They became infected by Rome with the monarchical principle; and, in adopting the culture of Rome, they imitated also its political forms and set up a great number of monarchies. The rivalries and conflicts of these monarchies, which made up the history of Europe for fifteen centuries, accentuated and confirmed the monarchical principle, rendering it more completely

absolute; until it culminated in the doctrine of the divine right of kings to rule and in the dictum of the king of France, "*l'état c'est moi*."

In the thirteenth century the English people made some little headway towards the assertion of the rights of the people. But it was not until the sixteenth century that the overweening political pretensions of the Pope of Rome stimulated a new outburst of nationalism among the peoples of Europe and brought on the Reformation. It was, no doubt, the revival of learning and the increasing diffusion of knowledge that prepared the way for this step in the struggle of reason against instinct. And in the seventeenth century, the English people, among whom the diffusion of knowledge had progressed rapidly, was stimulated to further nationalistic effort by the arrogant pretensions of the Stuart kings.

A by-product of this new nationalistic effort was the founding of the colonies on the Atlantic seaboard of North America. This movement, humble and insignificant as it must have seemed to the statesmen of that age, was nevertheless the most momentous incident of the age-long struggle between instinct and reason, between autocracy and democracy, between despotism and nationalism. The men who founded those colonies could not know that they were founding the greatest of all Nation-States, and that by their example they were to secure the triumph of nationalism throughout the world. But, with a

courage and vision that seem to us of the present age well-nigh superhuman, they deliberately aimed at instituting a commonwealth or commonwealths in which the principle of government by public opinion should prevail, untroubled by the autocratic traditions of the Old World. "Those who did embark for the New World," says the author of a recent history of democracy, "were men of force and character who stood for the principle of equality in their church life and were determined to establish a government on the same basis. They not only carried with them into their new home the ideas of English freedom, but the ideals of freedom based upon democratic principles. Before the Pilgrims on the *Mayflower* landed at Plymouth, they drew up a voluntary compact under which the body politic should be formed in the new land, in which it was said: 'We, whose names are underwritten, the loyal subjects of our dread sovereign King James [a form of words which reveals that even they had not emancipated themselves entirely from the old instinctive submission to the herd-leader] do solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and of one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by virtue hereof, to enact, constitute, and frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions and offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most con-

venient for the general good of the colony. Unto which we promise all due submission and obedience.'”¹

The Will of the People

Now let us consider what is implied when we assert that, in a democratic nation, government expresses public opinion or that the State is controlled by “the will of the people.” The latter expression is one that has been clothed in much obscurity in a multitude of philosophic and political discourses. “The will of the Nation,” said de Tocqueville, “is one of those expressions which have been most profusely abused by the wily and the despotic of every age.” Yet the phrase has a definite meaning, expresses a fact of fundamental political importance, and should give rise to no confusion or obscurity, if carefully used.²

Note first that these two statements do not imply rival theories of democratic government, but are merely two ways of saying the same thing. The public opinion that controls the State is opinion as to what ought to be, as to what ought to be done, or what ought not to be done, by the State. And it goes without saying that those whose opinion it is that the State should do this, or should not do that, desire

¹ “The Irresistible Movement of Democracy”, by J. S. Penman, New York, 1923.

² I have discussed, at some length, the meaning and proper usage of this expression in my “Group Mind” (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1920) and would refer to that work any reader to whom the present discussion of it may seem inadequate.

or will that it shall so act or abstain from action. This identity of opinion with desire and volition does not hold good in the sphere of individual action. A man may admit that he ought to take certain action, and yet neither desire nor will to do it; his private interest, his peculiar tastes, his sloth, may prevent the coincidence of his desire and volition with his opinion as to what he ought to do. But in the sphere of public or State action, such disharmony can hardly occur. If there prevails a decided public opinion that the State ought to act in a certain way, it is safe to assume that the State, in acting in that way, will express the will of the people.

There is, however, one way in which public opinion and the will of the people show themselves to be not quite identical, but rather to some extent independent variables; namely, public opinion may be decidedly in favor of a certain mode of State action, and yet the people may will it either strongly or feebly, energetically or with but little force. This is a point of no small importance: for every large and complex social organization, such as the modern democratic State, has a considerable inertia; like a heavy complicated engine, it requires a certain degree of force to set it in motion along any particular line of action. And the volition of the people, if it be weak or slothful, may fail to secure the State action demanded by a prevailing public opinion.

When we speak of a strong public opinion, we

mean one supported by energetic volition. This consideration derives further importance from the fact that effective action by a democratic State not only requires to have behind it public opinion and the will of the people, supporting it and driving it onward towards the goal demanded, but also it requires that public opinion shall be clear as to the means by which it shall strive to attain the desired goal. Division of opinion as to the proper or best means for attaining a goal which all desire is a condition which only too often prevents effective State action. For example, it may be confidently asserted that at the present time (1924) the public opinion of America and the will of the American people demand that the American State shall take some effective part in the restoration of Europe to a more healthy and normal condition. But there is much difference of opinion as to what means the American State may best adopt to achieve this common purpose. And for this reason little has been done hitherto.¹

We must next deal with a question that is of the first importance, yet so subtle that a very widespread misunderstanding of it is the root of much political error and failure. The question may be stated in either a theoretical or a practical form. We may ask — What is public opinion? What is the will

¹ I am not forgetting the fact that the Dawes plan, which promises so much for the restoration of harmony and prosperity in Europe, is largely of American origin; but at present it remains a promise rather than an achievement.

of the people? Or we may ask — How is the state of public opinion to be ascertained? How is the will of the people to be made known? We may best answer the theoretical question by dealing with the second, the more practical one.

It is often assumed, and the assumption underlies many modern political innovations, especially “the initiative”, “the referendum”, and “the recall”, that “public opinion” or “the will of the people” is an algebraic sum of the individual opinions or volitions of all the citizens of the State, and that it may be ascertained by asking each individual separately to record his private opinion or desire in respect to the question in hand; by requiring him to vote “Aye” or “No”, and then, if the ayes are in the majority, accepting that reply as the mandate of the people.

To take this view is grossly to over-simplify the facts, to ignore the complexity of the mental processes of a nation; and to apply it in practice is to stultify democracy, to render it unworkable.

Even in the small and simple societies of the City-States of ancient Hellas where democracy had its birth and first partial success, the facts did not correspond to this over-simplified view. Every citizen had the right to vote in the general assembly. But it was expected, and in practice it was the rule, that each citizen before voting would discuss with his fellows the question at issue and listen to the public orations made in the assembly and elsewhere. In

this way a decision by vote was rendered something quite other than a decision by algebraic summation of individual opinions and volitions. The decision was the issue of a process of collective deliberation in which the *pros* and *cons* were presented in the most forcible manner to each citizen. In the course of this process of collective deliberation, each citizen was made aware of the way his fellows looked upon the question at issue; and the men best qualified by capacity and experience were able to exert a proportionately large influence in forming the resultant collective opinion. That is to say, the citizens did not come to the assembly each with a closed mind, each already determined to vote "Aye" or "No." They came together to discuss the question at issue, to debate it, to take part in a process of collective deliberation by which a common opinion or decision might be reached.

Now it may be said with truth that it seldom happened, or could happen, that in a numerous assembly every citizen would be led to share the predominant opinion and will a common end. It is only in small bodies, such as the jury of twelve citizens, and then only under a certain compulsion, that unanimity can be expected or frequently obtained. This leads us to the statement of a principle which lies at the very foundation of democratic government, the principle, namely, that when, after due public discussion and deliberation, a decisive ma-

majority of the people records a common opinion and demands a certain action, the minority, consisting of those who still are not convinced of the wisdom of the policy or action proposed, shall loyally defer to the majority and shall will the end demanded by the majority, shall coöperate in action for its attainment, and shall do nothing to weaken or frustrate the collective action of the State. Here again, then, in the case of the overruled minority, we meet with a certain divergence between opinion and volition.

Such loyal coöperation of the minority, in spite of difference of opinion, is, I say, a basal principle of democracy. It is implied in all such phrases as "trusting the people", "having faith in democracy", "loyalty to the nation." The greatest democrats, the finest natures, have given us many notable examples of such loyalty. One of the best known and finest of such examples was that furnished by Robert Lee, the great general of the Confederate armies. We are told that his private opinion was against armed resistance and the attempt at secession by the southern States. But he held that his loyalty was primarily due to his State, the State of Virginia; accordingly he submitted to the will of the people of his State, unmistakably expressed, and he loyally placed at its service his military experience and great capacities.

Only by the recognition and loyal acceptance of this principle can the life of a democratic State be harmonious and successful. We have in America at

the present time a notable illustration of the fact. The Federal State has decreed general prohibition of the sale of alcoholic liquor. But a disloyal minority refuses to submit and conform to this expression of the will of the people and persists in attempting to defy the law, producing in consequence a widespread demoralization that seriously threatens the prosperity of the Nation.

To return, then, to our question — How is the state of public opinion and how is the will of the people to be ascertained? There is no single answer applicable to all nations. The answer depends in each case upon the kind of political and social organization that the people has built up. Here we must dwell upon a principle of fundamental importance, one which has been strangely neglected by philosophers who have sought to define the word “nation”; the principle, namely, that a population is a nation only in so far as it is organized for collective deliberation and volition; that is to say, in so far as it is politically organized.

Political Organization

Without political organization, a population, though it might possess in high degree all the other attributes of nationhood and might enjoy all the favoring conditions we have noticed, would not and could not be a nation in any full sense of the word; it could not rise above a low level in the scale of

nationhood. It would continue to be a mere crowd, enjoying no collective mental life, incapable of national deliberation, decision, and volition. There would be no national mind and will.¹ The population would continue to be a mere aggregate of persons, subject to all those disabilities and disorders which characterize the mental life of crowds and mobs.²

Nor could such a population, desiring to be a nation, suddenly or rapidly convert itself into a nation. If all members, moved by a common strong desire to create a nation, were to rise up together saying, "Come, let us become a nation; let us create a political organization", they could not forthwith accomplish their desire. Political organizations are not made in a moment; they grow. An efficient political organization that shall give to a population the capacity of true national deliberation and volition, that shall render it a nation, can only be gradually developed. It is true that its development may and must be promoted by the efforts of many great and patriotic citizens, supported by the good will of the mass of the people. At this point some of my readers will say, "Did not the American people, the British colonists of North America, make themselves into a nation in the course of a few years? By

¹ Or, as I have expressed it elsewhere, there would be no group mind. Cf. "The Group Mind", G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1920.

² These have been so abundantly displayed in a series of modern treatises, beginning with M. Le Bon's "The Crowd", that I will not dwell upon them here. The reader may find a summary statement and explanation of the principal features of crowd life in my "Group Mind."

repudiating in action and in words the authority of the British Crown, by successful war, by the Declaration of Independence, and by adopting the Federal Constitution, did they not become a nation?"

The instance is unique; but it is no exception to the rule of gradual development of political organization. We must remember, in considering the history of the United States, that, as de Tocqueville wrote, "It was a new country, but it was inhabited by a people grown old in the exercise of freedom." They came of a people among whom freedom, during more than a thousand years, had "broadened down from precedent to precedent." They were heirs of all the ages of the British people's unflagging struggle for liberty and justice. That is to say, they had brought with them ancient and well-established traditions of freedom and justice. Such traditions cannot be made in a day, nor a year, nor a century. It is the sense of their antiquity, the knowledge that they have been established by the blood and sweat and agony of untold thousands of our ancestors, that gives to such traditions their sanctity, their power to hold our devotion, to inspire and sustain our efforts in their cause.

It is just because such traditions are an essential part of any effective national organization that such organization cannot be made to order, cannot be cut out of new cloth, but can be created only by a long process of evolution.

In the light of the accumulated experience of man-

kind, an admirable constitution may be designed, an excellent political organization may be set forth on paper, and a whole people may acclaim it and agree to adopt it. But, in the absence of the appropriate traditions, such a constitution, such organization, will not work; or will work only in a partial and ineffective manner. Such a people will, as history clearly shows, soon find itself, despite its beautiful written constitution, ruled by a despot or an oligarchy, or torn by civil conflict, or lapsing into anarchy.¹

The traditions of which I speak, as essential to the effective organization of a nation in any full sense of the word, are not only strictly political traditions, traditions of procedure, of public debate, of party loyalty, of respect for political opponents, for the judicature, for the law and the State; they are also moral traditions that, by molding the moral sentiments of every citizen, govern his every action in public and private; traditions of service, of fair play, of justice and kindness and helpfulness as between man and man; traditions of honesty and truthfulness and personal honor; traditions of loyalty to persons and institutions and to the nation; traditions which are embodied in the national literature, in poetry and architecture and in all the arts, and which have their most intimate roots and their only guarantee of perpetuity in the family life of the people.

¹ As is at the present time the condition of so many of the would-be democracies of the world.

This great truth is too often ignored by those radical reformers who propose to tear up society by the roots and would reconstruct it according to some scheme that seems to them more rational and perhaps more just and humane. It is easy to devise schemes of political organization. It is infinitely harder to make them work, even though they should be accepted by the whole people.

The Representative System

Of all possible types of political organization, some form of representative system seems to be essential to nationhood of the higher level. Whether the form should be monarchical or republican, federal or centralized, bicameral or served by a single assembly, these are questions of secondary importance, about which there is fair scope for differences of opinion. We may safely assert that the perfected nation must be organized as a representative democracy, that the making and execution of its laws shall be controlled by a body of representatives elected by and responsible to the whole people. The manner in which these representatives are chosen, the electoral methods and "machinery", the form of ballot, the operation of bodies for nominating candidates, for drawing of "platforms", and for the making of propaganda — these also are features of the representative system of secondary importance, on which opinions may differ.

The essential feature of a good representative system is that its operations shall result in the election of representatives who represent all that is best in the citizenry.

It is one of the dangers of a democracy that it is apt to pervert the system of control by representatives into one of control through delegates, individuals whose function is merely to vote according to the strict instructions of those who have elected them. This danger would be greatly magnified if the electoral system were put upon an occupational basis; a change which, at the present time, is being loudly demanded by various groups of "social reformers." For the member of the controlling assembly elected by an occupational group, such as the farmers, or the coal miners, or the railway workers, would almost inevitably be a mere delegate. He would feel himself responsible only for the interests of the group he represented; and he would be strictly charged by that group to vote on every question in the manner dictated by their supposed interests.

All such proposals are founded upon and imply a false and pernicious belief, the belief, namely, that the harmonious life and prosperity of the nation can proceed from the mere conflict of interests of its parts. It is no doubt inevitable that there shall be conflicting interests of occupational groups. With the elaborate organization of occupational groups that has grown up in modern times, the struggle be-

tween such groups for the raising of the standard of life of each group, relatively to and at the cost of all other groups, has become a very sinister feature of democracy. And it is, therefore, more than ever important that this conflict shall not be accentuated by degrading the political representative to the level of a mere trade delegate. The way has been prepared for these pernicious proposals by the false teaching of various political philosophers who have falsely supposed that the unity, harmony, and welfare of a nation may be and commonly are the undersigned by-products of the private activities of the citizens. Some of these philosophers, for example those of the ultra-individualist school of Herbert Spencer, have taught that all that is required of the citizen is that he shall energetically and intelligently pursue his private interests, without grossly interfering with the similar activities of his neighbors. To others it has rightly seemed that the issue of a harmonious and prosperous national life from a multitude of such private activities would be a miraculous process. And so they have proceeded to define or name this miraculous factor in national life, calling it Providence, or Divine Guidance, or the Time-Spirit, or the Genius of the People, implying by these or other such names that the national life is somehow guided and kept on the path of true development by some intelligence and purpose different from and superior to the intelligence and the purpose of the citizens.

We may agree that the theory of national harmony issuing from mere mechanical interplay of private activities is an impossible one; and that, if the citizens of a prosperous nation did in fact design and pursue only their private interests, the result would imply some such miraculous guidance as these expressions postulate. The truth seems to be that the harmony and prosperity of a nation are truly possible only as the result of intelligent purposive guidance and design; but the intelligence, the purpose, the design that produce the result are in all cases those of patriotic citizens, groping no doubt without perfect vision of that which is to be, without a perfect and detailed plan of action, yet in successive generations gradually working out a more perfect plan, conceiving in the light of experience more adequately what a nation is and should be, and by their efforts and sacrifices realizing step by step the ideal that is being shaped in their minds.

This is no airy theory; it is an empirical fact, a fact of observation; one which appears most clearly in the life of the simplest communities. The prosperous family group of nomad savages owes its prosperity to the consciousness of its members that they are a group, a vital unit on which all alike depend, and to the wisdom and mutual forbearance and helpfulness which each member is constrained to exercise by his sense of the value of the whole. The same is true of the primitive village community; and of each

form of human community that is in any degree democratically organized. How, then, should it not be true of the highest and most complex form of human community, the democratic Nation-State?

Let us then dismiss all the false philosophies that neglect this most fundamental truth of political science and, with them, all specious proposals to transform our nations into mere congeries of conflicting occupational groups.

The need of counteracting this strong tendency to substitute delegates for representatives is but one reason, though in the present age a very strong one, for insisting that each representative shall be elected and be charged primarily to care for the interests of the nation as a whole. Though each one may, and inevitably will, have special knowledge of the needs and interests of special groups, occupational, territorial, or other, he must never forget that such groups are but parts of the whole nation, that the welfare of the whole is the prime condition of the welfare of each part, and that, though he may have special knowledge of one part, it must always be his purpose to secure justice for all parts rather than favors or advantages for one. He must remember that the nation is not merely the sum of its parts, but is vastly more than such a sum. It is a vital organization, not a mechanism. And what is here said is true of every vital organization.

A machine or mechanism can be completely de-

scribed in terms of the parts of which it is composed and of their relations to one another at any moment of time. But a vital organization cannot be so described; because it is a growth, a development that extends from the past into the future, of which development the present state is but one phase; and because this development is not a mere series of changes impressed by external forces, but proceeds from the intrinsic nature of the organism.

Now I do not propose to say that a nation is an organism; for this assertion, which has often been made, gives rise to endless controversy and is liable to lead those who accept it into the drawing of false analogies. But, whether or no we call a nation an organism, we must recognize it to be a vital organization; and it is one in which the peculiarity (asserted in the foregoing paragraph) of all such organizations is present in a higher degree than in any other known to us. For, while all others have a limited existence in time, the duration of a nation is one that, so far as we can see, has no necessary limit; hence its welfare in any phase of its development is in itself of vanishingly small importance, except in so far as it affects the future course of the national life.

The tendency to ignore this truth is one of the fundamental weaknesses of democracy. The unthinking man is apt to identify the nation with himself and his contemporary fellow citizens and, therefore, to assume that what is good for all the

existing citizens, or even for a majority of them, must be good for the nation. Unless the nation is led by men who take a larger view of its nature, who see it as a whole whose future is vastly more important than its present, that future is in gravest jeopardy. Such men will, like Lincoln, not scruple to demand that the mass of existing citizens shall give up all that makes life worth living and even life itself, if such sacrifices are required for the sake of the future welfare of the nation.

The representative system must then be one that secures as its representatives men of this type, men who are patriots in the large sense, men who conceive the nation not as a mere aggregate of existing men, women, and children, but as a vastly greater whole that endures, that grows out of its entire past history and projects itself into an indefinitely prolonged future, and which is, and may increasingly become, for countless generations yet unborn, the main condition and instrument for the realization of the good life.

The public opinion and the will of the people need constantly to be formed by a never-ending process of collective deliberation, in which, through press and platform and pulpit, school and college and university, the influence and prestige of such men shall exert a preponderating guidance. And the essence of the organization must be that, while it gives a voice to every citizen, it secures that that voice shall

not make itself heard without the opinion and the will which it expresses having been molded by all those great agencies of the national deliberative process.

Whatever the detailed nature of the representative system, when, by the free play of that system, a decision has been reached, that decision is the expression of the will of the people. It is true that, in almost every case, there will be a minority in opposition, a minority unconvinced of the wisdom of the decision; but, in the ideal system, the members of this minority, recognizing that the deliberative process has reached its conclusion by the legitimate, the accepted and prescribed methods, will loyally accept the decision, will accept the end and the means chosen, and will them. Thus, if the question at issue is one of peace or war, and if the decision be cast in favor of war, the minority will neither obstruct the prosecution of the war, nor sit back with folded arms, but will energetically play the parts assigned to them in the great collective effort.

Further, since no political organization has attained to perfection, it will happen sometimes that the deliberative process may be distorted and may issue in a decision other than its true and proper working would have produced. Or a large proportion of the citizens may assert and believe that this is the case. Even then, the loyal citizen, recognizing the imperfection of the political organization as some-

thing to be remedied if possible, will loyally accept the decision; though he may endeavor to secure its reversal.

For the national decision reached by the process of national deliberation, effected through the accepted organization, is the expression of the will of the people. Or, at least, it is as nearly such an expression as the imperfect political organization can achieve. It is not permissible for any man to refuse obedience to the law because, as he asserts, it is not a true expression of the will of the people. For there is no other method of ascertaining that will than the one by which the decision has been reached and the law adopted.

The Perfected Nation

The ideal nation will, then, be organized, politically and socially, as a democracy. And its organization will be such as to secure the fullest possible collective deliberation upon each measure proposed to the legislature, a nation-wide process in which each citizen will take part, exercising upon his fellows an influence great in proportion to his knowledge, his intelligence, and his moral elevation. The decisions thus reached, promulgated as laws and declarations and orders to the citizens, will be accepted and respected by all of them; and each will play his part in giving effect to them according to his capacities and his status within the whole organization which is the nation.

Lastly, in the ideal nation each citizen will in some degree share in that large and enlightened patriotism which, as was said above, must furnish the main-spring and overruling motive of the national leaders. That is to say, each citizen will know the nation for what it is, will comprehend it as a thing of highest value for himself and for all his fellow citizens and their posterity, the vehicle of the traditions formed and preserved by the devoted efforts of innumerable ancestors, the only guarantee of the conditions of the good life for the living and for the millions of his fellow citizens yet unborn. He will esteem and love his nation, will jealously preserve its traditions, guard its resources, and cherish its honor and reputation; he will desire its perpetuation and perfection, realizing that its future welfare is committed to his hands; and he will know that its future is more precious than its present, since it will extend through a vastly greater period than the life of his own generation and may become more glorious, more productive of all that men rightly value, than any man now living can imagine or foretell.

CHAPTER TWO

THE VALUE OF NATIONHOOD

IN the foregoing chapter I have asserted the supreme value of nationhood, without pausing to take notice of the fact that, in so doing, I express an opinion which, though widely held, is by no means universally accepted. In this chapter I propose to state and examine very briefly some of these adverse opinions and the grounds on which it is sought to justify them.

The anti-nationalists range from those who look upon nations with a positive and keen aversion to those who regard their existence with a good-natured tolerance as something to be borne with and to be made the best of only until it can be cured, can be made to give place to some more ideal order. All such anti-nationalists belong to the great class of "superior persons"; persons who set themselves apart from and above the masses of their fellow men, and look down upon them with pity or contempt, as the common herd, a herd that is swayed by irrational prejudices and passions and, under the driving power of its primitive instincts, deludes itself with fancies to its own detriment and danger.

TYPES OF ANTI-NATIONALISTS

The Anarchists

We may roughly classify these "superior persons" in several large groups.

First and most radically anti-national are the philosophic anarchists, persons who, like the great Russian novelist, Tolstoi, assert that all government is bad. The most commonly adduced ground of this assertion is the further assertion that man is by nature good; and that, if only no compulsion of any kind be laid upon him, he will everywhere live happily and always act virtuously and wisely. This view may be or, rather, used to be supported by a fancy picture of the noble savage and of a mythical golden age "When wild in woods the noble savage ran." "Man was born free, yet everywhere he is in chains." So ran the magniloquent opening of Rousseau's treatise on the Social Contract. An immense influence in preparing both the French and the American revolutions of the eighteenth century is said to have been exerted by that much celebrated book.

The general acceptance of the theory of human evolution has rendered all such views untenable, has shown them to be fanciful creations of the mythopoeic faculty. We have now sufficient understanding of the evolutionary process to see that human nature is allied to that of the animals; that its finer potentialities rest upon and presuppose a basis of

instinctive tendencies, similar to those which guide and impel the animals in their struggle for existence; that in every man these tendencies need to be curbed, modified, and redirected by the pressure of the social traditions of an organized community, traditions that have been slowly built up in the light of the accumulated wisdom of the ages and by the self-sacrificing efforts of innumerable great men and women; of whom some have earned the admiration of the world for all time, but others in far greater numbers have gone down to nameless graves, unwept, unhonored, and unsung.

Further, it is now generally recognized that government of some sort is essential to the good life of men; that, though liberty is a great good, the liberty of the savage roaming at his own sweet will in a vast wilderness is not liberty of the kind that we can hope to achieve or should aspire to. We recognize that good government is essential to liberty. The reconciliation of efficient government with the maximum of liberty is the most difficult and persistent of all political problems. Yet the problem is not to be evaded by abolition of government. In any population dense enough to permit of the rudiments of civilization, government is an essential condition of liberty. And, with the rapidly increasing density of populations characteristic of the modern 'age, liberty of the individual can only be secured by increasing the range and scope of government.

In submitting to government, the individual sacrifices his liberty to some extent. Some philosophers endeavor to disguise the fact by a doctrine similar to that by aid of which the stoic philosophers sought to console themselves for the necessity (as they held) of believing in strict determination of all events, including human actions. The stoic philosopher said that the good man accepts the universe and wills all that happens in it, and then, though every event is strictly determined in a mechanical sequence of cause and effect, everything yet happens according to the will of the good man.

The political philosophers of whom I speak say that the good citizen accepts the State and, in one supreme act of volition, wills every action of the State and so makes it his own. There is a certain truth in this statement. When Socrates refused to avoid the death penalty imposed by the State, he may without sophistry be said to have accepted it. But to accept the inevitable is not to will it. And to recognize that government is a necessity, and therefore to accept it, is still to sacrifice one's liberty to the extent that government limits and directs the actions of the citizens. And this would remain true even under a government which the citizen regarded as a perfect government, whose every action he accepted as right and proper and, therefore, in a general sense willed by him.

All government involves restrictions of the liberty

of the citizen. But the better the government, the more are its restrictions confined to those kinds of action in respect of which liberty is of least value, and the less does it restrict liberty in those spheres in which the exercise of individual choice and judgment are of most value to the human spirit, the most essential to the full development of personality. Thus, as population has grown denser, the American citizen has resigned in some measure his liberty to fish and shoot and camp in the forests and to fell the timber when and where he pleases. But he has gained greater freedom to believe and assert and teach whatever may seem to him to be true and important. The increasing density of population does bring the need for more government, for increasing restriction of individual liberty of choice and action. The best government is that which demands of its citizens the least sacrifice of liberty consistent with civil order, and which restricts liberty in those spheres of action in which it is of less importance, for the sake of preserving it as completely as possible in those spheres in which it is of great importance.

The ideal of the anarchists belongs, then, to that great class of ideals which are incapable of being realized unless and until the nature of man, the in-born constitution of the whole human race, shall have undergone some profound change for the better. But, since all our increasing knowledge of biology in general and of human nature in particular converges

to prove the stability of the foundations of human nature, to show that, though not absolutely fixed, appreciable changes and especially improvements have been, and are likely to be, extremely slow, a matter of thousands of years rather than of decades or centuries, ideals of this class must be put aside as impracticable, as outside the sphere of practical politics.

The Anti-national Pacifist

A more modern and a more serious anti-national attitude is that which deprecates nationalism and patriotism on the ground that nations, so long as they exist, are liable to engage in war against one another. Those who urge this liability as a reason for decrying nationalism and deploring the existence of nations are persons acutely sensitive to the evils of warfare. They commonly assert that war is the greatest of all evils. Perhaps they are right. In order to justify nationalism and the existence of nations, we do not need to say a word in extenuation of the evils of war.

The writers of this group commonly support their position by attacking patriotism, the sentiment which leads us to attach high value to our nation, to regard it as worthy of our love and service and devotion. They assert that patriotism is irrational; and they call it a mere prejudice that distorts our judgment, a principle of injustice that leads us to prefer the good of one man to that of another, the good of our fellow

citizens to that of the citizens of other States. To this some of them add a more serious charge. They say that patriotism, a man's devotion to his own land and nation, inevitably involves hatred and contempt for other nations, a readiness to belittle, ill-treat or even destroy them, whenever opportunity arises, in order that his own nation may profit by their loss.

Others again say that, though we are apt to regard the division of the world into nations as a proper, natural, and enduring state of things, history gives no warrant for any such belief. They point to the fact that the wide diffusion of nationalism and the existence of well-developed nations are facts peculiar to quite modern times. And they suggest that they may well be merely of brief duration, may shortly give place to some other world-order, better suited to bring to higher development the finer potentialities of the human race.¹

Indictments of Nationalism Examined

Let us consider in turn these four indictments brought against nationalism, against nations and the sentiment of patriotism.

¹ Thus a distinguished philosopher wrote to me recently, "Nationalism may prove rather ephemeral. It is relatively recent, and in fact in its modern form a product of Napoleonic oppression. Its present excesses may disgust mankind with it, as the Thirty Years War sickened the world of the politics based on religion. On the whole I should prophesy that its place as a breeder of wars will be taken by class friction. Behind the class-wars loom race-wars, in which it must not be taken for granted that the European race will win."

Nationalism and War

Nations are said to be quarrelsome and jealous of their rights, their power, and their honor, and ever ready to go to war in defense of them; and, further, it is said that even those nations which are peaceably disposed are timid, apprehensive of aggression by other States, and therefore apt, for the sake of security, to maintain themselves in a state of preparedness for war; and that this involves in turn two great evils: first, the constant maintenance of armies, fleets, and other weapons becomes an immense economic drain and waste; for the nations inevitably are drawn into a competition in armaments, and each feels compelled to devote to them all of its wealth that is not required for the bare maintenance of its population above the level of poverty. Secondly, the existence of great armaments in the hands of nations adds greatly to the risk that they may go to war; for it involves the maintenance of (1) a large class of professional fighting men, many of whom can hardly fail to desire opportunities to put into effect the knowledge, the skill, the theories, and the organization to the development of which they have given their best energies; (2) a large class whose livelihood is derived from the manufacture of the enormously expensive apparatus of modern war and who see in war opportunities for profits greatly exceeding any they can hope for during peace.

It is necessary to admit that there is some sub-

stance to all of this indictment. But we must notice that all of it applies with equal force against every form of State. Nation-States are not more liable to these evils than States of other types. Many ardent advocates of democracy have asserted that democratically organized States are by their nature relatively immune to these evils. But any such assertion is not borne out by experience. The democracies of ancient Hellas waged frequent war, and may without gross exaggeration be said to have committed suicide thereby; for the loss of much of their best blood in warfare was a main factor in their destruction. Modern democracies have hitherto shown themselves hardly less foolish, less quarrelsome, less murderously and suicidally inclined. But, if we compare in this respect an ideal or enlightened autocracy (or oligarchy) with an ideal or enlightened democracy, we must admit that the advantage lies with the democratic State. Rulers of autocratic States, even though motivated solely by the desire for the welfare of the State and all its subjects in the present and the future, are more likely than an enlightened democracy to decide for war, when the question of peace or war arises. For in a democracy those who choose war have to bear the burdens and the suffering of war, the heat and toil, the wounds and death of the days and months of battle, and the impoverishment which in the modern age follows upon victory no less than upon defeat. And there are already

signs that the democracies have learnt a little wisdom from the Great War and are less disposed than formerly to beat the war drums.

The argument founded upon the horrors of war applies, then, against all States and less against democratic or Nation-States than against States of all other types. Those who urge this argument against nations are inconsistent, unless they are in principle thorough-going anarchists. And we have already seen that the anarchists' ideal is an impossible one, is beyond the range of practical politics.

The only form of State that would be immune from the liability to war would be the all-embracing World-State. And such a State is the substitute commonly offered as the ideal substitute for nations by those who decry nations yet realize the necessity of government. Now there is much to be said in favor of some form of World-State or super-State, which shall exercise some authority over nations, if only of a very narrowly prescribed kind designed for the reduction of the risks of war. But it cannot be too strongly asserted that any such World-State can only be formed by, and maintained as a federation of, preëxisting States. A World-State in which were concentrated all powers of government for the whole world would be too cumbrous to be workable. There is no rational hope for good government of the world along that line. For, in addition to the mere cumbrousness of the required bureaucracy, the world

under such an all-embracing government would suffer very serious deprivations, chiefly of two kinds. First, it would lack that variety of effort and experiment through which alone political progress is possible. Secondly, its citizens would be deprived of all those motives to energetic and public-spirited activity which spring from the sentiment of patriotism and which find indispensable stimulation in the honorable rivalries of nations and States.

At the present time a number of thinkers are advocating the supersession of all existing States by States of a new kind. They say that the territorial State has now become an anachronism, and that the existing territorial States should be replaced by a system of purely economic States, each world-wide in its scope, each governing all the processes of one great economic field, such as that of transport, mining, or the textile or steel industries, and each being a democratic organization of all the workers in its special economic field. There are many strong objections and immense difficulties in the way of any such world organization. In the present connection it may suffice to point out that it would not obviate the possibilities of war, but rather would entail very serious risks of war of a peculiarly horrible kind, a kind of civil war in which the dominant motive would be sheer greed, a warfare that would be wholly lacking in those partially redeeming features which national wars have never failed to display.

Is Patriotism Irrational?

Against those who decry patriotism as an irrational prejudice and a degrading principle of injustice the case is no less clear. The higher life of mankind can be maintained and promoted only by organized groups. Participation in the life of some continuing group, some group with which the individual identifies himself and is identified by the world, on whose behalf he is ready to exert himself to the utmost, whose honor and welfare he holds dear, such participation is a main condition of the good life. Without such participation in the life of one or many groups, large or small, few if any men will rise above a selfish and narrow mode of life.

In our modern civilization, almost every citizen participates in the life of many groups. He is a member of his family, of his township or city or other neighborhood community, of his college, his church, his sect, of his profession or trade union, of his political party, and often of some such gratuitous group as the Masons, the Elks, the Kiwanis, or the Rotarians. In these his natural craving for community life finds legitimate satisfactions; to each of them he feels a certain loyalty; for each he acquires a sentiment of attachment, pride, and devotion which inspires him to public-spirited effort, at the same time that he seeks personal distinction through the services he renders to the group.

Now it is the peculiar virtue of patriotism, the

sentiment of loyalty or devotion to the nation, that it may and should resume and comprise within itself all these minor loyalties. In exerting himself on behalf of any one of these minor groups, be it his family, his church, or any other, a man's activity is ennobled, is raised to a higher plane, when he realizes that each such group or institution is a part of the larger whole, the nation, and that by working for the good of the lesser group, striving to realize its ideals, to keep traditions pure and sweet, he is at the same time promoting the welfare of the nation to which also he is loyal and devoted. The larger loyalty seldom or never conflicts with the lesser loyalty, but, rather, harmonizing with it, gives it a greater vigor, a more enduring life, a wider significance, a higher value. The activities of the citizen thus harmonized, coordinated, and enriched by his patriotism, yield him a correspondingly deeper satisfaction, and develop in him that harmony of character which is the main condition of an effective life and of personal happiness and serenity. These virtues of group life, these indispensable moral values which we derive from it, and in the highest degree only when patriotism crowns and harmonizes our various minor loyalties, are ignored by those who decry patriotism and nationhood; equally by the socialistically inclined who advocate various administrative substitutes for national life, and by those extreme individualists who, like Herbert Spencer, regard the State as a necessary

evil and the nation as nothing more than a group of persons who have organized a police power among themselves merely for the sake of preventing undue interference of one man with another.

Patriotism and Chauvinism

Consider now the other closely allied charge against patriotism, namely, that it involves or promotes hatred and contempt against other nations and their citizens. This charge implies a confusion of thought; it confuses patriotism with chauvinism, a sentiment of a very different kind. While patriotism is, in the most general sense, love of one's own country, the land and the people, its traditions and institutions, chauvinism is suspicion, contempt, and hatred for other countries. Now to say that love is hatred is absurd. Patriotism no more implies chauvinism than a man's love for his wife and children implies, involves, or necessitates hatred of other women and other children. A short and vigorous answer to all such charges against patriotism was given by the late President Roosevelt, when he said that he would think no better of a man who loved not his own country more than other countries, than of a man who should love his own wife or mother no more than he loved the wives or mothers of other men. There is, however, a small kernel of truth in this charge against patriotism, namely, the fact that, in coarse and ignorant people, patriotism is apt to be

confused with and blended with chauvinism. A vulgar and stupid man is apt to feel that in decrying other countries, in ridiculing their customs and belittling their institutions, he is exalting his own nation. But the fact that in coarse and ignorant persons the sentiment of love, whether for nation or for family or for individuals, is apt to assume imperfect forms and to be marred by the development of sentiments of dislike, or contempt, or envy, for all outside the scope of his loyalty, that fact is no sufficient reason for decrying or attempting to eradicate such loyalties. The success of such a policy would result in a loveless world, a world containing only cold-hearted passionless individualists, moved to good only by such feeble motives as an abstract sense of duty can supply. In such a world human life would be a poor thing, without zest, warmth, or flavor.

The worth of human life and the betterment of human life depend not upon the cultivation of a sense of duty, but rather upon the deep and passionate devotion of men and women to persons and to interests and causes other than those which are purely individual.

Patriotism in its purer forms is an ennobling sentiment which the world cannot spare; and though there are other great and noble sentiments, such as the devotion to truth, to art, to religion, patriotism surpasses all these in one respect as a great agent in raising man above the brutes; namely, it is a senti-

ment that is readily inspired in all the citizens of a well-ordered nation, and which, therefore, not only is capable of ennobling all alike, but also binds them all together in the bonds of common sympathy and mutual affection. Where patriotism does not exist, it is necessary to create it; for it is an indispensable agent of the moral elevation of man; and perhaps those are right who assert that patriotism is a greater moral force than religion, a more indispensable condition of the good life of men in general. But fortunately there is no need to make any such comparison. There is, or need be, no conflict or rivalry between religion and patriotism; in almost all ages and nations religion and patriotism have worked harmoniously together. And it may be hoped and expected that in the future they will so work in every part of the world.¹

Is Nationalism Ephemeral?

The last of the four methods of belittling nationalism and throwing doubt on the value of nations is to assert that nationalism is a phenomenon of very recent development and that nations themselves, in any full sense of the word, have existed during only a brief period.

It is true that nationalism as a world-wide force is a modern development of the last half cen-

¹ I have discussed some aspects of the relations between religion and patriotism in my "Ethics and Some Modern World Problems", G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1924.

tury; and it is true that the democratic Nation-States of the present age are novelties, that none of them can claim to have existed as such over any long period of time. But to deduce from these facts that nationalism and nations are likely to prove ephemeral would be highly illogical. The conditions of their rise are in the main obvious. Both are the natural, the inevitable, consequence of the spread of education and of intelligent interest in political affairs among the masses of the peoples. Peoples of every race and of every color have reacted in the same way to the enlightenment brought by the spread of education, by the diffusion of the arts of reading, writing, and printing, and by the facilitation of intercourse and the free exchange of information between the peoples of the world.

A few peoples, of which the British were the foremost in time and the most successful in practice, slowly evolved the traditions and the organization of democratic government by means of representative institutions. Their descendants have carried them to all the many parts of the world in which they have settled, and in those areas, more especially in the United States of America, have self-consciously striven, not without success, to give them a more logical and perfect form. These examples have become known to other peoples; their success has inspired those other peoples to strive for similar institutions; and, as the facilitation of communications

and the diffusion of education have rapidly progressed during the nineteenth century, these examples have fired successively the remoter and the politically more backward peoples; until now the same cry goes up from every part of the world, alike from the vast areas and stagnant millions of Russia and China and India, from tiny islands in the far Pacific Ocean, and from the smaller peoples of Europe and Asia, peoples which, though long denied political independence, have nursed through centuries the memories of former statehood or some of the elements of nationhood. In these last especially the aspiration for complete nationhood is manifesting itself in loud demands that refuse to be stilled and, more importantly, in a rebirth of public-spirited activity such as only a hopeful patriotism can sustain.

The strength and universality of nationalism in the present age is then no mere fashion of the moment; it affords rather an inductive proof of a conclusion which we may reach deductively from the study of human nature and its most deep-lying tendencies.

Psychological Bases of Nationalism

Nationalism is the expression of two fundamental tendencies which, in varying degrees of strength, are common to all the races of mankind; and it is the only means of harmonizing and satisfying these two tendencies, the social tendency or impulse and the

impulse to self-assertion and mastery of circumstance. Under unfavorable social conditions these two great impulses may seriously conflict with one another; but, in a well-organized self-governing community all members of which are animated by a sentiment of loyalty to and pride in the community, they are reconciled, supporting one another, coöperating, and finding a common satisfaction in public service and communal achievement. And only in the community which is both a State and a nation can this reconcilment and coöperation attain the completest form and most effective expression. The one is the social tendency which in the animals we call the gregarious instinct; it impels men to associate with their fellows and to find a peculiarly great satisfaction in associating with those of like mind with themselves. The other is the tendency which in the animals is the mere instinct of self-display and assertion; it prompts men to find satisfaction, not only in their own excellencies and superiorities, but also in the excellencies and superiorities of whatever group or society whose life they may share.

Although nationalism has become the dominant and all-pervasive tendency that it now is only within the lifetime of men still young, it is, as I pointed out in the first chapter, a gross misreading of history to assert that it is a new or recent tendency. It has manifested itself under a multitude of forms, among the most diverse peoples, in all parts of the earth, and

at all times of which any record remains. The Old Testament is in the main the history of this tendency among the children of Israel. Even peoples so lacking in all the other elements of civilization as the black people of Australia displayed this nation-making tendency; they recognized certain great territorial groups of which the members, though living in small widely scattered communities, felt themselves to be bound together by some ties of affinity, of blood, speech, and custom. Among the red men of North America the same tendency achieved a higher degree of organization, as notably in the case of the federation of Iroquois tribes. Among the black peoples of Africa, nation-building reached a further stage. The Zulus, the Basutos, the Matabeele formed rudimentary nations, each conscious of itself, each inspiring some degree of pride and loyalty in its members, each striving to assert itself over against all other peoples. In the vast spaces of Asia many nations have begun to take shape; and the most successful of these have produced the civilizations of India, China, and Japan. In India the Hindus were an invading nation, keenly self-conscious and striving by means of the caste system to preserve their nationality and racial purity among the very diverse indigenous populations. The history of China is the history of the gradual expansion of an invading nation by successful assimilation of all the peoples of a vast and homogeneous territory. The Japanese

have enjoyed a high degree of nationhood from the earliest times of which any record remains.

The Two Great Enemies of Nationalism

At the dawn of European history we find the scene occupied by such loosely organized nations as the Hellenes, the Etruscans, the Celts, the Teutons. And the whole history of Europe has been the history of the struggle between the nation-making tendency or nationalism and certain conflicting influences. Of these influences two have played in Europe, as elsewhere also, the chief role, namely, migration and autocracy.

In the barbaric phase of their development, nations tended to be migratory. Having little in the way of cities, buildings, or other lasting productions to tie them to one spot, they were ever ready to migrate as a whole to some new region, impelled by an increasing pressure of population, or attracted by the advantages of some land more fruitful than their own and occupied by a less virile population. In some instances such migrations may have been successfully accomplished without loss of national unity. But more commonly the nation became divided, and its various parts became mingled with, and eventually blended with, the populations of the areas into which they moved. This involved a setback to the nation-building process and played into the hands of its second great enemy, autocracy or imperialism.

No true nation has ever been autocratically governed. Many nations have consented or chosen to be ruled by monarchs; but the monarch of a nation is the elected leader of his people, holding his authority by their consent and so long only as he gives satisfaction in the performance of his duties. But, where a nation becomes divided and scattered amongst alien populations, autocracy rears its head. Some chieftain, generally the leader of a conquering invading host, becomes an autocrat, owing to the necessity, felt by the invaders, of holding down by force the conquered population. The chieftain divides and rules; or rather, finding the population divided — the indigenes on the one hand, the invaders on the other — he is able to play off the one party against the other and so to build up for himself a position of absolute power, claiming to derive his authority from God alone. The greatest examples of such autocracies were, of course, the Roman Empire, the Roman Church, and the Byzantine Empire. Throughout a long period the success of these autocracies, especially the first, arrested the process of nation-building. The forces of nationalism seemed to slumber through centuries; though in reality they were never entirely subdued to acquiescence. On the decay of the Roman Empire ensued a period of chaos, the nation-building processes having been perverted, clogged, and arrested. Over this chaos the Roman Church was able to establish and maintain for a long

period a certain measure of autocratic rule. And, as monarchies and kingdoms began to take shape out of the chaos, the monarchs, accepting the Roman Empire as their model, sought with varying degrees of success to establish themselves as autocrats over the mixed populations which they claimed as subjects. After a period of some centuries, during which the mixed populations of the various kingdoms became blended, acquired some degree of homogeneity of blood, of language, and of custom, and became conscious of themselves as communities, the age of enlightenment dawned, the tremendous sanctions of the Roman Church lost their power to hold the peoples in political subservience, and the nation-building process went steadily forward in a tremendous struggle for national freedom against the autocracies of the Church, of emperors, and kings.

Modern nationalism is, then, no mere fashion peculiar to the present age, an ephemeral phenomenon that may be expected to subside like a summer storm. It is the culmination of an age-long world-wide tendency that is the true and natural expression in the political sphere of strong and ineradicable impulses of human nature. We may confidently assert that, if some great conqueror should subdue the whole earth, or if some band of pacifist enthusiasts should obtain world-wide influence, and if, in either way, all national boundaries and distinctions, all national governments and States, were abolished

and all national loyalties exterminated, nationalism would sooner or later reassert itself and march through seas of blood to the establishment of new nations.

Nationalism and Democracy

Many who are enthusiastic in the cause of democracy are cold or even hostile to nationalism. In this they are inconsistent, betraying a lack of understanding. The course of our discussion has prepared us to see that nationalism and political democracy cannot be separated. It cannot be said that the nationalistic principle and tendency are identical with the democratic principle and tendency. Yet each implies the other; each is the natural complement of the other; neither tendency can realize itself fully, can make any considerable progress towards its goal, without a corresponding realization of the other.

For, as we have seen, a true nation is a people so organized that all its members take part in its deliberations and decisions, are influenced by and in turn play their due part in the molding of public opinion, the final arbiter in all questions of public policy. That is to say, a people can advance beyond the first steps in the scale of nationhood only by achieving democratic organization.

Conversely, democratic organization can be effective in the control of all the affairs of large populations only when these are grouped as nations. For, as we have already seen, there is no form of government

other than national government that offers any prospect of combining efficiency with stability and social harmony. We have briefly examined and found to be impracticable the various alternatives proposed — namely, anarchy, the World-State, and government by and through occupational groups. The various forms of autocracy, pure or partial, are of course excluded from our discussion, as being essentially undemocratic. The only remaining form of democratic organization that could be said to be other than national would be one resembling that of the City-States of ancient Hellas. Such organization in a multitude of small independent groups would be utterly inadequate and impossible in the present age of dense population and highly developed means of communication.

It is, then, very necessary to insist strongly on the fact that to decry nationalism is to be an enemy of democracy. We must realize that the enthusiasm for democracy, which is so widely spread and has been so justly celebrated as the characteristic and most hopeful feature of the present age, is at the same time an enthusiasm for the national principle. Democracy and nationalism are one and inseparable. We cannot rationally hope to promote the one and retard the other. And all those many prophets of democracy who decry nationalism are but blind leaders of the blind, false voices crying in the wilderness of political fancies and empty phrases.

Nations, then, are indispensable means to the good life for the masses of mankind. The peculiar function of the nation, a function that can be performed by no other institution, is to diffuse among its members the ennobling influences of its great men and women, to embody these influences in the national traditions, and by so doing to transmit them undiminished, strengthened rather by that reverence which we naturally accord to the great things that come to us out of the past stamped with the approval of many generations. Thus preserved and strengthened, these accumulated influences bear with irresistible force upon successive generations, restraining their cruder impulses, shaping and harmonizing their moral sentiments into firm character, and binding them all together, the living, the dead, and the unborn, with one supremely powerful bond, the will to progress towards perfect nationhood.

CHAPTER THREE

INTERNATIONALISM

ARE we then condemned to look forward for all time to a world composed of mutually jealous and hostile nations preoccupied in peace with preparations for war and mutual destruction, each forever contending against all others for a larger share of the economic resources of the world, for greater power and military prestige, for relative increase of population as a basis for such power and for dominion over other peoples?

That would, in truth, be an intolerable prospect. And it is the contemplation of such a prospect that drives so many modern thinkers to decry and oppose nationalism, to demand the abolition of national boundaries, national distinctions, national loyalties, as irrational survivals from the ages of barbarism. Many of these opponents of nationalism proclaim themselves as exponents of internationalism, thus betraying a gross confusion of thought and language; for nationalism and internationalism are in no sense opposed to each other. This unfortunate confusion seems to have arisen through the adoption of the name "Internationale" as the official title of a group

of anti-nationalists. The illogical ground of the choice of this name seems to have been the fact that the persons concerned were unwilling citizens of many States and nations. Their ideal is more properly called "Cosmopolitanism."

Nationalism and true internationalism are, as President Roosevelt strongly insisted, complementary. Without strong and stable nations there can be no effective international law; and such law is the essence of internationalism. Without strongly organized self-confident nations, there can be no internationalism of any value; and without internationalism there can be no enduring prosperity for nations. For internationalism is the tendency for nations to enter into stable relations of friendly intercourse, honorable rivalry, and coöperation for the good ordering of the whole world, relations in which all their dealings with one another shall be governed by acknowledged principles of justice and by sentiments of mutual respect, with appreciation by each of the peculiarities of custom and institution and achievement of every other nation, with sympathy and good will for the peculiar difficulties of each and tolerance for its shortcomings. Under such a system of internationalism mankind may hope to make un-resting progress in all that constitutes civilization, a civilization common to all mankind, but taking on special features and excellencies in each nation, a civilization to which each nation will contribute ac-

according to its special gifts and resources and from which it will receive according to its needs.

No effective Internationalism without strong Nations

Without nations there can be no such internationalism and no progressive civilization throughout the world. Those who, while decrying nations and nationalism, call themselves "internationalists", are commonly advocates of some crazy scheme for destroying the existing nations and putting in their place some fanciful, vaguely conceived, and grandiloquently described World-State.

It cannot be too strongly urged that all such schemes are futile and doomed to produce nothing but disorder and relapse to barbarism. We cannot hope to achieve a tolerable world-order, if we set out by destroying whatever of orderly and stable organization we already possess. A World-State is only to be achieved by a gradual process of synthesis and federation of existing States. And the form of State best fitted to enter into any such world organization is the Nation-State. What powers should ultimately be entrusted to such a World-State, and how far we may hope to go in the immediate future towards the realization of such a World-State, these are difficult and disputable questions. But it may be confidently asserted, as the most general principle underlying such a World-State, that only so much authority should be vested in it as is necessary to

regulate the relations of the various Nation-States with one another; that each of the several nations should retain and develop, with the least possible interference from the World-State, its own political institutions, its own national life and culture.

Only when nationalism shall have run its full course and all the people of the world shall have formed, or have become incorporated in, Nation-States in whose life they are well content to participate — only then will a satisfactory World-State be possible.

At the present time nations are slow to commit themselves to any steps towards such world-wide federation. Within each nation are many citizens who remain very jealous for the sovereignty of their own Nation-State; they are averse, they say, from yielding up any part of that sovereignty, from rendering it in any way less than absolute. Yet this absolute sovereignty of States is a foolish shibboleth. Every civilized nation and every civilized man recognizes in some sense and degree the existence of international law. But to recognize international law as binding upon nations is to admit that the sovereignty of no nation is absolute; for, as with individuals, so with nations, to recognize and to submit to law is to resign the right to act purely independently, and without limitation of one's free will, in respect to those matters in which the law prescribes what shall or shall not be done.

We have discussed the question of the relation between law and liberty on a previous page in connection with the freedom of the individual. We saw that, in the democratic State, the citizen resigns his liberty, in respect to certain forms of action where liberty is least worth having, in order to ensure his liberty in those fields of activity where liberty is of the greatest importance. And the parallel between the individual citizen and the nation is here strict. As the citizen is to the law of his Nation-State, so is the nation to international law, the law of the world. For the sake of the general welfare and security in which all may share and from which all may benefit, the nations must resign their right, their liberty, to make aggressive war upon one another, to settle their disputes by force of arms, to trespass, to commit robbery and fraud upon one another.

In respect of two points there is at the present time defect in this parallelism or analogy between the relation of the citizen to domestic law and the relation of the nation to international law: first, the sanctions of international law are still rudimentary, ill-defined, and of uncertain application; secondly, whereas domestic law has been imposed upon individuals by authority of ancient growth, it is necessary that the more powerful nations shall voluntarily combine for the support of international law, if it is to have an authoritative influence upon international relations.

But no nation, and no individual who recognizes the world's need of international law for the regulation of the intercourse of nations with one another, should hesitate to approve the development of effective sanctions for international law, and of tribunals endowed with authority for the interpretation and administration of such law. To do so is to be illogical and timid; it is to fall short of confidence in the power of mankind to conduct its affairs rationally according to the dictates of justice.

It is true that we need to proceed circumspectly in organizing international tribunals and sanctions; that, in undertaking this task, in which we have no precedents to guide us, the nations need to give their most earnest efforts in far-sighted deliberation; that they should proceed tentatively, aiming at gradual development rather than at a manufacture. For, as with domestic law, so with international law: it is useless and worse than useless, it is harmful to that respect for law on which the validity of all law rests, to outrun the public opinion of the age. In the evolution of an effective system of international law, the law of the World-State, the opinions of the nations must be won over and traditions of confidence, obedience, and respect must be gradually and firmly established.

International Law Requires Force in the Background

It may be added that the effective sway of international law requires that somewhere in the back-

ground shall be a sufficient physical force capable of being brought, when necessary, to the support of the rulings of the tribunal charged with the interpretation of international law.¹ At the present time the greatest obstacle to the development of international order is the reluctance of men and nations to recognize this necessity. Many nations are willing to enter into treaties designed to render war less probable, treaties of arbitration or mutual assistance against aggression. At the moment of writing,² the European powers are debating these two alternative methods for the prevention of war. France and a group of lesser States would rely upon treaties of mutual defense against aggression. The Government of Great Britain insists that treaties of arbitration, treaties between all States, binding all alike to submit to arbitration all disputes between them, is the better way. Such treaties openly entered into and proclaimed to the world would form a body of international law.

¹ This essential requirement of international law was emphatically proclaimed on many occasions by the late President Roosevelt. He wrote, among many passages of similar import: "Peace treaties and arbitration treaties unbacked by force are not merely useless but mischievous in any serious crisis. . . . The policeman must be put back of the judge in international law, just as he is back of the judge in municipal law." The same truth was clearly recognized by the group of distinguished Americans, led by Chief Justice Taft, who during the Great War instituted the "League to enforce Peace." That league was dissolved on the formation of the League of Nations, under the mistaken belief that the latter was to function as a league to enforce peace. But the difficulties in the way of providing for such enforcement have led to the abandonment by the League of Nations of this, the most important, part of its functions.

² September, 1924.

*International Law must be interpreted by
an International Tribunal*

But every law is, and can only be, laid down in general terms. For its application to each particular case, it needs to be interpreted by a judicial tribunal; and the decision, the interpretation, of that tribunal needs to be supported by force. Without the sanction of force, there can be no guarantee that the decision of the tribunal, its interpretation of international law as applied to the particular case, shall be upheld. The provision of such power of enforcement remains the great problem of internationalism. This problem lies unsolved behind both the French and the British proposals. Until the imperative nature of this problem shall be freely recognized and substantial progress made towards its solution, international law will remain a precarious and very inadequate means to the preservation of world order and the maintenance of international justice.¹

Further, it is necessary to recognize that the establishment of international law on the basis of such effective sanctions will inevitably involve some corresponding restriction of the sovereignty of States. Such loss of absolute sovereignty is the price that

¹ In my "Ethics and Some Modern World Problems", I have proposed the exclusive use of air-force for this great end. I am inclined to believe that, unless air-force be superseded by some still more overwhelming mode of military attack, this plan will eventually be found indispensable for the prevention of war. Its realization would put in the hand of International Justice a sanction so formidable that the actual use of force would never be necessary.

must be paid for national security and international harmony. Just as the individual cannot be a member of any politically organized community, without sacrificing his right to absolute freedom of choice and action to the extent that he becomes liable to the compulsion of the laws of that community; so also States cannot form an orderly community of States, without sacrificing their sovereignty to the extent of rendering themselves liable to the compulsion of international law.

I insist tediously upon this point, because there are so many persons of good will, especially in America, who are ardent advocates of peace, of international law, of treaties of arbitration, etc., etc., but who have not yet brought themselves to admit that all these good things can become realities only at the cost of the sacrifice in some degree by each State of its absolute sovereignty. It is true of States, no less than of individuals, that you cannot both eat your cake and have it. The sooner this simple truth is frankly recognized by all good citizens of all States, the sooner shall we make progress towards a stable system of internationalism, a true and lasting world-order that will permit each nation to develop in peace and security its own peculiar contributions to civilization.

But, I repeat, it is only through the good will of powerful nations that such international order can be achieved; therefore, all those who seek to diminish

the strength and unity of the great nations in the supposed interest of internationalism are victims of their confused thinking. As was said by the late President Roosevelt, "A sane and strong nationalism is the only possible basis for internationalism."

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PROMISE OF NATIONHOOD IN THE UNITED STATES

THE population of the United States is commonly spoken of as the "American Nation." There is an American nation; and that nation comprises all the citizens of the United States, the living, the dead, and those still in the womb of the future. Perhaps no other proposition could find so universal and unquestioning acceptance among American citizens. Many of them do not hesitate to proclaim that theirs is the greatest and most perfect nation. In many respects this claim is well founded. In wealth, in prestige as a world-power, in industrial development and activity, in the wide diffusion among the citizens of material comforts and the prime conditions of the good life, the American nation marches in the van of progress, far ahead of all others. It may be justly claimed also that it far excels all others in the works of munificence and benevolence, both private and public, in the number and magnitude of its charitable gifts, of its philanthropic endowments, of its universities, colleges, and schools, in the amount of activity

devoted to enlightened effort for the improvement of the condition of the people.

Contemplating all these excellencies, the American citizen may well be filled with confidence and pride in his nation, and may find ample justification for the complacency expressed in the popular verdict that America is God's own country.

God's Own Country

The greatest of all the many critics of American institutions, Alexis de Tocqueville, declared that "the valley of the Mississippi is, upon the whole, the most magnificent dwelling place prepared by God for man's abode." Without disputing that verdict, we may safely extend it to the whole territory of the United States. For, while the valley of the Father of Waters, which forms the heart of America, is incomparably the most splendidly adapted for human development of all the great river valleys of the world, the regions which surround it, with their more varied climate and scenery and their wealth of natural resources, add that variety of conditions, of stimulus, and of opportunity which, perhaps, are essential to a many-sided national life of the richest and most perfect kind.

The vastness of the scale upon which Nature has lavished all these gifts is in itself an immense advantage to the nation. In earlier ages, men dwelling in areas so vast, among natural phenomena so stu-

pendous, were overawed by the powers of Nature and were content to bow down before them in supplication and adoration. And too often this attitude has degenerated into one of groveling superstition.¹ But the settlement of North America by Europeans was achieved during a period when science was throwing down the bars of ignorance and superstition, was increasing immeasurably man's power to cope with Nature, with her great distances, with her vast forces, her capricious moods, her malignant agencies. White men who came from Europe early in the seventeenth century were equipped with some of the most fundamental of the gifts of science; the art of navigation kept them in touch with the civilized world; firearms enabled them to subdue the wild beasts and the savage men that roamed the country without possessing it; the well-tempered axe and plough converted the pathless forests into smiling fields and orchards; the well-built wagon gave them mobility. But, above all, they came with knowledge and traditions of ordered citizenship, of freedom and virtue, of justice and public spirit, and with confidence in the power of plain men to form an orderly self-governing community. Therefore, the lavish scale of Nature, the immensity of her forces, instead of humbling and subduing the spirit of the settlers, stimulated their energies, their imagination, and their

¹ As pointed out by the historian, Thomas Buckle, in relation more especially to the peoples of Asia.

will. Their early successes, coinciding with further rapid development of the practical arts brought by the advance of science, created in them a supreme confidence in their power to complete the great work they had begun, the subjugation of a continent, the conversion of a vast wilderness into the seat of a mighty nation. They had abandoned the security, the comfort, the amenities of an ancient civilization, braving a thousand hardships and dangers, in the hope of securing freedom for plain living and high thinking. And, after a little while, it became obvious that they were to be rewarded with a political security that great empires might envy and riches far surpassing the gold of Eldorado and all the treasures of the fabled East. No wonder that they became of good cheer and multiplied exceedingly; that the humblest American soon disdained the customs and institutions of the Old World, held cheap the advantages of life amidst the culture and the limitations of Europe, and esteemed citizenship in God's own country as the highest privilege to which any man might aspire!

Racial Quality of the American Colonists

In addition to the advantages which we have enumerated, advantages of which they were keenly conscious, these people enjoyed yet another advantage, one which went far to justify the claim, sometimes expressed even at that early date, that they

were already a nation; an advantage of which they were hardly aware, to which few of them attached any importance, yet one which, perhaps, outweighed all those others, the immense advantages of the unrivaled physical conditions, of equipment with the solid foundations of the arts and sciences, of sound moral and political traditions.

This further advantage, which they enjoyed in high measure without appreciating its importance for national development, consisted in the fact that the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the thirteen States were the descendants of a people which, indubitably, was in the first rank of the populations of the earth in respect of its natural constitution or native endowment. They were for the most part descended from the British peoples; and those peoples, merging about that time to form a single nation, had proved the excellence of their fiber through many centuries of recorded history. These peoples were themselves the product of the blending, throughout more than a thousand years, of two of the great races of mankind, two races which had long been in the van of human progress and which had contributed more than any others to the sum of knowledge and tradition that we call civilization. These two races were the Mediterranean and the North European or Nordic races. The former was the olive-skinned, dark-eyed, dark-haired race that had played the leading part in developing the ancient

civilizations of the Mediterranean coast lands. The other was the tall, fair-haired, blue-eyed race which, swarming down from the lands about the Baltic sea, had overwhelmed the Roman Empire and established itself as a ruling class of land-owners in all the northern and western parts of Europe.

The Mediterranean race had proved itself to be of quick and fertile intellect and richly endowed with artistic capacities. The Nordic race, strengthened by many centuries of successful warfare against man and Nature in the rude and bracing Northlands of Europe, had acquired those qualities of physical and moral vigor which the ancient historian, Tacitus, so admiringly described, qualities which rendered them the dreaded foes of Julius Caesar and his legions and, eventually, the masters of the decaying Roman Empire.

The blending of these two stocks by free intermarriage throughout some thirty generations, within the highly favorable environment of the British Isles, had produced a stock second to none; a stock that had proved its physical and moral vigor on a thousand battle fields and had displayed a diversity of talent of the first order in almost every branch of human endeavor. And the process of blending, though it was by no means complete, had gone far. It had produced a substantial degree of similarity of constitution throughout the greater part of the British Isles; a similarity or homogeneity of constitution that

made it easy for the men of each part to understand, to sympathize with, and to come to lasting agreement with, the men of other parts of the island home.

It cannot be asserted that such homogeneity of constitution is an essential condition in any population that is to become a nation. But it may confidently be asserted that such likeness of inborn nature facilitates the path of development of national life; and that the lack of it puts in that path obstacles and difficulties the magnitude and subtle influence of which it is very difficult to estimate.

This biological or racial quality developed in the British Isles was the common inheritance of the populations of the thirteen colonies, when they set themselves to the task of building a new nation.

The Formal Institution of the Nation

When, after the successful rebellion against the British Crown, the nation was formally constituted, its position and achievement were already enviable, its promise and potency were magnificent.

Up to that time the colonists had been subjects of the King of Great Britain and Ireland. By the Declaration of Independence and by the adoption of the Constitution, the citizens of the United States declared to the world their desire to be a nation; they formally constituted a Nation-State.

The opportunity was unique in the history of the world. Such a conjunction of favoring conditions for

the birth and growth of a nation had never before occurred. And, so far as the human mind can foresee, such a favorable conjunction can never occur again. We, looking back upon that moment from the vantage ground of modern science, can clearly see the extraordinary, the unique, magnificence of that opportunity. We see it more clearly than could the men who were struggling a century and a half ago with the task of founding well and truly a nation yet to be. It may well seem to us that there was a land reserved by God for one great purpose, and a people developed and guided by Him to occupy that land in order that they might realize that purpose, namely, the development of a nation stronger, wiser, richer, more virtuous than any other, one destined to serve as a pattern to all the rest, and to lead mankind onward and upward towards the realization on earth of the City of God.

Among all the arguments by which men have sought to prove the reality of divine guidance in human affairs and the working out on earth of a divine purpose, I know of none which in cogency can compare with this one. And many an American citizen has accepted the conclusion of this argument, and has derived from it greater sense of responsibility and an increase of devotion to his nation, giving shape to his conviction in the doctrine of "manifest destiny." For nations as for individuals, great opportunities involve correspondingly great responsibilities.

And a nation so surpassingly endowed at its birth with all and more than the wisest mortal could have demanded for it, does indeed bear an immense responsibility; a proposition to which all must agree, both those who accept the theory of divine guidance, and those who see, in the circumstances of the birth of the American nation, merely a strangely favorable conjunction in time and place of purely natural events.

History Conspires with Geography

Even the course of history in Europe at that time seemed to conspire to favor and contribute towards the laying of the foundations. In Britain there was enough of democratic feeling and influence to prevent a whole-hearted national effort to suppress the rebellion of the colonies. Yet there was enough of monarchic autocracy to force the colonies to assert their independence in a war that welded them together with a sense of common danger, a common purpose, and the memory of a successful and united effort for an ideal end. At the same time, the military power of the British Crown was divided by its participation in European conflicts; and the great imperialistic powers of the European continent, which had asserted their claims to vast areas of the territory that was to be America, were already weakened by the spread of republican and democratic sentiment.

All things seemed, then, to conspire in promising

a new and higher development of the political and moral life of man. The civilization of Europe was old and weary, torn by ancient feuds and implacable hatreds, burdened and clogged by a thousand institutions and customs that were "part and parcel of the dreadful past." Of these burdens the institution of autocratic government, the evil heritage of the grandeur that was Rome, was the most ponderous, the most firmly rooted, and the central support of many others. In one sharp conflict the American colonies threw off this worst burden forever and combined, with a just confidence and a becoming sense of the significance of their action for the development of all mankind, to constitute themselves a new Nation, a Nation dedicated to promote the material and the spiritual welfare of all its citizens, and to be a beacon to those men of all other nations who were beginning to see in democratic institutions the one sure hope for the elevation of the human race. The Nation, unlike every other, was created by the deliberate design and self-conscious purpose of men, the men whose efforts had set free the colonies to form an independent political union and had created and solemnly proclaimed the Constitution of the new Nation.

The Pilgrim Fathers had of set purpose vowed themselves to the creation of "a civil body politic for our better ordering and preservation." But they could not foresee that the body politic was to be the

nucleus of a great nation, one that should overshadow all others in wealth and power. But when, after the lapse of two centuries, their descendants entered into a similar but vastly larger combination, they knew that the body politic they were forming could be nothing less than a nation; and though the immensity and magnificence of its territory were still unknown to them, the vast promise of the new Nation was not altogether hidden from their eyes.

In the period of a century and a quarter that has elapsed since this deliberate purposeful founding of the Nation, the work of nation-building has gone steadily forward, guided always by the conscious purpose of the great majority, the purpose of all the people to be a nation, to become increasingly a nation. Unforeseen difficulties and dangers have arisen to threaten the national unity. With increase of size and complexity of the community, the working of democratic institutions has not always proved as satisfactory as that of the New England township. But, on the whole, two purposes have been held fast and have prevailed against all adverse influences, the purpose to be a united Nation and the purpose that the Nation shall be a political and social democracy.

CHAPTER FIVE

PROGRESS TOWARDS NATIONHOOD

WE have now to inquire in how far the desire to be a nation has been realized; in what respects the people has achieved the attributes of a nation; in what, if any, it falls short; what progress the people has made in the scale of nationhood.

We must notice how this desire, from small beginnings, has grown stronger and more explicit, until it has become the declared purpose and will of the people, the firmly set resolution of the citizens of all the States. Also we must try to understand how it has been stimulated and its realization favored by certain influences; how other influences have worked against it.

The desire, the purpose to be a nation, was perhaps not clearly defined and fully and self-consciously accepted by all the colonists, not even by all those who played a prominent part in asserting the independence of the United States. The very name they adopted for the new State, the United States of America, implies this lack of a clear and unanimous purpose. It can hardly be doubted that, if this purpose had been clearly formulated and unanimously

accepted, the people would at once have boldly claimed some such designation as "The American Nation."¹ And the policy expressed in the Constitution implies that the nationalism of the people was still in the bud only.

For the accepted principle of the Constitution was to leave the sovereignty of each of the thirteen States as nearly complete as was consistent with their union for certain defined purposes that might best be achieved by action in common, especially defense against the aggression of European States. And a jealous solicitude for the sovereignty of each State seems to have animated the mass of its citizens. In the mind of the average citizen there seems to have been no clear vision of an American nation, no express purpose to create such a nation. The federation of the States was an arrangement accepted by them as

¹ This would have brought certain advantages which, after the lapse of a hundred years of nationhood, are beginning to be realized by the practice, both informal and official, of using the term "America" as synonymous with "the United States." One great drawback of the latter term is that it has no adjectival form, and that a citizen cannot say "I am a United Statesian", but must say "I am a citizen of the United States." The briefer but less accurate way of saying "I am an American" and of speaking of American institutions, American laws, officials, customs, ships, etc., etc., is inevitably coming more and more into vogue. For my part, I think this fashion is justifiable and likely to be accepted by the world. A waggish friend suggests that the United States, if only they lay in the southern half of the continent, might with advantage be called Samerica; but, as that is impossible, he suggests "Namerica" in deference to the susceptibility of South Americans.

It is perhaps worth while to point out that the citizen of the British Commonwealth suffers under a similar disability. He cannot find any simple and satisfactory designation. The Englishman will not be content to call himself a Briton. The word "Britisher" is the only one that covers the ground; but its slangy flavor is against it.

a political necessity, an evil to be endured and to be restricted to the smallest possible proportions.

The Purpose to be One Nation

On the other hand, some of the men who played the leading roles in the great drama of founding the new nation acted with prophetic insight and of set purpose. They foresaw and desired to create one united Nation-State, an American nation, that should take its place among the great States of the world. And with this clearly defined purpose they sought to consolidate the federation. They foresaw the risks of dissension and disruption that would arise from inevitable divergences of economic interests. And, fortunately, they were able to secure to the Federal State the control not only of the armed forces of the States, but also of certain other factors which later, by becoming of greatly increased importance, were to serve as very powerful bonds; more especially the sole right to impose a tariff of import duties on foreign trade, the right to levy taxes directly upon the citizens of all the States, Federal banking and postal systems, and, above all, the Federal Supreme Court of Justice, to which was assigned the power of deciding all disputed questions of jurisdiction and the function of interpreting the Constitution.

The nationhood of America was, then, not an assured and immediate consequence of the Federal Union. Any man who at the date of the Union

might have foretold the existence within one hundred years of a single well-compacted American Nation, occupying all the territory between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, must have been a bold prophet endowed with great vision. There was much to support a contrary forecast, a vision of the growth of the several colonies into as many distinct nations, by extension of their territories inland, by the increase of their populations, and by the differentiation of their economic interests, their laws, customs, and institutions.¹

¹ In this connection it is of interest to remember that de Tocqueville, writing in the third decade of the nineteenth century, expressed very decidedly the opinion that the power of the Federal Government was declining and that it was likely to continue to decline. "The Union," he wrote, "is a vast body which presents no definite object to patriotic feeling. . . . If the sovereignty of the Union were to engage in a struggle with that of the States at the present day, its defeat may be confidently predicted; and it is not probable that such a struggle would be seriously undertaken. As often as a steady resistance is offered to the Federal Government it will be found to yield." Again: "The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the States; and, in uniting together, they have not forfeited their nationality; nor have they been reduced to the condition of one and the same people. . . . It appears to me unquestionable, that if any portion of the Union seriously desired to separate itself from the other States, they would not be able, nor indeed would they attempt, to prevent it; and that the Union will last only as long as the States which compose it choose to continue members of the confederation." De Tocqueville regarded the people of each of the States as forming a distinct nation and as likely to continue; yet on reviewing the motives for the continuance of the Union, he was inclined to the opinion that they might continue to be sufficiently strong to preserve it.

"The temporal interests of all the several parts of the Union are intimately connected; and the same assertion holds true respecting those opinions and sentiments which may be termed the immaterial interests of men. . . . I will never admit that men constitute a social body, simply because they obey the same head and the same laws. Society can only exist when a great number of men consider a great number of things in the same point of view; when they hold the same opinions upon many subjects, and when the same occurrences suggest the same thoughts and impressions to their minds. The observer who examines the present condition of the United States upon this principle, will

Forces Making for Division

Such a forecast might have found solid support in an array of obvious facts and tendencies. There was the fact of wide differences between the northern and the southern States in respect of climate, soil, natural resources and products, in respect of the religion, antecedents, and sympathies of the founders of those States, as also of the aspirations and motives that had brought them to the New World. There was the fact that the most northerly and the southern

readily discover, that although the citizens are divided into twenty-four distinct sovereignties, they nevertheless constitute a single people; and he may perhaps be led to think that the state of the Anglo-American Union is more truly a state of society, than that of certain nations of Europe which live under the same legislation and the same prince."

There was perhaps some oscillation and uncertainty of opinion in the mind of the great Frenchman. For, after reviewing the many grounds that made probable the continuance of the Union, he wrote, "I confess that I am inclined to consider the fears [of increase of Federal authority] of a great number of Americans as purely imaginary; and far from participating in their dread of the consolidation of power in the hands of the Union, I think that the Federal Government is visibly losing strength." And again he wrote, "Whatever faith I may have in the perfectibility of man, until human nature is altered and men wholly transformed, I shall refuse to believe in the duration of a government which is called upon to hold together forty different peoples, disseminated over a territory equal to one half of Europe in extent. . . . I am strangely mistaken, if the Federal Government of the United States be not constantly losing strength, retiring gradually from public affairs, and narrowing its circle of action more and more. It is naturally feeble, but it now abandons even its pretensions to strength. On the other hand, I thought that I remarked a more lively sense of independence, and a more decided attachment to provincial government, in the States. . . . I do not foresee anything for the present which may be able to check this general impulse of public opinion: the causes in which it originated do not cease to operate with the same effect. The change will therefore go on, and it may be predicted that, unless some extraordinary event occurs, the Government of the Union will grow weaker and weaker every day. I think, however, that the period is still remote, at which the Federal Power will be entirely extinguished by its inability to protect itself and to maintain peace in the country."

States, all of which had been settled almost exclusively by colonists from England, were separated by States, notably the powerful State of New York, in which there was a very large proportion of colonists from other European peoples. And, above all, there was the extreme individualism of the people, an individualism which was presumably innate in the great majority of them; for only persons of independent disposition, of great initiative, and impatient of governmental control, were likely in those early days to emigrate to the colonies. In most of the colonists the individualist tendency had been increased by experience of the tyrannical ways of powerful centralized governments; and in all of them it was fostered by the freedom they enjoyed in their new homes, by the successful practice of local self-government, by their remoteness from the seats of political authority, and by the experience that in the colonies every man could acquire by his own exertions all the prime essentials of life, if only he were allowed a free hand, unfettered by governmental regulations. This natural individualism, thus favored by the memory of past evils endured and escaped from and fostered by the conditions of colonial life, became from an early date the leading characteristic of the American people; and it continued to be so for some generations. It showed itself not only in the spirit of self-reliance and initiative, which was so marked a feature of colonial life, but also, in its obverse aspect,

as an extreme jealousy of governmental control and an aversion from every innovation that might consolidate the strength and extend the range of centralized government.¹

Conflict of Two Tendencies

Thus the issue of American nationality lay open before the people of the thirteen States. Two paths of development lay before them from the first: on the one hand, the path leading to a single great Nation-State outranking all other States in power and influence; on the other hand, the path which, dividing into an indefinite number of divergent

¹ As Professor F. J. Turner has so well shown in his essays on "The Frontier in American History" (Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1920), the existence, until the later part of the nineteenth century, of a western frontier, upon and beyond which great areas of undeveloped territory called for and fostered those qualities to which the colonists had owed their success in the earlier days, did much to preserve the individualism of the people. "From the beginning of the settlement of America, the frontier regions have exercised a steady influence toward democracy. . . . Most important of all has been the fact that an area of free land has continually lain on the Western border of the settled area of the United States. Whenever social conditions tended to crystallize in the East, whenever capital tended to press upon labor or political restraint to impede the freedom of the mass, there was their gate of escape to the free conditions of the frontier. These free lands promoted individualism, economic equality, freedom to rise, democracy." Again he writes, "From the conditions of frontier life came intellectual traits of profound importance. The works of travelers along each frontier from colonial days onward describe certain common traits, and these traits have, while softening down, still persisted as survivals in the place of their origin, even when a higher social organization succeeded. The result is that to the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics; that coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that restless nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil, and with all that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom — these are traits of the frontier, or traits called out because of the existence of the frontier."

tracks, would have led to the existence of a number of distinct and independent nations. And, while the vast majority of the people were inclined to follow these divergent routes, only a few farseeing minds of large grasp deliberately strove to prevent that divergence and to create a single American Nation.

In the first days of the Republic, Washington had exerted his great influence to secure the permanence of the Union; the same goal had inspired the Federalists, who, led by Hamilton, did so much to set the institutions of the Federal Union upon the path leading to national unity. But, in the minds of the majority of the citizens, this goal was not clearly defined and accepted, and the purpose to attain it was only slowly taking shape.

This division of opinion and of purpose¹ led to a prolonged conflict which reached its culmination and what seems like a final settlement through the Civil War of North against South. For that, rather than the issue of slavery in the United States, was the great question then decided. Was the people to become many nations or to remain one, — one great, firmly knit nation? Such unity was the goal which the great heart of Lincoln felt to be so supremely desirable that he was ready to send his fellow citizens to slaughter one another by thousands in that great

¹ So clearly reflected in the passages from de Tocqueville's great book cited on an earlier page.

cause. By common consent Lincoln's greatness was chiefly manifested in the steadfastness of his purpose to preserve the unity of the Nation.

This great issue, which was the most fundamental cause of the division of opinions and parties throughout the period between the Revolution and the Civil War, still in some sense is a living issue. It has been sometimes described in terms rather different from those here employed. De Tocqueville represented it as a struggle between the aristocratic and the democratic principles, between the tendency to limit and the tendency to extend the power of the people. "When," he wrote, "the War of Independence was terminated, and the foundations of the new Government were to be laid down, the nation was divided between two opinions, — two opinions which are as old as the world, and which are perpetually to be met with under all the forms and all the names which have ever obtained in free communities, — the one tending to limit, the other to extend indefinitely, the power of the people. The party which desired to limit the power of the people endeavored to apply its doctrines more especially to the Constitution of the Union, whence it derived its name of *Federal*. The other party, which affected to be more exclusively attached to the cause of liberty, took that of *Republican*. America is the land of democracy, and the Federalists were always in a minority; but they reckoned on their side almost all the great men who

had been called forth by the War of Independence, and their moral influence was very considerable. . . . The accession of the Federalists to power was, in my opinion, one of the most fortunate incidents which accompanied the formation of the great American Union; they resisted the inevitable propensities of their age and of the country. . . . A considerable number of their principles were in point of fact embodied in the political creed of their opponents; and the Federal Constitution, which subsists at the present day, is a lasting monument of their patriotism and their wisdom.”

While accepting the verdict of de Tocqueville as to the value of the services and principles of the Federalists, we may question whether he has rightly described the question at issue between them and their opponents as that of limiting or extending the power of the people. The States were fundamentally democratic; political power lay for good and all in the hands of the people; and no party, probably no individual, seriously proposed to deprive them of it.¹

¹ It is no doubt true that many of the Federalists feared that the democracy, if it should assert itself as a popular party ranged against the leaders who had guided it through the revolutionary crisis, might subvert the Constitution and break up the Union. And there was some justification for such fears. But even if it be true, as has been often asserted, that Hamilton and some of his fellow Federalists hoped to restore some form of monarchy in America, it is no doubt true also that they aimed at a constitutional monarchy reigning over a people which, through a representative parliament, would be the sovereign power, a monarchy such as was fast developing in Great Britain. To this day it remains an open question whether such constitutional monarchy does not constitute a natural, advantageous, and prolonged phase in the development of a true or democratic nation, and whether, therefore, if Hamilton's alleged

The issue between the Federalists and their opponents was rather whether the States, recently united, were to become one nation or many, a baker's dozen or more of independent States, each going its own way, developing its own peculiar institutions, until it should become a distinctive Nation-State; States which would inevitably develop conflicting interests and eventually become involved in a system of alliances and a succession of wars against one another, after the pattern of the European States. Perhaps not all of the Federalists envisaged the issue in this way. And, certainly, few if any of their opponents accepted or proclaimed the ideal of many distinct and independent Nation-States. The purpose of the popular party was primarily to secure the individual citizen against the encroachments of governmental power; and they felt that the power of a strong Federal State was more to be feared than that of any one of the existing States, in the affairs of which each citizen might hope to make his voice heard with effective weight.

The difference between the two parties arose from the acceptance of a political philosophy by the one, the philosophy of nationalism, and the lack of all political philosophy in the other. In the popular party the place of a political philosophy was occupied by the habit of preference for individualistic action, design had been successful, the development of the American Nation might not have proceeded more smoothly than it has. Possibly, for example, the Nation might have been spared the loss of so much of its best blood in the Civil War.

and by an aversion from all that tended to interfere with the extreme liberty of the individual. They had no organic conception or ideal of a nation, a people organized for collective deliberation, for national decision and national volition. They saw only that government involves certain annoyances and imposes certain restrictions. They believed that their welfare could be sufficiently secured by individual effort and the friendly offices of each man to his neighbor; and they asked of government nothing more than the administration of a simple code of justice enforced by a police power retained within the hands of each local community. They were a people the vast majority of whom won their bread from the land by the labor of their own hands; and they could not conceive how the increasing density of population, the increasing complexity of social organization, the multiplication and wider organization of economic interests, must inevitably demand the increase of governmental functions. Further, the successful alliance of the States in the War of Independence, and later the happy issue of the War of 1812, led them to believe that by similar voluntary alliance they could make themselves secure against all foreign interference.

When we have regard to the great predominance of this individualistic temper, and to the fact that the Federalist party, after a brief exercise of power, yielded place to the opposing party, whose guiding

principles were the maintenance of the rights of the several States, the jealous restriction of Federal authority, and the extreme of liberty for the individual, it may seem surprising that the unity of the American Nation has been secured. And it will seem the more surprising, if we fix our attention upon the physical and social conditions that pointed towards the path of independent development of the thirteen States.

Each of the States lay upon or near the Atlantic seaboard. But behind them lay a vast *hinterland*; and most of the States were disposed to claim for themselves due shares of this *hinterland*.

Again, while the New England States were from the outset extremely democratic, the southern States showed in their organizations a large influence of the aristocratic institutions of the mother country. And the climate and soil of New England favored the perfection of the democratic organization; while those of the southern States, being suitable to the operation of large estates or plantations, tended to perpetuate the aristocratic influence by placing it in the hands of large land-owners.

Thirdly, the introduction of many African slaves into the southern States had accentuated both their aristocratic tendency and the divergence of their economic interests from those of the northern States.

It was these three strong influences that created the antagonism between North and South and led to

the Civil War. And it seems safe to say that, if Abraham Lincoln had never been born or had died before middle age, these influences would have resulted in the development of at least two independent nations in the area that is now America. And it is probable that, if the northern and the southern States had thus grouped themselves into two nations, neither of them would have been strong enough to retain the allegiance of the new States of the Far West.

Influences that Preserved the Unity

When we ask, "What unifying influences have overcome those that threatened disruption of the young nation?" we must give due weight to the large-minded and far-sighted men who, like Washington, Hamilton, Clay, Webster, and Lincoln, worked with clear purpose for the preservation of the single united Nation. But we must also recognize that, just as a train of circumstances conjoined most wonderfully in time and place to favor the founding of the Nation, so also the preservation of its unity was favored by a similar conjunction hardly less wonderful.

Let us briefly consider these circumstances that have so powerfully contributed to the preservation of national unity.

Favoring Geographical Conditions

First, the geographical conditions have played a fundamental part. If the States of the Atlantic sea-

board had been in easy and natural continuity with their *hinterlands*; if, for example, each one had been founded about the mouth of a large river that flowed eastward across wide plains or through long valleys, that geographical formation would have encouraged each one to spread its influence and political control far into the interior, to become more independent economically, and less ready to admit any diminution of its sovereignty.

But, most fortunately, the territories of all the thirteen States were shut off from the interior by a mountain barrier, from which descended rivers of modest size only. And, when the pioneers from the several States began to stream over this mountain barrier, they found themselves in a vast territory, the geographical features of which made irresistibly against disunion. For this territory, the basin of the Mississippi, was a natural unity. It was a unity in that it was a single great fertile plain, marked by no such differences of its parts as would lead to wide diversities of economic interests. But equally important was the fact that the great river and its branches flow in the main from north to south. For the river and its branches inevitably became, in the early days of settlement, the great highways of trade and communications of all kinds. And the development of steam navigation early in the nineteenth century facilitated this use of the rivers and greatly augmented their binding influence between North and South.

Within this vast territory, naturally a unit for all human purposes, streams of migrants from the northern States met, crossed, and mingled with similar streams from the South. They met and blended. They blended by intermarriage; and by reciprocal influence they blended their somewhat diverse traditions, customs, and institutions. The New Englander brought his schoolhouse, his puritanism, his town meeting, his traditions of local democratic government and of keen trading. The Southerner brought a more wide-ranging pioneer spirit, the tradition of leadership and the practice of farming on a large scale.

For a time it must have seemed that a new danger threatened the unity of the nation, the danger that the people of the Mississippi basin should separate themselves as a distinct nation from the States of the Atlantic coast land. The danger was real. The inland settlers did feel themselves to be apart and distinct from the seaboard people. They showed impatience of the control which the latter's higher economic and political organization disposed them to exercise. And to the present day there survives something of this tendency to conflict of economic and political interests between the eastern States and the Middle West.

Two great influences have prevented this regionalism from becoming so accentuated as to disrupt the nation. Of these, the one is geographic, the other was created by human art.

The coast lands of the Pacific slope are curiously like the Atlantic coast lands in their relation to the Mississippi valley. Like them they are separated from it by a long mountain barrier; and, by their climate and proximity to a great ocean, they induce in their inhabitants a sense of being somewhat apart from the people of the interior, a more outward-looking attitude that comes with more diversified contacts and wider economic interests.

Hardly two generations after the pioneers of the eastern States had begun to penetrate and to settle that "most magnificent dwelling-place prepared by God for man's abode", the most enterprising of their descendants had pushed on beyond the Rocky Mountains to yet another land of promise, one which in many respects surpassed all others, one the inhabitants of which have not ceased, and perhaps never will cease, to proclaim the true earthly paradise, a land beyond compare in its beauty and in its wealth of natural resources, of all that can stimulate and foster the higher faculties of mankind. And the people who occupied this land bore within them, as it were, the concentrated essence of all that was most truly American. They were sons and daughters of a Nation already great; they came from every part of America and mingled and blended the traditions of every part; and they themselves were the product of a selective process which had begun in the primeval forests of Northern Europe, and had been con-

tinued and repeated at every stage of their westward march throughout two thousand years.

These western coast lands, then, forming one continuous broad strip, have, by their distinctness from the Mississippi region and by their affinities with the eastern coast lands, served to counteract the natural tendency for the latter two to become estranged through excessive differentiation of interests. They have formed a third great region, widely different from both the others yet bound equally to both by a thousand invisible ties of kinship, memory, and interest. The two coast lands ranging north and south along the borders of the central plain have served as a bracket that holds the whole firmly together.

Binding Effect of the Railways

But this binding influence of the Pacific coast lands was only rendered possible by the second great influence, due to the development of the mechanical arts. As at the birth of the nation, so again during its adolescence, the unifying influence of a most fortunate spatial or geographic conjunction was at the most appropriate moment reënforced by an equally fortunate historical sequence.

It is safe to say that if, throughout the nineteenth century, the people of America had continued to rely upon those means of land communication which had remained substantially unchanged throughout all the centuries since civilizations first began to be formed,

the unity of the Nation could not have been preserved. The immense distance between the Atlantic and the Pacific coast lands would have rendered them strangers to one another. The lines of communication, of intercourse and trade, of the central area, continuing to follow the course of the great river and its branches, would have become set north and south; and the mountain barriers between it and the two coast areas would have become the frontiers of distinct nations.

At the critical moment an obscure engineer in the far homeland invented the railway locomotive; it was a new means of transport that was to affect profoundly the course of human history. Of all its immense influence no part has been of greater beneficence than that which it played in preserving and strengthening the unity of the American Nation. The railroad was just that thing which at that time America most needed.¹ Fifty years earlier, it would have been of comparatively small influence. Fifty years later, it would have come too late. But it came at the critical moment; and the Americans, provided with immense masses of coal and iron, seized eagerly upon it and within a few years bound together their whole vast and splendid territory with a network of steel bands. Especially important was the influence

¹ In the introduction of railway transportation we may, perhaps, see that "extraordinary event" which de Tocqueville, without being able to foresee its nature, yet correctly described as necessary to the preservation of the Union.

of the railways in binding together the three main natural areas, the Mississippi valley and the coast lands, east and west. The great river had set the lines of commerce north and south; sea transport had facilitated and fostered intercourse between North and South in both the coast lands. The railways traversed the mountain barriers, bridged the rivers, and set a new vast stream of trade and human intercourse flowing east and west. They alone rendered possible the organization of industry and trade on the continental scale.

Without the timely development of the railway system, supplemented by the parallel system of telegraph wires, there would inevitably have arisen a regionalism that would have threatened very seriously the unity of the nation. The intercourse between the three great natural regions would have remained very limited; their economic interests would have diverged more widely: for each of them would have been driven to attempt to make itself as nearly as possible self-sufficing in all the arts of production and manufacture. And, in the sphere of foreign politics, the special interests and relations of the Pacific Coast States would have become accentuated: those States would have relied chiefly upon the sea routes of the Pacific Ocean for communication with the outer world.

It is possible also that, without the binding influence of the railroads, the States bordering on the

Great Lakes would have increasingly sought their trade outlets through artificial waterways leading from the lakes to the Atlantic, and that in this way they would have separated themselves from the rest of the Mississippi valley, as a fourth great region of distinctive type and special interests.

It is not improbable that this regionalism might have become increasingly accentuated, until the Federal bonds should have become incapable of holding together the four great regions. Four federations might well have been formed by the splitting of the young Nation; and four distinct nations would have begun to take shape.

Without railroads, the mere sending of representatives to Congress from the Far West would have been a very difficult task, and the representatives so sent would have found it impossible to keep in close touch with their constituents. And the regional tendency would have been further accentuated by a development of the last fifty years that was not foreseen by the founding Fathers; namely, the partial segregation of new immigrants, according to the nationalities and races from which they derived. To illustrate the point, I need refer only to the Germans of Wisconsin, the Scandinavians of Minnesota, and the aggregations of Poles and Finns in certain regions. In the absence of railroads, the tendency shown by these segregated immigrants to perpetuate the languages, customs, and traditions of their homelands,

and to exert differentiating effects upon the general culture and mode of life of each area in which they settled — this tendency would have realized itself more effectively and might in itself have sufficed to produce regional differentiations dangerous to the unity of the nation.

The railroad and the telegraph have in very great measure prevented the realization of these tendencies. The regional tendencies have not been entirely abolished; but they have been effectively counterbalanced, so that their threat to the national unity now seems almost negligibly small.

Binding Influence of the Frontier

Perhaps we should recognize as a third great binding influence, equal in importance to the two we have discussed, the existence of the western frontier throughout the formative period. We have seen how the frontier encouraged an extreme individualism of character that made for impatience with governmental control, and to that extent made against the unity of the Nation. But the frontier exerted also a different, an opposite, influence. Says Professor Turner, in the work already cited, "The effect of the Indian frontier as a consolidating agent in our history is important. From the close of the seventeenth century various intercolonial congresses have been called to treat with the Indians and establish common measures of defense. Particularism was strongest

in colonies with no Indian frontier. This frontier stretched along the western border like a cord of union. The Indian was a common danger demanding united action. Most celebrated of these conferences was the Albany Congress of 1754, called to treat with the Six Nations and to consider plans of union. Even a cursory reading of the plan proposed by the congress reveals the importance of the frontier. The powers of the general council and the officers were, chiefly, the determination of peace and war with the Indians, the regulation of Indian trade, the purchase of Indian lands, and the creation and government of new settlements as a security against the Indians. It is evident that the unifying tendencies of the Revolutionary period were facilitated by the previous co-operation in the regulation of the frontier."

Again the same author writes, "The legislation which most developed the powers of the national government, and played the largest part in its activity, was conditioned on the frontier. . . . The growth of Nationalism and the evolution of American political institutions were dependent on the advance of the frontier. . . . The public domain has been a force of profound importance in the nationalization and development of the government. The effects of the struggle of the landed and the landless States, and of the Ordinance of 1787, need no discussion. Administratively, the frontier called out some of the highest and most vitalizing activities of the general

government. The purchase of Louisiana was, perhaps, the constitutional turning point in the history of the Republic, inasmuch as it afforded both a new area for national legislation and the occasion of the downfall of the policy of strict construction. But the purchase of Louisiana was called out by frontier needs and demands. As frontier States accrued to the Union the national power grew. . . . It is safe to say that the legislation with regard to land, tariff, and internal improvements — the American system of the nationalizing Whig party — was conditioned on frontier ideas and needs. But it was not merely in legislative action that the frontier worked against the sectionalism of the coast. The economic and social characteristics of the frontier worked against sectionalism. The men of the frontier had closer resemblances to the middle region than to either of the other sections. . . . It was this nationalizing tendency of the West that transformed the democracy of Jefferson into the national republicanism of Monroe and the democracy of Andrew Jackson.

“The West of the War of 1812, the West of Clay and Benton and Harrison and Andrew Jackson, shut off by the Middle States and the mountains from the coast sections, had a solidarity of its own with national tendencies. On the tide of the Father of Waters, North and South met and mingled into a nation. Interstate migration went steadily on — a process of cross-fertilization of ideas and institutions.

The fierce struggle of the sections over slavery on the western frontier does not diminish the truth of this statement; it proves the truth of it. Slavery was a sectional trait that would not down, but in the West it could not remain sectional. It was the greatest of frontiersmen who declared, 'I believe this Government can not endure permanently half slave and half free. It will become all of one thing or all of the other.' Nothing works for nationalism like intercourse within the nation. Mobility of population is death to localism, and the western frontier worked irresistibly in unsettling population. The effect reached back from the frontier and affected profoundly the Atlantic Coast and even the Old World."

Desire for Unity Predominates

In insisting upon the happy influence of the geographic features of the country, and upon that of the railroads, in binding together the parts of the Nation, I do not mean to imply that the continued unity of the Nation is the result merely of such natural factors and of the new art of transportation. The Civil War showed that the desire for unity was predominant; that a great part of the people, under the leadership of large-minded statesmen, were ready to make great sacrifices for the preservation of the national unity. And this desire to be one Nation, though it found its clearest and strongest expression in the victory of the Federal party over the Southern

Confederation, has been, without doubt, both before and since the Civil War, an influence of prime importance. Without the influence of this desire, guiding the decisions of statesmen and widely diffused through the mass of the people, the other factors, the geographic and the economic, would not have sufficed. Conversely, without those favoring conditions, the desire, however strong and widely diffused, might have failed to achieve its object; and, without those conditions, the desire would have been less widely and less strongly felt.

Industrial Specialization as a Binding Influence

We have still to notice among the influences that have made for national unity one of the first importance. The operation of trade routes and of communications of all kinds on the continental scale has been of vast importance. But more important still is the specialization of the functions of many areas and groups. Some specialization of occupations has always and everywhere been determined by natural peculiarities of the groups concerned; but more importantly by the natural products and resources peculiar to each region. In a primitive state of society, when man's wants are few and simple, such specialization of occupations tends to divide group from group, rather than to bind them together. The herdsmen on the plains, the fisherfolk on the coasts, the hunters in the forests, live their own lives and manage

to supply by their own exertions the few wants of which they are conscious. And, when at a later stage there grows up the practice of bartering the products of one area for those of another, such primitive commerce does little to produce harmony or unity among the groups concerned.

But, under the conditions of modern civilization, wants have multiplied immensely; and in America, owing to the development of the great natural wealth of the country and the nation-wide attainment of a very high standard of living, wants are more numerous, more diverse, more urgent, and more widely felt than in any other country. In every part of the country a very large proportion of the citizens, including all the most influential of them, expect to receive, weekly and daily, their news, their magazines, their fruit, their meat and a hundred delicacies, their oil and gasoline, their coal, their lumber, their cotton and woolen and leather goods. And each of these and of many other things is obtained and prepared in parts of the country in which nature and the course of economic development have conspired to specialize the industry required, the groups of workers of special skill and knowledge.

If, for any reason — a frost in Florida, a strike in the anthracite fields, or what not — the supply of any one of a multitude of such goods is curtailed, almost at once men and women in every part of the country suffer discomfort and are made acutely aware

of their dependence upon the activities of their fellow citizens in remote regions.

In modern times this reciprocal dependence of each citizen upon his fellows for the supply of his daily wants has become a factor more powerful than any other in holding men together in the bonds of mutual service. And in America its influence is greater than elsewhere; because the immense variety and abundance of her natural resources and the vigorous development of all the mechanic arts render her self-supplying in respect of almost every product of nature and of art that meets a widely felt want. The imposition of a tariff on the products of foreign industry has no doubt had considerable influence in accentuating this condition of reciprocal dependence of all parts of the nation, and at the same time it has tended to make the nation economically independent of all other peoples.

Large Scale of Industrial Operations Makes for Unity

Yet another economic feature, more developed in America than elsewhere, increases the strength of these economic bonds, namely, the large scale of many of the industrial and financial corporations. If each such body had been confined in its operations to the area of one State, or to one of the natural regions, that would have tended to separate the States or the regions. The predominance in all parts of the country of one language, the fundamental sameness of the

laws of all the States, the vast scale of the natural features and wealth of the country, and the bold enterprise of the citizens, these influences have conspired to encourage the growth of corporations that extend their operations into every part of the country, each forming its own network of agencies; and the sum of these many invisible bonds of economic interest, though they are the product and the expression of the highly developed individualism, constitute a binding force no less strong than the network of steel rails.

“Broadcasting” Makes for Unity

In the last few years yet another great unifying agency has come into existence and nation-wide operation, namely, the art of “radio”, especially the wireless transmission of sound over vast spaces. The political philosophers of antiquity held that a democratic State never could or should comprise more citizens than can assemble in one place to take part in public discussion by word of mouth. In the modern age this narrow limitation has been transcended owing to the invention of printing and of the various means of rapid communication over great distances. Of all these means, radio transmission or broadcasting of the human voice promises to be of the first importance. Already it enables millions of citizens scattered throughout all parts of America to listen to the words of national leaders, to overhear the de-

liberations of Congress and of national conventions, and even to catch something of the waves of emotional excitement, of enthusiasm, of harmony, of conflict, that sweep over such assemblies.

It is still too early to foresee all the political effects of this new art. But it seems clear that it will prove to be a new unifying agency, facilitating the processes of national deliberation and contributing importantly to that like-mindedness which is the very essence of nationhood. To cite only a single instance of such operation—it seems clear that, in a far higher degree than the press, the practice of broadcasting all interesting and important news must promote and secure, in undisputed supremacy throughout all parts of the nation, the use of the English tongue.

Direct and Indirect Unifying Influence

The reader should notice that, of the great unifying influences discussed above, some operate indirectly by intensifying and rendering more nearly unanimous the conscious desire and will of the American people to be one nation. Of this kind were the blood kinship of the great majority of Americans in the colonial days and indeed until after the middle of the nineteenth century. And closely connected with this and of similar influence was their sense of common nationality, their inheritance of common traditions and customs and institutions, moral and

political. Of similar influence was the need of the several States for mutual support against all foreign aggression and in the actual conduct of war, both war against the Indians and war against foreign powers.

But many of the other unifying influences have operated more directly in securing the unity of the nation, and have worked only secondarily, obscurely and subconsciously, to strengthen the desire for unity. Such have been in the main the geographical and economic factors we have noticed. For example, the differentiation and specialization of the economic functions of the various regions has gradually set up between them relations of reciprocal service and dependence which are assumed without reflection by the mass of the citizens. These, however, would immediately make their importance felt and would be consciously asserted as effective grounds for strengthening the will for unity, if that unity were seriously threatened. If, for example, any one State, or a group of States, should propose to erect around itself a tariff wall, such a proposal would immediately call out in all the other States a resentment and an intensified and more vividly conscious desire for unity; for it would be felt as a threat to the unity of the Nation. And, in the more reflective minds, the latent threat to unity that lies in the possible — and in the, to some extent, actual — development of sectionalism and regionalism has been a constant

ground of anxiety, keeping alert and active their desire for unity, and leading them to exert through the press and in other ways an influence that counteracts any such tendencies.

These directly operative factors of unity constitute, as it were, a potential reserve of force making for unity; for if and when the importance of them for the national welfare is brought home to the minds of the mass of the citizens, their desire for continued unity will be greatly strengthened.

It seems probable that in the near future yet another great binding influence will take shape in the economic sphere; namely, the production of electrical power in a few centers and its distribution from each such center throughout areas that will include many States, areas which, having their limits determined primarily by economic considerations, will cut across or ignore the political boundaries of the several States. Some such schemes are now in hand; and it is already urged that all such schemes should be coördinated in one vast nation-wide system. It is obvious that, in so far as progress may be made in this direction, a new economic bond of great strength will be forged.

It is to be desired that, without and before the rise of any serious threat, the mass of the people shall become clearly conscious of the benefits that accrue to the whole Nation from the intimate unity of all its parts. For such clear consciousness will strengthen

in all the citizens the desire and the will to maintain the national unity. In this connection an important distinction must be observed between national unity and the centralization of legislative and executive powers. Such centralization does constitute a strong national bond; and some degree of it is essential to national unity. But it does not follow that further centralization is desirable, nor even that some degree of decentralization may not be advantageous. There is a danger lest some considerable number of citizens, judging that the centralization of governmental powers has already been carried too far, dreading further centralization, and failing to distinguish clearly between national unity and such centralization, may be weakened in their desire for unity and moved to advocate courses that might lead to disruption. The aversion from all that tends to increase the power of the Federal State is still strong in many minds; it is shown, I think, in the dislike of all foreign entanglements, of all that involves the Nation in responsibilities towards other States and peoples. This dislike is strongest, perhaps, in the Middle West; and it is commonly regarded as due to the remoteness of the citizens of that region from Europe, their self-centered isolation and lack of contacts with foreign peoples. But it is more than a mere indifference to the affairs of the outer world, such as naturally results from relative isolation and lack of knowledge and intercourse. It is also a positive aversion

grounded largely upon the jealousy of the Federal power and the perception that all conduct of relations with foreign States tends to the increase of that power and the further subordination of the several States of the Union.

This is only one instance and illustration of a general truth, namely, that the extreme of liberty cannot be combined with government, that all political life involves a compromise between the two most fundamental needs of civilized man, the need of liberty and the need of ordered government; that the great problem of politics is to effect the best possible compromise, securing as much liberty to the individual as is consistent with orderly government.

In view of what has been said above as to the binding influence of the railways, it is noteworthy that this influence is now entering upon a new and higher phase. Hitherto the whole country has been served by a large number of independent railway companies in competition with one another, the development of each being regulated only by the desire of its directors to render it commercially prosperous. Of recent years it has become obvious that the country's needs can no longer be efficiently met by the unregulated competition of these rival companies. Individualism and capitalism are strong enough to prevent all attempts to put the railways into the exclusive possession and control of the State or Federal governments. But it seems that the

Federal Government will succeed in imposing upon the railways the practice of coöperation with a view to economical and efficient service of the whole country. As a very competent student of the subject has lately written: "The national government is concerned not only in regulating individual railways, but is also and equally — even more, indeed — intent on assuring adequate carrying service to the whole country and to all the people."¹ The same writer points out that "the policy of the Transportation Act of 1920 was this: American railways are a system — a national system — of transportation for a people and therefore must be considered as such a system, interrelated, interdependent and mutually sustaining." It is obvious that in so far as this policy may be successfully carried through, the binding power of the railways, already so great, will be considerably increased.

¹ A. G. Beveridge, "The State of the Nation", Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1924.

CHAPTER SIX

THE DISRUPTING INFLUENCES

THE binding power of the influences briefly touched on in the preceding chapter is very great. It has sufficed to overcome and neutralize the separating influences, the vastness of the spaces, the great natural barriers, the differences of climate and of natural resources in the various areas, the resulting divergences of economic and political interests.

When the one great split between North and South had been arrested by the victory in the Civil War of the party of Union, and when the bitterness of defeat and of the reconstruction period began to die away, the ideal of one united Nation was loyally accepted by the South. At that time it may well have seemed to any thinker, endeavoring to pierce the mists that enshroud the future course of history, that the unity of the American Nation was established for all time; that Daniel Webster's magnificent phrase, "Liberty and Union, one and inseparable, now and forever", was no longer a battle cry, but had become rather a statement of accomplished fact.

The subsequent course of development of the American Nation has revealed a danger to its unity

that was unforeseen and hardly foreseeable fifty years ago.

The danger I speak of has arisen from the enormous increase of immigration and from the change of type of the immigrants. After the first period of settlement, during which the thirteen colonies took shape in the Atlantic coast lands, there followed a period in which immigration was relatively scanty. During this period the predominance of English speech, laws, customs, and institutions, and especially the English and Scottish forms of the Protestant religion, became firmly established in all parts of the country, and were carried forward by the pioneers into the new settlements. It was a period of consolidation, of the laying down of the main lines along which the civilization of America was to go forward. There was no nation; but the foundations were well laid for the nation that was to be built upon them.

Of the relatively few immigrants of this period, a period prolonged until after the formal constitution of the Nation, the greater number came from the British Isles. Especially there came the Scotch-Irish, Scots who had dwelt for some generations in the north of Ireland, and whose hardy and enterprising nature led them to play a leading part in the exploration and settlement of the western wilderness. These immigrants, closely allied by race and traditions with the descendants of the original colonists, were readily

absorbed into the life of the colonies and of the several States.

About the middle of the nineteenth century began a fuller stream of immigration of a somewhat different character. It included large numbers from the western part of the European continent, notably Germans. But most of these were racially akin to the existing population and were led to seek new homes in America by sympathy with her institutions and ideals and, like the first colonists, by the desire to escape, from the restrictions imposed by monarchical governments, into a land of freedom and democracy. Hence these also were not felt by Americans of the older stock to be likely to form enduring groups of alien speech and custom that might prove to be discordant notes in the national harmony, already a swelling chorus. In the main, this optimistic view has proved to be just.

The New Immigration

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a new and portentous phenomenon began to attract attention. Owing to the immensely increased facilities of ocean transport, the stream of immigration swelled to a flood surpassing in volume all the great migrations of which history and archeology have any record. And this flooding tide set, not mainly along the course of the old streams, but from a new source. The old streams from northern and western Europe

contributed little to the new flood. It came in the main from the south and east of Europe and even from Asia. Its units were members of a hundred different races and nationalities, speaking as many different tongues, practicing a great variety of customs, cherishing as many traditions, new and strange to America.

A few voices began to murmur that this "new immigration" was a doubtful blessing, that it might prove the source of national weakness and disharmony. But during the earlier period the tradition of the open door to all comers had become well established; and the mass of the people, absorbed in the task of building up the material prosperity of a continent, were content to accept the tradition. It was consonant with that spirit of smiling tolerance, of universal benevolence, and of general optimism which the material prosperity of the country had diffused widely and raised to a high level, until it had become the most striking characteristic of the people in all parts of America.

Those who paid any considered attention to the protests, protests that found expression in several short-lived popular agitations, such as that of the "know-nothing party" and of the American Protection Association, fell for the most part into two groups. There was the humanitarian group which answered all such protests by asserting the equality of all men and the equal right of all to share in the

resources and advantages of all the world, America included. This party was greatly strengthened by the conflict over the status of the Afro-Americans. The Negroes had been brought into the country in great numbers as slaves, at a time at which they were generally regarded by their white masters as less than human. It might have been expected that the history of other States founded upon slave labor would have given pause to the statesmen of America and have led them to forbid from the outset the introduction of the Negroes as slaves. And it is probable that, if the importation of them as slaves had been prohibited, they would not have been allowed to come in large numbers as free men to become citizens and the ancestors of the Americans of the future. For the Americans of that time were of a stock, the North European stock, which never has consented to or approved of intermarriage with the Negro race.

From an early date, some influential voices had been raised, even in the southern States, in warning against the institution of Negro slavery. But in the main the extreme differences of race and culture between the Americans and their black slaves gave predominance to the view that the Negroes were destined forever to serve the white men. And, when the American citizen proclaimed his acceptance of the great principles enunciated by the founding Fathers, he held them to be true of all white men, but hardly of the Negro. When he asserted that all men are

created equal with equal rights to liberty, justice, and the pursuit of happiness, he seems to have excluded, by a subconscious mental process, all men not of the white or European race. Thus, through lack of clear thinking, was created the most difficult of all the national problems of America, one which, by causing the Civil War of North against South, came near to destroying the unity of the Nation. For, when the black slaves had multiplied and had become a distinctive section of the population, many millions in number, it became clear to some minds that, as Lincoln said, the nation could not long endure, part slave and part free. Those who, like Lincoln, were primarily concerned for the unity of the Nation, were supported by a multitude who, like John Brown and Lloyd Garrison, were moved by a passionate pity for the slaves and by the desire to abolish what seemed to them, and what indeed was, a state of affairs intolerable among a humane and Christian people. And it was inevitable that in their passionate indignation against the cruelties of slavery, this multitude, especially men and women of the northern States who had little acquaintance with the Negro people, should react against the theory that the Negro was less than human, by espousing blindly the opposite theory, namely, that the difference between him and the white man consisted only in the color of his skin. In those days there was no science of anthropology to reveal that in the most intimate

structure and composition of his tissues, of his blood and bone and brain, the Negro was distinct and different.

And so the party that triumphantly asserted the unity of the Nation was led to assert also the literal accuracy of the phrase "all men are created equal", to interpret it as meaning that, for all the purposes of nation-building, all men are essentially alike. They assumed and loudly asserted that all the mental and moral differences between one man and another are purely and wholly the effects of differences of circumstance and opportunity, of environment. And they confidently assumed that all such differences, all inferiorities, physical, moral, or intellectual, are capable of being wiped out in the course of a few years, if only all men be given freedom and opportunity and the elevating influences of a humanely organized society. It was a noble and inspiring belief, and one that suited well with the humanity and optimism, the somewhat uncritical idealism, and the profound belief in their own powers, so characteristic of the American people.

The Theory of Americanization

When, then, the tides of the "new immigration" began to set in a steady flood upon the shores of America, any misgivings of the more critically minded were overwhelmed by this generally diffused belief in the power of American institutions to raise and to

transform into typical American citizens within a brief period every individual and every group that might land upon these hospitable shores. This belief, which has been aptly called "the Americanization theory", has continued to be widely entertained and to be the basis of much energetic social effort in the cause of that like-mindedness, some measure of which is rightly seen to be essential to the unity of the Nation.

As the tide continued to flow, it began to become obvious that the ideal of complete Americanization of all immigrants is an impossible one. The typical American, the perfect type of Americanism, remains the frontiersman, such as Daniel Boone, a man of all-round capacity, hopeful, bold, enterprising, adventurous, even fierce, yet gentle, self-controlled, cautious, sedate and imperturbable under all conceivable circumstances, and always public-spirited, pious, and patriotic. Such men, their virtues disguised under their business suits, and their rifles and axes exchanged for portable typewriters, still abound in America. But it has become clear that neither a few years nor yet a few generations of the marvelous climate and moral atmosphere of America will change into such a type every petty trader from the Levantine bazaar, nor even every sturdy peasant from the valley of the Danube, or the Mediterranean coast lands, or the Balkans. Such men, such typical Americans, though in part made by their environ-

ment, are in large part born. They owe their qualities chiefly to thousands of years of the severest selective and tempering process to which any part of the human race has been subjected.¹ Races that have lived for many generations in the shade of the date palm and the banana tree do not produce such men.

The Theory of the Melting-Pot

About the end of the nineteenth century there came into vogue, in consequence of some dawning recognition of the strong and all-pervading influence of heredity, the strangely obstinate persistence of racial peculiarities, a rather different theory with which to still all doubts, all anxieties, aroused by the spectacle of the still waxing flood, a flood reaching the proportions of more than a million a year, a veritable *Völker-Wanderung*.

This was the theory of "the melting-pot." It was said that all the newcomers must soon inevitably blend by intermarriage with the older American stock to form a new American race. And, with the optimism and idealism so characteristic of America, it was confidently assumed that this "new race" would be superior to all others, a race of supermen and superwomen.² The enthusiasts for the melting-pot

¹ In this connection the reader should consult Dr. Ellsworth Huntington's "Character of Races" (Scribner's, 1924) where he will find much interesting discussion of the slow processes by which the racial qualities of man have been molded.

² The term, "the melting-pot", seems to have come into vogue through the popularity of the play of that name by Israel Zangwill. In it the theory

theory did not stop to ask whether, when we attempt to forecast the issue of the blending process which the melting-pot is to effect, biology and history can afford any guidance. They simply assumed the truth of the view which they naturally desired to believe, namely, that the biological result of the blending process must be good. If they had consulted history, they would have found some reason to believe that fine races, on mixing their blood too freely with that of other stocks, have been very seriously deteriorated and thrown backward many steps in the scale of civilization; notably the Arabs of North Africa, the Portuguese, the Hindu conquerors of India, and the Spanish conquerors of South and Central America.¹

If these enthusiasts had sought counsel from biology, they would have learnt that the crossing of highly specialized fine strains does not always give good results. Rather they would have found that, in the case of the fine breeds of domestic animals, the excellence of each breed can be preserved only by

was expressed in the uncritically optimistic form in which it was popularly accepted. The hero exclaims "America is God's Crucible, the great melting pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming! . . . German and Frenchman, Irishman and English, Jews and Russians, into the Crucible with you all! God is making the American! . . . The real American has not yet arrived. He is only in the Crucible. I tell you — he will be the fusion of all races, perhaps the coming superman." The critical reader of this eloquent exhortation is tempted to ask, — Why did the gifted author forget to mention the poor African? And, why, Oh! why, did he permit his hero to use that fateful word "perhaps"?

¹ On this topic see my "Ethics and Some Modern World Problems", G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1924.

continued and rigid selection; and that, when such breeds are crossed with one another or with less fine breeds, the consequence commonly is that their distinguishing excellencies are lost, and that the blended progeny reverts to a type resembling the common wild stocks from which the specialized fine breeds have been developed by careful breeding through many generations; further, that, though in some cases this reverted stock shows abundant vigor and fertility, in other cases the result is less happy, the stock showing disharmonies of constitution, among which a lack of fertility is one of the most significant.

Now the so-called races of men are in many ways analogous to the breeds of domesticated animals. And we ought at least to pay some attention to this analogy, when we attempt to forecast the results of blendings of human stocks.

The teaching of history and of biology should, then, give us pause, should lead the American people to consider critically the theory of the melting-pot. We cannot be content to assume offhand that the melting-pot will inevitably produce a new race of supermen. It is quite possible that it may rather produce a race of submen. It is even probable that the issue of the melting-pot process might be a stock of good all-round quality and vigor, yet one lacking in the highly specialized excellencies that characterize the various European peoples and enable them to

produce men of genius, leaders in all the fields of human endeavor. And the American, inspecting critically the masses of his fellow countrymen, might even fancy that he can already detect some such effect of the early stages of the blending process, the replacement of the specialized types of Europe by a more generalized type.

It is, of course, possible that this blended stock, even though it may lack some of the specialized excellencies of the parent stocks, may nevertheless be most excellent material for the building of the Nation. But this cannot be guaranteed by science; nor can it be foretold as the most probable result.

Some such doubts and anxieties made themselves heard as the flood of immigrants continued to increase during the early years of the twentieth century. They have led, among the instructed classes, to a more cautious attitude and an increased sense of responsibility for the future of the Nation. The old tradition of a hearty American welcome to the discontented of every region of the earth has become "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought"; it has become increasingly clear that America cannot afford to accept blindly either the Americanization theory or the melting-pot theory; that there is somewhere a limit to the number of immigrants of alien stocks and traditions that America can absorb without grave danger to her institutions, her ideals, and perhaps her racial quality and national unity.

*The Substitution of the American Stock
by Immigrants of Alien Races*

To all this must be added yet another disturbing consideration. About the beginning of the twentieth century, General F. A. Walker, an accomplished economist and statistician, arrayed a mass of evidence pointing to the view that the process of immigration, at least from the earlier part of the nineteenth century onward, tended not, as had been commonly assumed, merely to increase the population, but rather to replace the old American stock by the descendants of the newcomers, to destroy the old stock and to put in its place a new one of different ancestry, untried under American conditions. The process, he indicated, seemed to work simply, but subtly and continuously. The essence of it seemed to be that the older stock, in face of the economic competition of the newcomers, who for the most part were accustomed to a standard of living far below that which had become general in America, restricted its birth rate; while the immigrants continued to breed freely and naturally. This demonstration made it seem that neither the Americanization theory, nor the melting-pot theory, was tenable; that rather, if the tides of immigration should continue to flow along the new channels, the older American stock was destined to disappear completely, leaving few if any traces upon the new race that is being formed by the blending

process, a process that undoubtedly is going on and will in some degree continue.

It seems highly probable that General Walker's conclusion in respect to the newcomers holds good also of the Negroes, that in the long run they also must be regarded, not merely as an addition of so many millions to the population formed by the descendants of the colonial Americans, but rather as so many millions of black and colored folk substituted for a like number of white Americans who would have been born if the Negroes had never been brought into the country.

Economic Aspects of the New Immigration

Beside the more far-sighted and reflective party, which, as we have seen, began by offering a welcome to all comers in a spirit of humanitarian enthusiasm, and which has now passed to a more sober and critical revision of its views, there has existed another and larger mass which has paid almost exclusive regard to the economic aspects and consequences of immigration. Here also a change of view has taken place.

Throughout her history America has enjoyed a singular privilege, namely, the possibility open to the great majority of her citizens of a rising standard of life and of raising themselves in the social scale. These possibilities, which have been the ground of so much of the widely diffused happiness and con-

tentment of the people, have been largely due to immigration on a large scale.

It has been generally true that, in the course of one or two generations, the immigrant families, or all their more vigorous and capable members, rise in the social scale and secure for themselves economic possibilities which lead them to refuse the rougher and less well-paid forms of labor. These forms of labor are left to the families of more recent immigration.

This state of affairs seemed for a long time very acceptable to the mass of the people. And it was acceptable also from the point of view of the employer of labor, especially the employer on the large scale. And, as American industries expanded, the demand for a large supply of cheap immigrant labor became more explicit and urgent; for its economic advantages became more obvious, in proportion as the immigrants came increasingly from countries of lower standards of living. But here also there was a fly in the honey pot, thorns among the economic roses. And, as time went on and the flood of emigrants continued to swell, the thorns began to overshadow the roses. It began to be evident that, with so great an influx of cheap laborers, the established Americans could no longer rise upon their shoulders, could no longer simply enjoy the economic benefit of having all forms of coarse hard labor performed by adults bred, born, and reared at the expense of other peoples. The presence of so many

newcomers competing for livelihoods in all forms of industry was seen to be a danger to the standard of living of the American workers in all the lower ranges of industrial activity.

Some of the employers of labor also began to question whether it might not in the end be more profitable to depend for their labor supply upon the home product, rather than upon perpetually renewed swarms of immigrants. For many of these had proved to be mere birds of passage; others had evinced an unwelcome tendency to imitate the American workers in forming combinations to force up the rate of wages; and the enormous "turn over", due to the unstable migratory nature of so much of the labor supply, had become a serious problem, involving much economic waste.

These economic considerations have, perhaps, been of wider influence than those of the kind previously mentioned, in producing a change of popular opinion and attitude towards the immigration process.

Reversal of Immigration Policy

However that may be, all these considerations together have effected a complete reversal of the national attitude towards immigration. The older attitude was in the main one of rough but hearty welcome. "Let them all come. Here is a vast continent; it needs only the labor of many hands in order that it shall yield up its riches abundantly; the more

rapidly its resources are developed, the richer and happier we all shall be." In some such phrases the old attitude might be expressed.

The new attitude is more thoughtful and less carelessly confident. The vast areas of fertile soil are settled; the forests, a vast store of wealth, are shriveling; the more valuable minerals no longer can be gathered on the surface of the ground. Oil still gushes from a multitude of wells, a liquid stream of ready-made wealth poured into the hands of the Nation; but it will not flow forever. Economic competition grows keener. The Nation begins to distinguish between economic development of its natural resources and the enormously wasteful exploitation of them that has long been the accepted practice. The cost of living has risen rapidly. It begins to seem that even the food supplies cannot be indefinitely augmented to meet the needs of a continually increasing population.¹ On every hand the law of diminishing returns begins to operate; and America appears no longer as the land flowing with milk and honey and every form of natural wealth and luxury. Rather, America begins faintly to resemble in some respects the crowded countries of Europe from which her people have escaped, with their laborious peasants, their wan-faced patient industrial masses, their necessity for thrift, their conflicts of classes.

¹ A recently published book ("Mankind at the Crossroads" by Professor E. M. East) has shown us how serious this aspect of the population problem threatens to become in the near future.

In short, America is within sight of the time when she will cease to be the land of unlimited opportunities for all; the land where a man, if he does not secure a fortune or a competence by middle life and does not raise his family a few rungs on the social ladder, regards himself as a failure. The time is at hand when the vast majority of her people must, like the people of other lands, be content to do their duty in that station of life to which they have been born. And the people may well ask whether it is wise to hasten the coming of that time by inviting an unlimited number of immigrants to share their still great advantages, to curtail the share of each American citizen in those advantages, and in the course of a few generations to supplant their stock, which has proved its competence, by stocks which in the main have remained through all the centuries of European civilization at or near the bottom of the social scale.¹

This change, this reversal of attitude towards immigration, has been very rapid. If, twenty years ago, any far-sighted man advocated, as some few did, a policy of immigration restriction, he was liable to be laughed at. If his anxieties were not pooh-poohed, he was likely to be told that unlimited immigration

¹ It is to be remembered that the colonial stock was in the main a fair sample of the British people, including a due proportion of the old-established middle class and the yeomanry of England, and perhaps a more than fair proportion of men of exceptional vigor and initiative. The same claim cannot be made for the "New Immigration"; it would seem to be in the main a selected class, selected by its lack of economic success in the homelands, rather than by its pioneering qualities.

was a firmly fixed tradition of America and that it was as futile as it was foolish to attempt to stem the tide.

But in the years since the Great War the new attitude has very rapidly defined itself and found expression in national legislation for severe restriction of immigration, and for restoration in some degree of a balance between the numbers of immigrants of the old and of the new types.

There are many who regret this change, regarding it as a falling away from an idealistic tradition. There are others who rejoice to see that, in a matter which gravely affects the life of the nation, the nation is capable of arriving rapidly at a decision, by an overwhelming majority that leaves no room for doubting the authority of the national voice. These, however much they may regret the change, regard it as necessary, or at least as one justified by every consideration of national prudence and dictated imperatively by the sense of responsibility to the nation's future. And there seems to be little room for doubt that this new attitude will continue to prevail.

The immigration problem first came into prominence in the States of the Pacific coast. For there all the dangers and drawbacks that may result from unrestricted immigration threatened to develop in a peculiarly acute form. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, now reduced to nothingness as a bar-

rier to migration, loom China and Japan and India, with eight hundred million inhabitants, densely crowded and accustomed through long ages, so far as the masses were concerned, to a very low standard of living. And these peoples of Asia, as soon as ocean transport on a large scale had become cheap and easy, showed strongly the tendency to emigrate to America in great numbers. Most of these immigrants naturally settled in the western paradise. And it soon became evident to all the citizens of those States that a comparatively short period of such immigration, unrestricted in any way, would plant many millions of the yellow and brown men among them, would inevitably lead to social conflicts, debase greatly their standard of living, transform completely the type of their civilization, and, in all probability, lead in no long time to the complete supplanting of the white by the yellow race in those most delectable areas of the earth.

The people of those western States were quick to resent these threats and to insist upon rigid restriction of such immigration. At first they found little sympathy, little appreciation of their point of view, among their fellow citizens of the eastern States. And for a time this difference of view seemed to threaten the unity of the nation. For the Westerners were ready to fight and secede rather than submit to have their restrictive measures overruled and forbidden by the Federal Government.

Fortunately, the change of attitude of the whole nation, brought about by the considerations I have so briefly described, came in time to prevent this disruptive tendency from doing irreparable damage. And, when, in the year 1924, the Senate of the United States bluntly replied to a veiled threat of the Japanese Ambassador by imposing almost complete exclusion of Japanese immigrants, there were many patriotic Americans who regretted the bluntness of the manner, but few who did not openly or in their hearts agree that the passing of some such measure was a duty which the American people owed to their posterity.

It would seem, then, that this great threat to the welfare and unity of the nation, implied in the old policy of unrestricted immigration, has been finally reduced to very small proportions. However, the prevalence of that policy throughout a long period has given rise to certain national problems which I shall discuss in the following chapter. Here it is necessary to touch as lightly as may be upon another feature of present-day America which may contain the possibility of future discord and even prove a threat to the national unity.

Religious Differences

The early colonists were for the most part protestants of the protestants. In one or two of the colonies were a few Roman Catholics. The smallness of their

numbers and the fact that they were in the main of the same nationality as their fellow colonists rendered it easy to maintain relations of mutual tolerance and respect. But, with the "new immigration" and even earlier in the nineteenth century, came many Roman and Greek Catholics; and their numbers have increased until the former alone can claim to be twenty million strong. These Catholic Americans have had among their leaders, even among their prelates, men wise enough to see and publicly to assert that the Roman Church in America must forego all political aspirations and activities. And many Catholics have proved themselves to be patriotic citizens of the highest type. In view of these facts it seems clear that adhesion to the Roman Church is not incompatible with good citizenship and that the presence of many millions of Catholic citizens does not necessarily forebode future conflict. Especially, it may be hoped that the wider diffusion of culture among all classes will prevent the rise of any spirit of religious intolerance.

And yet there are signs of widespread uneasiness, to which the history of the Roman Church affords perhaps some color and justification. It is pointed out that that Church has never resigned its claim to temporal power, and has never ceased to exercise it save where it has been compelled to do so. And it is said that some of the public declarations of Catholic prelates in America contain cautiously worded in-

dications that that claim is latent only. Others go further and assert that the Roman Church looks to the conversion of America to a predominance of Catholicism as a sure means to the restoration of its temporal power throughout the world. It is difficult to estimate the amount of truth in this view; but it may perhaps be admitted that, if the old policy of unrestricted immigration had continued to prevail for an indefinite period, the proportion of Catholics would have steadily increased, and that such increase might have reached a point where the pretensions of the Roman Church would have escaped the control of the wiser leaders and have provoked a conflict of a serious kind.

The new policy of immigration restriction promises to prevent any such disastrous development. And it is rendered further improbable by the fact that the Catholic immigrants have been of many different races and nationalities and, in spite of some local segregation, have become widely diffused through all parts of the nation.

Yet these reassuring considerations do not entirely suffice to allay anxiety in all quarters. In the years since the War a secret society, calling itself by the name of the Ku Klux Klan of the reconstruction days in the South and claiming some continuity with it, has grown very rapidly in numbers, until it now claims a membership of five millions. And it would seem, according to reports of several students of the

movement, that, whereas the old Klan was motivated chiefly by the desire to assert white supremacy in the South, the new Klan is motivated chiefly by jealousy of the growing influence and numbers of the Roman Catholics, or, as the Klan's leaders say, by the desire to prevent the influence of the Roman Church from passing beyond the strictly religious sphere.

The Klan professes the most friendly feelings towards Catholic citizens as such, but is bitterly hostile to the organized power of the Roman Church. And the Klan seems to be composed in the main of solid, seriously minded, pious, and patriotic Americans whose chief defect seems to be a lack of the sense of the ridiculous. In view, then, of the claim and tendency of that Church to govern its members in all their relations and in view of its historical claim, never repudiated and often reasserted, to supremacy over all political powers, the marvelously rapid growth of the Klan organization cannot but be regarded as an omen of serious import. The obstinate claim of the Church to dominate the political life of Europe led her into a series of conflicts with the growing forces of European nationalism, conflicts that deluged Europe with blood, sundered and cleft the European nations, and were only terminated, even in those countries, such as Italy, in which there was no large body of Protestants, by the triumph of nationalism. It must be remembered also in this connection that the influx of Catholics was not only

from Europe, but also from Mexico on the south and from Quebec on the north. From both regions there has long been a steady and increasing stream of Catholic immigrants.

The existence of this religious division of the American people is, then, not a matter to be too lightly passed over. If the stream of Catholic immigrants had been allowed to continue unchecked for another fifty years, there might have been created a very difficult situation. But now it seems safe to predict that American nationalism will prove strong enough to dominate permanently any tendencies to division arising from differences between ecclesiastical systems.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE NEGRO PROBLEM

IN a frank discussion of the conditions that make for discord within the national life, it is impossible to ignore the Negro problem, one no less delicate and even more difficult than that created by ecclesiastical differences.

The Afro-Americans, Negroes, or colored people (using these terms in the usual sense as covering all those Americans who have an appreciable amount of Negro blood) are the descendants of the slaves who were brought to America against their will in the economic interests of their white masters. And the white Americans of to-day are under the strongest possible obligation to treat them with humanity and justice. They have increased to the number of some twelve millions, roughly one tenth of the whole population of the United States. That this large number of colored people constitutes a national problem is generally admitted; for, in any full sense of the words, these people have not been incorporated in the nation, they have not been assimilated. They form a caste more rigidly marked off and socially

separated from their fellow citizens than any caste of India.¹

In the middle of the last century the presence of this caste in the bosom of the nation did prove a very serious threat to its unity. It seems now improbable that it can ever again become a threat in that sense. Yet its presence constitutes a bar to the attainment of that harmony between all parts, that like-mindedness, which is essential to the perfection of national life.

In face of this problem, there are three main policies between which the nation has to choose.

The Policy of Laissez-Faire

First, there is the policy of *laissez-faire*, the policy of no policy, of leaving things to nature. Those white Americans who accept this policy, largely through mental inertia (and they are in overwhelming majority) contemplate an indefinitely prolonged continuance of the present state of affairs, the existence side by side for all time of the two castes, the white and the colored Americans. The only change to which they look forward is some amelioration of the

¹ One of the many amazing and amusing naïveties entertained by many Americans is the belief that, while all European countries are pervaded by caste, America alone among the nations is entirely free of it. The statement above may seem at first slightly exaggerated; but is, I think, literally true. For the colored people of America form a racial caste, distinctly marked off by obvious physical peculiarities. In India also the original basis of caste was racial; but, in the course of ages, the bars against racial blending have gradually been overcome, and there is now no clearly marked color-line among the natives of India.

social relations between the two castes, the complete abolition of lynching, the more complete securing to the colored people of equal political rights, and a more careful administration of justice as between the two castes.

Some of the more thoughtful of this party point out that the colored people do not seem to be increasing so rapidly as formerly; they hint at a natural lack of fertility of the strains of mixed blood; and they suggest that the colored people will find it increasingly difficult to maintain their numbers in face of the increasingly strenuous economic competition of the future. They hint that in this way the problem, if left alone, will solve itself, through the ultimate extinction of the colored stocks. This is a somewhat speculative forecast. The Negro race has been everywhere distinguished by its virility, fertility, and adaptability. In these respects it contrasts very strikingly with the other colored people of America, the Red Men, who, just for lack of these qualities, have faded rapidly away at the contact with civilization. That has never been the history of Negro peoples in contact with peoples of higher civilization. They have rather in every case gradually mixed their blood with that of the other people and have thus perpetuated their peculiar traits in generating a new race, not always a race of supermen.

The Afro-American stock has been undergoing adaptation to the American climate during a short

period only, and has enjoyed the opportunity of adjusting itself to the life of free American citizens for but a brief moment, some sixty years only. It is impossible to foretell at this early stage whether the stock is destined to diminish or to increase. The more completely it is relieved from political disabilities and social injustices, the more likely is it to multiply freely. In view of the fact that the present proportion of white to colored has been maintained only by a vast stream of white immigration, of the fact that the birth rate of white American citizens of two or more generations' standing tends obstinately to decline, of the fact that white American citizens show strong aversion to the rougher forms of labor, and of the fact that there will be, for an indefinitely long period, a large demand for the rougher forms of labor; in view of these facts, it is entirely conceivable that, within a relatively short time, the population of America may be predominantly colored; as are the populations of so many of the States of Central and South America.

It is necessary resolutely to face the unpalatable fact that, under modern conditions, the race is not to the strong and the ambitious, but rather to those that are poor in spirit yet obstinately fertile; that, in literal truth, the meek shall inherit the earth and all that is therein, in virtue of their continued acceptance of the prime condition of survival insisted upon by inexorable Nature.

The Negro Race and the Melting-Pot Theory

Those who do not contemplate with complacency the prospect of a nation permanently divided into two racial castes — one white, the other colored — are thus driven to accept one or other of the alternative policies. And it cannot be denied that such a racial division contains the possibilities of very grave discords. So long as the colored people are in a very distinct minority and are politically undisciplined, they are likely to accept in the main the position assigned to them by the white Americans. But already there are signs of a growing racial consciousness and a tendency to racial self-assertion, which, if they grow stronger, may necessitate the adoption of some more positive policy.

In this connection it is necessary to face very frankly the fact that the present status of the colored people is one of social inequality: the color line is drawn, the marriage bar is maintained, by the will of the white majority. When some years ago the late President Harding proclaimed the need of insisting upon equal political rights for the colored people, and at the same time asserted that they must not aspire to social equality, he voiced the attitude of the vast majority of white Americans. There was hardly a dissentient voice in the white press.

But the color line and the marriage bar are not gladly accepted by all the colored people. By many

of them they are bitterly resented; and even those of their leaders who wisely recommend their acceptance to their people do so in the main in the spirit of making the best of the inevitable.

The foregoing considerations, reënforced by principles of pure benevolence and humanity, lead many Americans, both colored and white, to accept and to advocate the policy of abolishing the color line, with a view to complete amalgamation of all American citizens in one homogeneous population. In other words, they would be thorough with the policy of the melting-pot, and would throw into the crucible all blacks as well as all shades of white.

This policy has great advantages over the first, the policy of *laissez-faire*. In the first place, it is in accordance with the immediate promptings of natural kindliness. Secondly, if it were accepted by the nation, it would be highly practicable, and would rapidly attain its goal. The presence in the country of large numbers of immigrants from the south and east of Europe would greatly facilitate this policy. For the peoples of those regions have always shown themselves far more ready than the peoples of north-western Europe to intermarry with the peoples of Africa.¹ Thirdly, it is consistent and thoroughgoing; it would lead to a final and complete solution of the problem, and that in a comparatively short space of time.

¹ It is in fact a question whether the presence of this element in large numbers has not already foreclosed the question in favor of the policy of the melting-pot.

Why not then accept it?

There are two objections. First, the biological objection. I do not propose to discuss this at length. Our knowledge in this sphere is still too slight to enable us to choose decisively between rival views. Three such views may be distinguished. The most optimistic view is that the incorporation into the American people of one tenth of African blood would distinctly improve the stock, would give it more virility, more joy in life, more versatility, a more romantic and esthetic and passionate element, in which qualities at present it is perhaps somewhat deficient.

A second view is that, after all, blood and race and heredity are mere shibboleths, that a man is just a man whatever the color of his skin, and that what each human being shall become is determined, not at all by race and heredity, but wholly by his environment, his education, his opportunities, his social contacts.

The third view is that the Negro race has remained at a lower level of evolution than the white race; that, in respect to the innate basis of its intellect and its character, it is decidedly and on the average inferior to the white race; and that the Negro race can hope to make good these steps of the evolutionary process only in the course of many centuries under the most favorable conditions, conditions difficult and little likely to be realized. Those who hold this view hold

also that only the most highly evolved branches of the human race are capable of building up a high civilization; and that no branch, perhaps, has sufficiently fine qualities to maintain for any long period the burden of such civilization with all its subtly deteriorating influences. They say, then, that it would be the height of folly for the white Americans, who have built up the most promising civilization that the world has known, to permit their biological quality to be deteriorated by a large admixture of Negro blood. They say that to do this would be to betray the cause of civilization and to prepare the rapid decline of the American Nation to corruption and despotism, chaos and barbarism.

They reënforce this gloomy forecast by pointing out that, in the proposed new race from Negro and white progenitors, the Negro blood might well prove biologically predominant, so that the new race, though it might be almost white in color, would be essentially Negroid in respect to its intellectual and moral qualities.

We cannot, I say, determine at the present time where the truth lies within the wide range of views indicated by the three I have outlined. But this we can say: since at present we are unable to forecast the effect of such race blending, it is the part of wisdom to oppose it and restrict it to the smallest possible proportions, until such time as we shall have surer

knowledge for the guidance of national policy in this grave matter.¹

The second grave objection to the policy of the melting-pot as applied to the colored people is that there seems no probability that the bulk of the white Americans could be brought to accept it. Their color prejudice, whatever its psychological nature and origin, and whatever its justification, or lack of justification, seems to be strong and enduring. In the northern States it has been weak. And it is no injustice to say that it has been weak only because the Americans of the North have had little contact with the colored people. With the recent exodus of colored people from the South to the North, there have appeared strong indications of the truth of this view. It is, I think, inevitable that an active policy of race amalgamation would provoke violent opposition throughout the white part of the nation and would but intensify and embitter very greatly such racial antagonism as already exists. For these two reasons the policy of the melting-pot is unwise and impracticable.

The Policy of Segregation

There remains the third policy, that of segregation. This takes two forms. The one is a policy of local segregation within each State and city. The idea is

¹ If one hundredth part of the money and energy devoted to research in the physical sciences (to the development of radio, of new explosives, of new aniline dyes, of new ways of moving more rapidly and comfortably from place to place) were devoted to anthropological research, we should soon have the knowledge of which we stand in so great need.

that the colored people shall form their own communities, geographically and socially distinct from the white communities, but politically coöperating. It may fairly be described as the policy of the ghetto. It is even now, partly by force of circumstances, partly by deliberate direction, taking shape in many parts of the country; and it seems likely to gain increasing acceptance as a *modus vivendi* among both the colored and the white people. It may seem to have much in its favor.

But, taking a long view, as we must in all national problems, this policy appears as merely a modification of, and compromise between, the two policies already discussed — the policy of the *status quo* or *laissez-faire* and the policy of the melting-pot. Eventually it will work out to the same end, namely, race amalgamation; though it may long postpone the completion of that process. And it is only too probable that, throughout that long period, it may give rise to much disharmony and suffering.

There remains, then, to be noticed only the policy of thoroughgoing segregation of the races. This has long been seen by a few far-sighted Americans, such as Abraham Lincoln, to be the only entirely satisfactory solution of the race problem of America.¹

¹ The same opinion was strongly expressed by de Tocqueville. "As soon as it is admitted," he wrote, "that the whites and the emancipated blacks are placed upon the same territory in the situation of two alien communities, it will readily be understood that there are but two alternatives for the future; the Negroes and the whites must either wholly part or wholly mingle." And he had already written that "those who hope that the Europeans will ever mix

And of late years a number of the leaders of the colored people have shown themselves friendly to it.

The difficulties in the way of such a policy are very great; but they are of a nature which may be overcome. They are in the main two. First, the difficulty of creating a public opinion among both colored and white Americans in favor of the policy. Secondly, the economic difficulty, the great economic dislocation and expense that would be incurred. The former difficulty is of a type that should never give us pause in the advocacy of a policy that appears after careful consideration to be decidedly the best possible. The second is one that should not stand in the way of a great act of justice long overdue. The American nation is so rich that it can afford any and every luxury, except the luxury of willful wasteful exploitation of its resources. It can afford itself the luxury of performing an act of justice far surpassing any hitherto achieved by any nation.

It would be premature to attempt to indicate the details of such a policy. We need only define its main lines. It must provide an ample territory (or territories) wide enough and rich enough to support a

with the Negroes, appear to me to delude themselves." He pointed out also very forcibly how the presence of the Negroes had retarded the economic and cultural development of the South; and he quoted with approval the opinion of the greatest of American democrats, Thomas Jefferson, expressed in the following words: "Nothing is more clearly written in the book of destiny than the emancipation of the blacks; and it is equally certain that the two races will never live in a state of equal freedom under the same government, so insurmountable are the barriers which nature, habit, and opinions have established between them."

people of at least fifteen or twenty millions. The territory must be suited by climate and natural resources to the needs of the Afro-Americans. There such conditions, social, political, and economic, must be created that the territory will strongly attract the colored people of America. They must be encouraged, aided, and supported, by all the resources of White America, to seize the opportunity to build up a Negro civilization in the territory assigned to them. And, though at first they must be guided and protected by the American Government, they must be assured of complete independence when and if they shall demand it with an authentic voice.

It would be premature to discuss the rival advantages of possible territories. Such a territory might be set aside in the southern part of the United States. It might be purchased in Africa. What better way could be found of expending the sums due to America as war debts? Or it might be the largest island of the world, New Guinea, a land of great fertility, at present quite undeveloped and very thinly occupied only by a few scattered and savage branches of the Negro race.

These suggestions may seem preposterous to many minds. But the American citizen should reflect on these facts: in justice, a large part of the territory of the United States, perhaps one tenth part, must be held to be the property of the colored people; the founders of the American Nation committed a tre-

mendous act of gross injustice in bringing the Negroes to America; an equally tremendous act of reparation has long been due, and the bill grows steadily larger. Would it not befit a nation that boldly claims the moral leadership of the world to clean its own slate, and to wipe out the stain from its record by a great national effort which would at the same time solve finally and gloriously its most distressing problem, one that, if not boldly dealt with, may prove a lasting and increasing danger to the health and even to the very life of the nation?

CHAPTER EIGHT

RIVAL IDEALS OF AMERICAN NATIONHOOD

IN an earlier chapter we have noticed certain schools of thought that make light of nationhood. We have seen how these schools decry or deprecate nationalism, that tremendous moral force which has increasingly dominated the world throughout the distinctively modern age, and how others, the extreme pacifists, the anarchists, and the communists, are actively striving to bring about the abolition of nations, in favor of various alternative and fanciful schemes of world-order.

The Pacifists

None of these schools of thought are strongly represented in America. There are, it is true, many pacifists; and many of them are so extreme as to pledge themselves against taking part in the support of any war, even a war of national defense against wanton aggression. But these persons, though for the most part they deserve a certain respect by reason of their sincere humanitarianism, have, we may fairly suppose, failed to think out to the logical conclusions the consequences of their attitude; the conclusion,

for example, that if all, or a majority of, American citizens should adopt and resolutely maintain the same attitude, the life of the American Nation would soon be brought to an end; the country would sooner or later, and probably during the lifetime of many now living, be invaded and dominated by one or more foreign powers, to whom its enormous wealth and resources would prove irresistibly attractive; and very probably would be divided among several such powers.

The American extreme pacifists are in the main nationalists and patriots. They merely fail to understand the inconsistency of their own attitude. They believe the American Nation to be so strong that it need fear nothing. And they have a quite unwarranted belief in the power of sweet and reasonable discourse to subdue the primal passions of greed for power and riches. They forget that discourse about the rights of property, about the advantages of peaceable industry and honest dealing and the blessedness of charity and benevolence, is apt to appear much more reasonable and persuasive to the man of wealth and substance than to those who are struggling for bread with which to still the hunger of their children, to those who have much than to those who have little. And the American, or rather the American Nation, enjoys the position of the man who has much; while the greater number of nations and peoples are of the class that has little.

It is necessary also to remind American pacifists that acts of benevolence towards suffering peoples, the raising of large relief funds, the sending of shiploads of food, in general the dropping of crumbs, and even of buttered crusts, from the rich man's table, has but a very fleeting effect in the way of engendering gratitude. The recent outbreak of acute resentment in Japan, against the summary action of Congress on the Japanese immigration question, followed within a few weeks upon the grateful acceptance of American assistance to sufferers from the great earthquake, this incident should serve to remind all Americans that it is necessary to examine all international relations and actions from both sides, to appreciate sympathetically the attitude of the other party to such relations, as well as to be convinced of the excellence of one's own motives and ideals.

In spite, then, of the large number of extreme pacifists in America, it seems true to say that there is no considerable party of anti-nationalists. America is overwhelmingly nationalist. The people are conscious of themselves as a nation; they desire to continue to be one nation; they take a just pride in the nation; and they entertain well-founded hopes of, and, in many cases, an overweening and uncritical confidence in, the future greatness of the nation.

But, in spite of this unanimity, there are current, side by side within this community of patriotic sentiment, very different views as to the kind and

degree of national organization and unity that are desirable.

We may distinguish four principal schools of thought and tendency.

The Individualist Policy

The first of these is historically continuous with the party of Jeffersonian democracy, the party that has always been jealous for the preservation of the rights of the several States against the encroachments of the Federal Government, the party that has stood for the extremest possible liberty of the individual citizen. It may justly be called the individualist school. It tends to regard a nation as nothing more than a number of individuals who for their common good agree to set up, observe, and enforce, by the agency of a judiciary and a strictly limited police power, certain laws prohibiting the undue interference of one citizen with the liberty of action of another.

The more instructed members of this school are acutely aware of the difficulty of reconciling government with liberty of the individual. They recognize that these two good things cannot both be enjoyed in the highest degree; that to some extent they are and must ever be incompatible with one another; that their reconcilment must at the best be a compromise. And, of the two goods, they rank liberty above good government. They are disposed to accept the dictum that the best government is that

which governs least. They are swayed by an ideal of a nation all of whose citizens shall be so wise and so well disposed that no one of them will ever infringe the rights of another. And in the sphere of international relations they are, like the pacifists, inclined to be swayed by the same ideal of a society of wise and good nations.

In this connection I would remark upon a peculiarity of the much-vaunted American idealism. To be an idealist, properly speaking, is to form an ideal of what ought to be and to strive to realize that ideal. But idealists are apt, and this seems to be peculiarly true of American idealists, to believe and to assert that that state of affairs which they desire to see realized already obtains. It is the old story; the wish is father to the thought. In practice this tendency is common to the average socialist and communist (in respect to their beliefs as to the constitution of human nature unperverted by the evils of capitalism), to the extreme individualist of the school of Herbert Spencer, to the Christian Scientist, and (according to popular tradition) to the ostrich.

This tendency is one of the mainstays of the individualist school. They incline to the view that, if only government will let men alone, men will be good and happy. The individualist tradition has been very greatly fostered in America by the strong influence of the frontier; as Professor Turner has so clearly shown. It has also been greatly favored by

the remoteness of America from other strong nations, geographically and economically and politically. The traditional attitude throughout the nineteenth century was one of proud aloofness, behind the barrier of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Waning of Individualism

In spite of the great strength of American individualism, rooted in the racial qualities of colonists and pioneers, fostered by the frontier life, by the relative paucity and unimportance of America's international problems, and by the social conditions prevailing in the land of great opportunities for all, in spite of all this, individualism has waned greatly of late years.

In part this may be due to the presence in the country of many millions of citizens of the newer immigration, citizens derived from races of less strongly individualist, less strongly self-assertive, tendency than that of the earlier settlers; citizens also whose ancestors have been accustomed through many generations to be ruled paternally or despotically.

Secondly, the waning of individualism is largely due to the abolition of the frontier and of those frontier conditions which so greatly fostered it. It is now more than a generation since this great change took place. The change resulted from the rapid occupation and exploitation of the whole territory and from the rapid increase of population in all parts.

If there were but some fifty million inhabitants of the United States, the frontier conditions would still obtain widely, even though the population were diffused through all parts. With the increasing density of population has come a more than corresponding increase of complexity of economic interests and relations. A nation composed for the most part of farmers may well be very individualistic. And throughout the first half of the nineteenth century Americans were such a nation. But now, although farming remains the greatest industry of the Nation, more than half the people dwell in cities and a still larger proportion of them earn their livelihood in a multitude of industrial occupations. Further, through all the land are stretching the long arms of vast commercial corporations whose economic power gravely threatens the liberties of the individual, in a way which even the man who farms his own land is made to feel.¹

All these closely related changes have had much influence in abating American individualism. So much so that Professor Turner inclines to the view that they have been the chief influences in substituting, within some forty years, for the strongly marked and prevalent individualism of the earlier period an excessive and regrettable tendency to seek

¹ The farmer is everywhere increasingly dependent upon the railways and upon various middlemen for the marketing of his products, and in many regions he has to obtain his water-supply and his fertilizer from other great corporations.

a remedy for all ills in action by the Federal Government. He writes:

“The transformations through which the United States is passing in our own day are so profound, so far-reaching, that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that we are witnessing the birth of a new Nation in America. . . . It is with a shock that the people of the United States are coming to realize that the fundamental forces which have shaped their society up to the present are disappearing.”¹ He goes on to say, “The old pioneer individualism is disappearing, while the forces of social combination are manifesting themselves as never before. . . . The present finds itself engaged in the task of readjusting its old ideals to new conditions and is turning increasingly to government to preserve its traditional democracy.”

The new tendency shows itself in the overriding and ignoring of the rights of the several States by the Federal Government supported by popular opinion; in the adoption of amendments to the Constitution (especially the prohibition amendment); in the demand for a popular referendum on many questions of nation-wide interest; in the mass of Federal legislation for the control of corporations and of interstate commerce; in the adoption of a Federal income tax; in the demand for Federal protection, even for the farmers of the West, and for a Federal department of education; and in many other ways in which the

¹ *Op. Cit.* Page 311.

power of the central government is increased and extended in its influence upon all the domestic affairs of the people.

It should, I think, be recognized that the increased facilities of communication and travel are doing much to accentuate this tendency. The same news and newspapers, the same magazines and journals, circulate freely throughout the whole country; and people move constantly from State to State in a way that tends to destroy any sense of a peculiar interest or pride in or devotion to any one State, weakening local loyalties and strengthening each citizen's sense of his citizenship in the whole country and his dependence upon the central Federal Government.

Nationalizing Influence of Foreign Relations

Great as have been the influences of these domestic changes in turning the American people in a short space of time from a thoroughgoing individualism to a thoroughgoing nationalism, an equally great influence making in the same direction has been exerted by the greatly increased contacts of America with other nations. It is almost true to say that, from the close of the War of 1812 until the Spanish War at the end of the century, America lived in splendid isolation. During this period she had almost no national armaments, no fear of aggression, no desire to aggress, no interests of great magnitude outside her own borders.

With the end of the century, the Spanish War, and the building of the Panama Canal, a new phase was entered upon. It is a phase which its adverse critics describe as imperialistic. The responsibilities assumed towards the Philippine Islands, Cuba, San Domingo, Porto Rico, and Haiti, give some color to this view. But, even though these responsibilities had not been assumed, it was inevitable that the American attitude of happy aloofness from and indifference to the world and its troubles should have given way increasingly to one of more active coöperation in world affairs.

A nation cannot become the richest and potentially most powerful in the world, cannot extend its trade into every corner of the earth and send its missionaries into every land and yet as a nation disclaim all interest in the affairs of its fellows and repudiate all responsibility for international complications; or at least it cannot do so without losing its self-respect and the respect of the world. And so America is finding herself drawn more and more into the maelstrom where only courage and clear thinking avail to save the ship and keep her on a steady course towards her guiding star.

American participation in the Great War proved inevitable, in spite of all reluctance. And her share in the War and in the peace-making and the enormous increase of her wealth, relative and absolute, that has resulted from her hesitant participation, her new position as a creditor nation on a vast scale and as

the center of the world's financial interests, all these changes force upon her responsibilities which lie upon the Nation as a whole and bring her into more intimate relations with many nations.

There is nothing that develops — that forces the development of — national consciousness, national sentiment, national pride and self-knowledge and self-criticism, sense of national responsibility, as does active commerce, whether friendly or hostile, with other nations. And so, with the shrinking of the world, the pristine innocence and naïvety of America's childhood are inevitably passing: the Nation finds itself called upon to put away childish things from it and to play the part of a man among men. And, however much the old-fashioned American may regret the passing of the Nation's golden age of youth, he is forced, like all his fellows, to give heed more and more to the insistent claims of the world upon his sympathetic coöperation, to the demand for international solidarity.

However reluctant America might be to respond to these voices, the economic demands of her expanding population would forbid the perpetuation of the old-time indifference to international affairs. The whole population rolls luxuriously upon rubber which it cannot obtain from its own territories; it begins to appear that the foreign market for the vast cotton crop is not perennially assured; and even the western farmer, the direct inheritor of the frontier tradition,

finds that his livelihood may be profoundly affected by the foreign policy of the Nation administered at Washington.

The days of extreme individualism for the Nation as for the citizen are, then, gone by forever. The Nation, for good or ill, is increasingly committed to the conduct of national policy. There is no choice before her, but to deliberate as fully and as carefully as possible upon her policies, to conduct them as wisely, as resolutely, as justly as may be; and, in order to achieve these great national tasks, to seek out for national leadership her citizens of finest intellect and character, and to purify and refine her political life.¹

For the policies of a Nation so rich and vast, of organization so complex, of international relations and responsibilities so wide reaching and so fraught with good or evil for her own citizens and for all the world; the policies of such a Nation cannot be safely entrusted to men who are "just folks", professional politicians concerned primarily with the spoils of office, or to parties without policies, dominated and motivated

¹ The greatest need of the Nation is that young men of good parts and good education should seriously prepare themselves (as the late Theodore Roosevelt did) to take part in the rough and tumble of political life with a single eye to the service of their country. In this connection I would venture to deplore the generally accepted view that a man who does not earn his own living (and something more) is in some sense an inferior being. Before everything the country needs a class of men who are not primarily concerned with money-making. The enormous wealth of the country makes such a class entirely possible; its existence and the beneficent influence it should exert on the national life are prevented by the false and perverted tradition that such a class is repugnant to the principles of true democracy.

by a boyish love of the game and by the desire of individuals to appear on the front page of the daily press.

The Policy of Federated Nationalities

The second of the four forms of national ideal is one that has only in recent years found formal expression. But it is likely to receive greater prominence; and it demands attention by reason of certain intrinsically reasonable features and the ability with which it is advocated. The exponents of this ideal point out that the American people is no longer predominantly of British ancestry and traditions. They acknowledge the services and achievements of the pioneer colonists and the excellence of the national foundations laid by them. But, they say, the population now consists of groups of many different nationalities, and each of such groups has brought with it to America its own peculiar and well-loved traditions, customs, and institutions, its language, its church, its recreations, all the main features of its national culture. Why, then, they ask, should these groups be expected to cast away all these good things? Why should they be driven to attempt to adopt, in an artificial and unnatural manner, the forms of culture that happen to have been imported to America by the first comers? What, after all, is the worth of the claim of priority? We have to do with the present and the future. Let not the dead hand of her past lie heavily upon America, the new

home of nationalities from every part of Europe. The Anglo-Saxon culture had, no doubt, certain virtues that adapted it to the rude days of the conquest of Nature; but it was marred by a gloomy Puritanism hostile to the development of art and literature and all the finer flowers of culture.

Let, then, each nationality cherish its own traditions, express itself in its own tongue, maintain intimate relations with its homeland, and bring up its children to be American citizens, but not Americans pure and simple. Let them all be frankly hyphenated Americans, German-Americans, Polish-Americans, Jewish-Americans, Irish-Americans, and, if any so desire, British-Americans. The British nationality and stock is only one among many others. It will probably be expedient that a debased and simplified form of the English language shall continue to be used as a *lingua franca*, for railway and hotel and roadside notices, for advertisements, and perhaps for commercial purposes in general.

Concisely stated, the ideal proposed is that America, instead of becoming a single homogeneous nation, should become a federation of nationalities. This is an ideal likely to appeal strongly to many Americans of the newer immigration. And it is noteworthy that its chief exponents are members of the Jewish race.¹

¹ Notably, Mr. A. E. Zimmern in his "Nationality and Government" (Robert M. McBride, New York, 1918), and Mr. H. M. Kallen in his

We must ask concerning it three questions — Is the ideal a desirable one? Is it necessary or inevitable? Is it feasible?

Undoubtedly, if we put aside prejudice, we must admit there are some strong arguments in its favor. The uprooting of so many immigrants from their own traditional culture, which is involved in their Americanization, is for many a great hardship; and it cannot be doubted that this disruption of tradition is very unfavorable to the moral growth of their children; it goes far to explain the monstrous frequency in America of robbery and murder and other crimes.¹

Further, we must agree with the more enlightened advocates of this ideal, such as Mr. Kallen, that racial peculiarities are real and important, though subtle and difficult to describe or estimate; and that it is therefore probable that many Americans of the new immigration must find themselves permanently out of harmony with the older American ideals and traditions and customs, those which are commonly

“Culture and Democracy in the United States” (Boni and Liveright, New York, 1924). The plans of these two authors do not completely coincide, and my brief outline does not, therefore, represent the views of either with entire accuracy.

¹ The other cause commonly assigned for this deplorable fact is the extreme laxity of administration of criminal justice. This in turn seems to be largely a defect of that quality of kindly tolerance which is so widely diffused. The American democracy seems to have taken to heart the famous saying, “There, but for the grace of God, go I.” The principle implied would be carried too far, if it should render a period spent in gaol an indispensable qualification for public office, and common honesty a bar, as intellectual distinction is already a bar, to such office.

designated comprehensively as "one hundred per cent. Americanism."

Also we must admit some substance in the claim that the perpetuation of the cultures of the various nationalities in America may enrich and diversify the culture of the country; and that the members of the various nationalities are more likely to produce the finer flowers of culture, if they find themselves in communities congenial to their own type and traditions, than if they are forced to adapt themselves to the preëxisting American atmosphere.

On the other hand, there are grave difficulties in the way of the realization of this ideal. Most of the newer immigrants have been of the laboring classes and have assimilated only the ruder elements of their national cultures. Many of them also have little or no love for their native land, having left it in part because they were discontented with its institutions; and these commonly desire to become wholly and rapidly Americanized.

Again, it may be urged that the higher elements of culture are international, are common to all the European nations; and that a mathematical genius, such as the late Doctor Steinmetz, or a man of great musical gifts, such as some of the foreign-born leaders of American orchestras, can develop their powers as completely in the American as in any other atmosphere. The German-American may continue to attach to certain forms of food and drink a value that

is quite unintelligible to an Englishman; but he is not debarred from cultivating this and other similar features of his national culture by a whole-hearted transference of his allegiance to American institutions of the more important kind.

The critic of this program may urge also that to permit and encourage the development within America of large communities of various nationalities, each cherishing its own national and racial traditions, would be gratuitously to create conditions likely to lead to conflict within the nation, and possibly to eventual disruption. In answer to this the exponents of the program point to the marvelously harmonious and successful Swiss Republic, which is a federation of nationalities of the type they desire to see develop in America. If it be objected that in Switzerland the three nationalities are much more completely segregated in homogeneous communities than are any of the nationalities in America, the advocates may point out that, if their program were generally accepted and deliberately pursued as a national ideal, a process of segregation of nationalities would go forward very rapidly and might soon be far advanced. We might expect to see Wisconsin become almost wholly and purely German, Minnesota become Scandinavian, New York City monopolized by the Jews, and Boston by the Irish. To this the critic may reply — “Yes, and, if your principles are consistently carried out, we may equally confidently

anticipate that at an early date Maine will be wholly French; Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona purely Mexican; California, Oregon, and Washington purely Japanese, Chinese, and Hindu respectively; and when to these are added large areas wholly Polish, Czech, Russian, Rumanian, Greek, Italian, Serb, etc., etc., what will become of the American Nation? We shall simply have Balkanized America and may look forward to a thousand years of bloody conflicts between races and nationalities."

Further, and this perhaps is the most serious difficulty in the way of this program, the American of the old stock and tradition cannot be brought to accept this ideal. He will not consent to regard himself as merely one kind of hyphenated American among many others. He insists that his forefathers have by their energy and enterprise, their sufferings and their self-sacrifice, prepared for their descendants a splendid heritage, performing with rifle and axe and plow the tasks of subduing a vast wilderness and of building well and soundly the foundations of a united homogeneous nation; tasks which, they may say (and it is impossible to prove them wrong in this), no other race of men could have achieved. They liken themselves to the children and grandchildren of a settler who by much labor has hewn out from the wilderness and given over to them a rich finely cultivated farm; they liken the new immigrants to gypsies who have, in virtue of the owner's benevolent

tolerance, camped here and there upon the rich pastures so hardly won from the forest; and they will liken the ideal which we are discussing to a demand, made after a time by the gypsy campers, to be recognized as equal owners of the farm and as having exclusive rights to the management of the part which they have been allowed to occupy, and the right, further, to introduce unlimited numbers of their relatives to share and divide still further the patrimony of the settler's heirs.

In face of this recalcitrant attitude of the older American stock, the newer immigrant may, if he be unusually outspoken, reply as follows:

"You keep harping upon the past. Our faces are turned towards the future. We are the true Americans; the future is in our hands. We are already more numerous than you and are rapidly outbreeding you, and, with our continued immigration and your continuously falling birth rate, you will soon be in a hopeless minority. So yield gracefully to the inevitable and don't make an unpleasant fuss about it. The very traditions which you profess to reverence so profoundly forbid you to murmur. Is it not your strongest tradition that America is the land of liberty, the land where each man is accepted at his intrinsic worth, regardless of the accidents of birth and ancestry; the land where each man may do as he pleases and carve out a fortune for himself in his own way?"

The moral problem here raised is unique. There are no precedents and no accepted moral principles that will guide us surely to a decision in this matter. The only principle to which we can appeal is the "utilitarian" principle. We have to ask which national ideal is the better? What national policy will best promote the welfare and harmonious development of mankind? To find an answer to this large question is no easy task.¹

We may, in view of what has already been said of the value of nationhood, and in view of the fact that both the chief parties to this dispute are agreed in desiring to see America continue to develop as a united nation of some sort, assume as common to both parties the purpose of furthering and strengthening the nationhood of America. That is, after all, the most fundamental condition of national unity. Assuming, then, a common American patriotism in this most fundamental respect, how may we hope to resolve what at present seems like a deadlock, a situation that threatens to become worse before it can improve?²

¹ I have devoted a small volume to the discussion of this great moral problem "Ethics and Some Modern World Problems" (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1924). In it I have pointed out that throughout the historical period western civilization has developed on a dual moral basis, two unreconciled and partially conflicting systems of ethics, the universal and the national systems. I have urged that a frank recognition of this historical truth is needed as a first step towards a new ethical synthesis which shall harmonize in one system these hitherto conflicting systems. And I have made some suggestions towards such a synthesis. The second essential step is the recognition of the validity of national ethics, the ethics of nationalism.

² It has been said, perhaps with some exaggeration, that the outstanding fact of American life at the present time is the waging of a disguised and in

I say "threatens to become worse", because the issue has only begun to define itself sharply in quite recent years. The ideal of nation-wide hyphenation has been seriously proclaimed only recently. But the claim has provoked a strong reaction. Of this reaction a most significant feature is the immensely rapid growth of the Ku Klux Klan. It is claimed for this organization that, within little more than two years, it has increased its membership from about one hundred thousand to some five millions. And it seems clear that it owes this astonishing success to the fact that it appeals to the desire of so many Americans to resist the innovations involved in the hyphenation process, and to preserve as fully as possible the older traditions of American life.¹

Each party accuses the other of stirring up strife and racial hatred and religious animosities. The new American says that the changes are inevitable and that the old American's protests can avail nothing, that they can only engender bitterness and social conflicts of all sorts. The old American asserts that various groups of new Americans have long worked more or less deliberately and in more or less or-

large degree silent struggle between, on the one hand, Americanism, as understood and prized by the Americans of the old stock, and, on the other hand, the many groups and individuals who are united only or chiefly by their resentment against the dominance of such Americanism and by the determination to subvert, transform, or reform it into something radically different.

¹ Compare two valuable and impartial studies of the Klan: "The Challenge of the Klan", by Stanley Frost (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1924), and "The Ku Klux Klan" by G. M. Mecklin (Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1924).

ganized fashion to bring about the changes they desire; and he maintains that he has at least as good a right as they to organize for the defense of the traditions that he holds dear. And, he adds, since a trial of strength is inevitable, the sooner the issue is frankly faced, the better. But no solution is to be hoped for from mutual recrimination. It behooves every patriotic American carefully to weigh the arguments and sympathetically to appreciate the sentiments and emotions of both parties.

After much reflection, I venture to offer the following tentative conclusions:

If the policy of unrestricted immigration were the settled policy of America, the arguments of the new Americans would be overwhelmingly strong. The proportion of Americans of the older stock would soon be too small to justify any anticipation of the survival of what may be called the older Americanism, the Americanism that owes so much to the Puritan tradition and the institutions of Great Britain; except perhaps in certain segregated communities, occupying certain States or small groups of States. In that case the best policy for the prevention of social chaos and general deterioration of American life would be that of a federation of nationalities; and the wisest action would be to endeavor to guide the process of segregation so that the various communities should coincide as nearly as possible with the existing States, so as to give to

each its own political life and organization and prevent a new complication and overlapping of interests within the federation.

But unrestricted immigration seems to be a thing of the past. Severe restriction seems to be the settled policy of the nation.¹ And greater restriction seems to be more probable than any relaxation. The overwhelming vote in support of restriction seems to show that very many citizens of the new immigration, moved, perhaps, chiefly by the desire to prevent the lowering of the standard of wages and of living, are in favor of the policy. This being so, we have to consider that, from the present time onward, the composition of the American population is relatively fixed, except in so far as enduring differences in the birth rates of its various constituent groups may be manifested. The Americans of the old stock may fairly claim to be not less than half the white population; and as a group they are very greatly more numerous, more powerful and influential in every way, than any other group or nationality.

Further, among the newer Americans are very many who are quite willing and even anxious to be assimilated, as completely as possible to the old type. And, whatever may be said of culture in the narrower sense of the word, it remains true that the political forms, the laws, the language used for the common

¹ Though, doubtless, we shall see in the near future some determined and well-organized efforts to reverse this policy.

intercourse and business of all parts, the prevalent social forms and practices, all these things, constituting the main framework of the civilization of America, are still in the main of the type introduced and developed by the British-American colonists and their descendants.

If the newer Americans were equally homogeneous, and equally strongly attached to their traditions, as they are equally numerous, some radical readjustment would be inevitable and desirable. But, as this is very far from the actual state of affairs, it would seem the part of wisdom that all American citizens should agree to accept this common framework; the various nationalities contenting themselves with the hope of building up by their united efforts on the common foundation a homogeneous civilization, richer perhaps in diversities than any the world has known, but continuing under the form of a Federation of States.

The alternative ideal of a federation of nationalities, though it may be in principle a form under which national unity and harmony might be preserved, would be a second best, a *pis-aller*, a form involving many risks, the possibilities of many disastrous conflicts.

When the new American is asked to submit himself to the assimilative process, he should remember two facts. First, though detachment from his national traditions may involve the sacrifice of much

that he holds dear, the conditions in America are such that sacrifices of this kind are necessary for national harmony. And the old American stock, in admitting vast numbers of immigrants to share freely in the matchless advantages prepared by its ancestors for its inheritance, has already made many such sacrifices.

Secondly, he should remember that the civilization to which he is asked to assimilate himself is one that already ranks very high in nearly all respects; and it is one to which he and others like himself are invited to contribute of their best; one which many like himself have already helped to mold into new forms, according as they have had contributions of value to bring and capacity and energy to make clear to their fellow citizens the value of those contributions.

The Policy of Federated Industries

A third ideal set forth as the goal of American political development is allied to the wild schemes for the supersession of all national governments by some system of industrial parliaments, each exerting world-wide control of one great industry. It differs from all such schemes in that it looks to the continuance of the Nation as a distinct political entity; but is allied to them in that it would have the Nation politically organized upon an occupational basis. In European countries various schemes having this feature in common have been numerous and loudly

advocated. The best known of them go by the names of Guild-Socialism, Syndicalism, and Sovietism. The main argument in support of them takes the form of asserting that the economic interests of each man are his chief interests, that each man understands and is therefore qualified to vote intelligently upon the affairs of the industry in which he is a worker, and that, with few exceptions, the workers in any one industry are not at all qualified to vote upon the affairs of other industries. From these premises the conclusion is drawn that the interests of the whole Nation may best be promoted by giving to every worker a voice in the control of the industry within which he works, and to each industry its due representation in the National Congress. It is suggested that in this way the affairs of the nation will be controlled more intelligently than is possible under any other system.

This ideal has not been put forward or elaborated as a national policy in America by any influential group, as it has been in European countries. Nevertheless there is manifest a strong and increasing tendency towards the growth of political organization of this sort. In this respect, practice is outrunning theory; and there is danger that the push of economic interests may effect a complete transformation of this kind, without any explicit formulation of it as a national policy and without approval of it by public opinion.

A recent article by an American, highly distinguished by his services to the State,¹ discusses this problem very frankly, showing with much force that this tendency to replace national representatives by delegates of occupational groups has already gone far and is already producing great evils. Mr. Child begins by citing a personal expression of opinion by Theodore Roosevelt, made shortly before his death: "The greatest danger we face is this danger — the danger of assaults on our Government by organized minorities founded on self-interest." He goes on to say that "the gravest issue before us" is "the breaking down of national unity and the threatening appearance of smaller militant groups trying to force favors from the Government by the hold-up methods of all self-interest minorities. . . . To-day the greatest political issue before the country is the threatened breakdown of our republican form of government by the increase in the power and number of organized minorities."

This is the language of one who assumes that the ideal we are considering is impracticable and disastrous and necessarily destructive of national unity. And there is little room for doubt that such language is justified. There can be no logical end to the process of political organization by industrial groups short of a world-wide organization that would de-

¹ "Government by Blackmail", by Richard Washburn Child. *Saturday Evening Post*, August 23, 1924.

stroy the nations and supersede all national organizations; and in practice the tendency to the ignoring of national boundaries and national interests by such industrial groups would inevitably be very strong and is already manifest.

The ideal is fundamentally wrong, because it is founded on two false assumptions: first, that the economic interests of men are the sole interests, or, at least, are of overwhelming importance as compared with all other interests — the fallacy that men live by bread alone; second, that the harmonious life of the world can and should proceed from the conflict of economic interests.

Mr. Child goes on to point out that no party has brought this problem into the open. "No party has touched this issue — no party has the courage to pick it up and run with it — to give the kind of leadership which will promise the American people a government, not only executive but also legislative, which will have the nerve to reestablish government for the good of all of us and put an end to government bowing and scraping before any organized minority which goes to Washington with its clamor, its propaganda, its selfish ends, its threats and its blackmail." He contends that government swayed by the pressure of organized sectional interests is essentially "government by blackmail." And this language, though it is strong, brings out clearly the essential and inevitable nature of govern-

ment organized upon, or controlled by, industrial or occupational groups. He rightly insists that there is no essential difference between the squeezing of government by strong groups of financiers and the squeezing of it by strong groups of industrial workers; in all cases the method is essentially the same, the method of blackmail. Addressing the leaders of radicalism, he writes:

“We taxpayers cannot distinguish much between you fellows and the old-fashioned old-guard senators who represented the interests. Both of you owe your election to an organized minority seeking selfish ends. Both of you jump when the organized minority which sent you as a messenger boy [a delegate] demands that you get something. Neither of you pay first attention to the good of the whole people. . . . From beginning to end there is nothing in it which is not destructive of national unity and of national service and of the welfare of the citizen who puts public welfare higher than his own.”

There are, Mr. Child asserts, two principal kinds of organized minorities. “The first maintain their lobbies more or less frankly to get something. The second maintain their lobbies more or less frankly to force upon us through government agency some form of moral, sentimental, or crankish tyranny over our free will, and to wipe out our right of moral self-direction and self-development. The first want to own the taxpayer’s dollars; the second want to put in

their own cages his conscience and his soul. Both of them are trying to raid the Government for special privilege more than their predecessors, the lobbies of big business, ever raided it."

Mr. Child has no difficulty in pointing to a number of important pieces of Federal legislation which have passed into law, not because they expressed the will of the nation, but because the Government yielded to the pressure of organized minorities. He rightly insists that all this is symptomatic of a serious weakness in the national life. "Right there is the distinction between a strong democracy and a democracy which shows signs of breaking down. In a strong democracy, such as our republic has always been supposed to be, the representatives act through their own calm judgment for the good of all; in a weak democracy, where representatives have degenerated into subservient messenger boys, the Government acts not by judgment but by fear. While we tolerate organized minorities seeking to gain their ends by threats, we are tolerating a government by blackmail and preparing for the degeneration of our democracy. The whole test is whether our Government is legislating and administering to reflect the will of the majority of us or is being intimidated into special-favor legislation and administration by a variety of organized groups. It is of no consequence that some of these groups serve pious or sentimental causes. In one case we still have a good machine of democracy;

in the other we need to make repairs or we shall see the machine of democracy go toward the junk-pile, doing immeasurable harm to national unity on the way."

There are, Mr. Child asserts, three chief symptoms of the failure of democratic institutions; all of which are manifested in America. First, "representative government . . . starts out with the theory that the people will elect representatives who can resist passing clamor and wear no leading strings. On this conception of representatives the whole fundamental idea of our own republic is based. But as time goes on the tendency is to lower the standards of representation. When that comes about, representatives in upper and lower houses no longer hold their places because they are wise in government for the good of all of us, but because they keep their ears to the ground in order to answer the demands, justified or unjustified, of any single group, class, or organization of constituents whose votes in the next election may defeat them."

Second: "When all the standards of legislative representation are lowered, it becomes more and more difficult to get men of integrity and capacity to take office. This is the second symptom of the breakdown of democratic government."

"The third symptom of the breakdown appears when the representatives neglect national policy and sometimes covertly betray the interests of all

the citizens in order to favor the needs or meet the demands of organized minorities. . . . In the experience of other democracies the course of the breakdown has gone on from this to ever-increasing difficulties. Selfish, avaricious minorities, or minorities gathered around some impractical dream of reform, carry their campaigns into politics. They form new parties, and these parties multiply and parliaments become the scenes of eternal debates and contests ending in stalemates. . . . A parliament or a congress, instead of possessing a majority party responsible for its own performance, is filled with discordant elements, each one pressing selfish claims. . . . The spirit of national unity disappears. Men and women take away their loyalty from the nation and attach it to a group or class. Citizens begin to think of government as a flabby institution for the granting of favors and the yielding of loot. . . . Citizenship loses its sense of responsibility and of self-help and of willingness to give service; it wants the government to solve all problems, heal all wounds, undertake all ventures, provide all salvation and to ask its citizens for nothing.”

Of recent would-be political leaders, Mr. Child writes:

“We have seen them go forth in the main with open or secret appeals to organized minorities — to religious minorities, racial minorities, labor minorities, bonus minorities, League-of-Nations minorities,

geographical minorities, endless minorities, to the extent that these minority interests have distracted attention from a national program and our majority interests; they have weakened our sense of national cohesion, to the extent that these minorities oppose one another; either in demanding attention or in conflict with one another, they are positive forces of disruption of our national peace and unity. . . . It is to some one strong enough and courageous enough for positive inspiration . . . to whom we, the great body of men and women in America, must look to stem the tide of minorities creating, by their political blackmail, moral, racial, religious, geographical, economic disunity, and to set against their assaults the stone wall of the American majority."

It is clear that Mr. Child is here protesting against both the sectional tendencies discussed in this chapter: the tendency to transform the nation into a federation of nationalities which is chiefly manifest as a theoretical ideal; and the tendency of political organization to follow the lines of special group-interests which is already strongly manifested in practical politics. His indictment is none too strong. National unity, harmony, and prosperity cannot proceed from a mere conflict of groups each pursuing its own special interest. It is only by the willingness of each individual and of each group to subordinate his or its own special interests to the interests of the

Nation as a whole that the unity and welfare of the Nation can be maintained.

The Nationalist Policy

We are, therefore, driven back from these alternative ideals, that of ultra-individualism, that of the federation of nationalities, and that of organization by occupational groups, to the fourth ideal of "national unity founded upon patriotism"; a patriotism which clearly realizes the value of the Nation and places the interests of the Nation far above the interests of all the groups and all the individuals within it; a patriotism which aims to promote the welfare of the Nation by means of a truly representative system, and by means of a government controlled by a public opinion in the formation of which every citizen plays his part according to his capacities, always animated and dominated by his regard for the welfare of the Nation.

This ideal has not the charm of novelty; and it cannot hope to appeal covertly or openly to the narrower self-interests of the citizens. But it has the superior merit of being in accordance with the dictates of sober good sense, of the deepest political philosophy, and of sound and venerable traditions. And, fortunately, it is one which can appeal effectively to the nature of the average citizen. In spite of all the cynicism of practical men and of theorists alike, it remains true that the bulk of the citizens of

America are of a stock which responds to the appeal on behalf of the larger ideal, the ideal that demands self-sacrifice for the public good and on behalf of remote ends only vaguely conceived; a stock that has always provided leaders of public spirit, of power, of high aims and large vision.

It is not too much to hope, not only that such leaders will again appear sufficient in number and caliber to the needs of each age, but also that the great majority of American citizens will turn decisively from the false ideals and perverted practices which have arisen during an age of extremely rapid changes; that, having stopped the flood of immigration which created new and pressing problems more rapidly than they could be solved or even clearly defined in the mind of the Nation, they will reflect long and deeply on their splendid past, their chaotic present, and their problematic future; that such reflection will lead them to pursue with clear vision and confident steps their destiny as a great Nation, a Nation great not only in material achievement, great not only in providing for all its citizens unrivaled opportunities for leading the good life, but great also as a power that makes for righteousness in all the struggles that lie before the human race in its upward march.

To those who have contemplated only the surface of the American scene, it may seem superfluous to invoke a renewal of confidence in the national des-

tiny. Americans have long been famous for their optimism, for an excessive confidence in the rightness, the greatness, the nobility, and the splendor of the future of their Nation. Something of this spirit of naïve optimism and confidence still survives among the masses; and it is still a national danger, in that it tends to resentful impatience of all criticism and obscures in the minds of many the great need for self-sacrificing effort and devotion in the cause of unity and strength and purity of the national life. But of late years this excessive optimism, which has long been a tradition and a cult, has given place in the minds of many of the more reflective citizens to an anxiety, a deep distrust, amounting in many almost to despair of the Republic. America, in fact, has passed from the period of happy childish confidence in the greatness of her destiny, and has entered upon the period of self-criticism, self-distrust, and painful groping natural to adolescence.

To some of America's critics, native and foreign, a blight seems to have fallen upon the splendid pageant of national development. America, says one critic, is not a nation, it is a polyglot boarding house. Others, criticizing in more detail, point to the corruption still all too widespread in local and in national politics; to the low esteem accorded to political activities and political personalities; to the widespread disregard for law and the even more widespread domination of trivial conventions. They

assert that, in spite of all the immense development of educational machinery, America still has no national culture, does not contribute in proportion to her resources to the higher life of mankind. The traditional answer to all such criticisms, the answer that America is a young Nation and requires only time to manifest her full power and glory, is no longer felt to be entirely adequate. For, as de Tocqueville has said, "It was a new country, but it was inhabited by a people grown old in the exercise of freedom"; to which may be added that these people were the inheritors, not only of free political institutions and traditions, but also of all the material and spiritual culture of Europe, and that three centuries have now elapsed since the founding of the new Nation, a period almost equal to that during which the Hellenes raised their civilization from barbarism to the highest peak yet attained by men. And so, beneath the buoyant optimism of the masses, which is still the most obvious note of American life, it is easy to detect an undercurrent of doubt and even of despair, of resignation to the replacement of nationality by sectionalism, of order by chaos, of culture by anarchy.

Very many of the current criticisms are well-founded. And there can be no doubt that the self-criticism that is now so active is a necessary phase of American development, a phase necessary to the passage of the Nation from adolescence to maturity.

Where so much has been accomplished, it would be premature to despair and pusillanimous to cease to strive for the realization of the magnificent promise of American life.

One great condition of this changed attitude has not been sufficiently noticed. In the early days of America, in fact until within the lifetime of the older generation, the task before the people was simple, obvious, and, though it demanded their strenuous exertions, it was one in which their ever-increasing success stimulated and justified a joyous confidence in their ability to fulfill it. It was the task of subduing a vast wilderness, of fitting it to be the seat of a great nation. While this task lay to hand, the American could and did rejoice in manfully playing his part in the work of laying the foundations; in seeing the wilderness give place to smiling fields; in seeing cities spring into being where the Indian and the bison had roamed for thousands of years; in perfecting that "most magnificent dwelling-place prepared by God for man's abode." While he wrought at this great task, the American was troubled by no doubts as to the goal towards which he strove; duty and inclination and self-interest pointed clearly in the one direction; with whole-hearted enthusiasm and simple piety he gave himself to the great work, rearing a numerous progeny to inherit the blessings that his hands were preparing and to take up the further task of building on the foundations he was laying a

culture and a civilization rivaling and surpassing all that the Old World had achieved.

But this further task, which for the pioneer American lay so far in the future that he was not called upon to envisage it in detail, is one of far greater difficulty, greater complexity, greater delicacy, than the work of laying the foundations. And this more difficult, more subtle task, with which the present generation is now fully engaged, is one in which there can be no assurance of success, no happy confidence that every step leads in the right direction, no simple joy of striving and achievement untroubled by anxiety and by conflict of opinion as to ends and means.

CHAPTER NINE

THE UNITY ATTAINED

WE have seen that the unifying influences have increasingly prevailed over those making for disruption of the nation; until now, the desire, the will, for continued unity seems to be strongly rooted in the minds of the vast majority of Americans; and it is difficult to imagine any change of circumstances that could reverse, or seriously weaken this, the most essential condition of national unity.

Nor is the unity of the Nation threatened by any foreign power. In this respect America enjoys a unique security. There is no other great State, except perhaps Japan, that is not liable to be torn to pieces by the armed forces of other States. For any other State such disruption would be the almost inevitable consequence of unsuccessful warfare. But American unity is so favored by geographical and economic conditions that even complete defeat in war could hardly involve any worse penalties than the loss of her outlying territories and the payment of a large sum of money to the victors.

American and British Commonwealths Contrasted

It is noteworthy in this connection that America and the British Commonwealth, both of which are

Federal unions of many States, have in the modern period followed very different — in fact opposite — courses of evolution. The British Commonwealth, in its modern form, began as a single strong State, the parts of which were firmly bound together by the authority and prestige of the British Crown and Parliament and by loyalty to those institutions which symbolize and give effective expression to the unity of all the parts. Its modern evolution has been a process of continued devolution, of repeated slackening and throwing away of the formal bonds, the bonds of legislative and executive authority, that radiated from the center to every part. In respect of the major parts, this process has now gone so far that hardly any remnants of these formal bonds are operative; at the present day the parts are held together only by mutual good will, and by the sentiment of devotion to the whole founded on kinship and common traditions and, to some extent still, on the sense of the strength that comes from presenting a united front to the world. The unity so maintained is a precarious one. The process of devolution has a certain momentum; and no man can foresee whether it may not go yet a little further and reach the extreme limit, the dissolution of all formal continuity.

The unity of the American Commonwealth, on the other hand, has been achieved by a gradual increase of complexity and intimacy of all the formal bonds. Beginning as a group of independent States,

very loosely joined together (like the parts of the British Commonwealth at the present day) only by kinship and some sense of common interests, the States, since the date at which they agreed to form the Federal Union, have been welded more and more firmly.

The contrast may be described rather differently by saying that, whereas the unity of the British Commonwealth began with the Crown and was diffused downwards and outwards from that central apex, the unity of the American Nation has been achieved from below, upwards and inwards from all the parts. This peculiarity of the American Nation was noticed by de Tocqueville, who wrote, "The political existence of the majority of the Nations of Europe commenced in the superior ranks of society, and was gradually and always imperfectly communicated to the different members of the social body. In America, on the other hand, it may be said that the township was organized before the County, the County before the State, the State before the Union."

We have seen how the happy conjunctions of time and place have marvelously favored this process of growing together of the parts into one firmly knit whole. The unifying influences have found expression in various amendments to the Constitution, in various judicial interpretations of the Constitution, and in the increasing number and influence of Federal laws and of executive powers, such powers as those

of the Department of Commerce and of the Interstate Commerce Commission. And the unity of the Nation-State has been strengthened immensely by the increased facility of communication between all parts; by the perpetual movements of persons in great numbers from place to place, without regard to State boundaries; by the differentiation and specialization of the economic functions of the various parts; by the nation-wide organization of distributive agencies; by the increasing predominance in the minds of the people of interest in Federal politics over State and local politics, resulting naturally from the increase of influence and authority of the Federal Government; and finally by the increasingly strong sentiment of pride in, of attachment to, and dependence on, the Nation as a unified whole.

The Nation Lacks a Metropolis

The only important feature which is commonly to be found in great unified and centralized States, yet is absent from America, is a metropolis, a city in which the political and commercial and cultural activities of the nation have their headquarters and which in size and influence predominates over all others.

New York predominates commercially, but is too cosmopolitan, too largely foreign, to become a true metropolis, even had it been made the seat of the Federal Government. Boston, having become largely

and increasingly populated by citizens of the new immigration, has lost its cultural preëminence. Washington, though already a beautiful and imposing city, has not a sufficiently large population of the educated class to give it a metropolitan character. Perhaps this defect might be remedied by making it the seat of a great national university. The residence there of a large and powerful academic community would usefully complement the political interests of the city by supplying a strong element of detached criticism.

The absence of a metropolis is, I think, a defect, a real lack of the national life. A metropolis is needed for the formation and guidance of public opinion, for the maintenance of standards of taste and criticism. There is little danger that Washington or any other city shall dominate the rest of the Nation at the expense of the vigor of other parts, as Paris dominates France.

Uniformity of Superficial Conventions

In spite of this lack, the unity of the American Nation seems assured. And in one way American unity surpasses that of all other nations, namely, in respect of the uniformity of all the outward and material aspects of civilization. Already in de Tocqueville's day, this uniformity was striking. He wrote, "I do not know of any European Nation, how small soever it may be, which does not present less uni-

formity in its different provinces than the American people, which occupies a territory as extensive as one half of Europe. The distance from the State of Maine to that of Georgia is reckoned at about one thousand miles; but the difference between the civilization of Maine and that of Georgia is slighter than the difference between the habits of Normandy and those of Brittany."

With the great increase of communications and of the complexities of the material bases of civilization, which has taken place since de Tocqueville's time, the uniformity he described has been greatly accentuated. It ranges from the forms of the buildings to the way of using the knife and fork and laying the breakfast table; from the attitude towards marriage to the manner of addressing one's partner in the dance, or introducing a friend; from reverence for the Constitution to the cult of aggressiveness as a personal quality. Trifling details of personal practice, such as bobbing the hair, suspending the trousers with a belt, wearing glasses with thick dark rims, strange shapes of footgear, sweep over the whole vast country.

Most of these nation-wide practices are either sensible adaptations to the needs of the time, hygienic conventions, or harmless foibles. Yet the degree of conformity displayed over so vast an area, which is paralleled only in China, where an even larger population submitted for many generations to the practice of footbinding among the women and

the wearing of the "pigtail" among the men, lends some color to the accusation that there is less personal liberty in America than in many European countries. When the foreigner finds that every man is expected to put on a new straw hat on a certain date each spring and to discard it on a certain date in the fall, he may feel that he is among a strangely suggestible people, which, for lack of a class that sets the standards of taste and by reason of the large proportion of persons anxious to make manifest their half-acquired "Americanism", is unduly susceptible to the wiles of the advertiser and the tyranny of trade interests.¹ And many visitors and some Americans complain of the monotony of the human scene engendered by this nation-wide sway of such conventions. These various conformities may seem to be superficial only; but they serve to conceal the immense variety of racial peculiarities and of imported traditions; they constitute a sort of mask of Americanism that proclaims the desire to be true Americans; and, since we tend to become that which we feign to be, they have a great influence in symbolizing and in promoting the unity of the Nation.

There can be little doubt that, after a period of consolidation, rendered possible by severe restriction of immigration, the diversified traditions and racial origins of the people will manifest themselves in a

¹ Among many other trifling facts of the same order I observed with interest that at a certain date almost all Harvard students wore felt hats of the same strangely ugly shape and color.

greater freedom of experiment in the arts of life and in a rich variegation of all that constitutes the national culture.

Deeper-lying Forms of Like-mindedness

The like-mindedness that underlies the unity of the Nation is, however, not confined to trivial practices and the externals of life. It goes deep, and involves a strongly developed national sentiment and the nation-wide prevalence of certain large ideals, most of which are altogether admirable. The old State loyalties have been almost altogether swallowed up in the loyalty to the federated Nation. With the exception, perhaps, of Californians, the average American's loyalty to his State is no more a determining influence in his life than that of the average Englishman to the county in which he was born. Very few Americans of the present day would, I suppose, feel that, in a serious conflict between the State in which they reside and the Federal State, their duty was to support their State, even though in their private judgment the claim of the Federal Government was justified by the abstract principles of right and justice. This was not the case up to the time of the Civil War. The difference marks the great advance of the unifying centralizing process.

The powers of the Federal Government continue to increase. Its revenue expands and its administrative functions multiply. One great unifying influence

throughout the earlier period was the responsibility of the Federal Government for the territories that had not attained to statehood. The same influence is still at work; for Alaska continues as a very large rich undeveloped area in the status of a territory. And the overseas possessions that accrued from the Spanish War are national responsibilities that make, perhaps even more strongly, in the same direction.

Further, the Federal Government administers, for the benefit of the whole Nation, vast and increasing areas of national parks and forests. There are in contemplation, and in some cases in actual process of development, vast schemes of power-transmission which far transcend the limits of any one State and necessitate the coöperation of groups of States and Federal supervision. Interstate commerce requires, as it becomes more voluminous and more widely organized, increasing Federal control. National prohibition; national restriction of immigration; the control of aërial navigation; the widely demanded uniformity of the marriage laws; the collection of the Federal Income Tax and of duties on imported goods; the enforcement of laws of hygiene for plants, animals, and men; all these require new or increasing functions of the central government.

In addition to all these functions, which by their nature require to be supervised by the Federal Government in the service of the whole Nation, there have grown up in recent years a great number of voluntary

organizations which ramify throughout the Nation, with many members and branches in nearly every State. Some of these, such as the Red Cross Society and the Young Men's Christian Association, perform quasi-public functions; others, such as the Masons, the Elks, the Rotarians, and scores of others, brotherhoods and fraternities, sororities, patriotic and benevolent associations, are active and strongly represented throughout the country.

It would seem that Americans, deprived in large measure of the fixed traditional forms of association that in European countries serve to satisfy the social tendencies and longings common to all normal men, have created with characteristic exuberance a wealth of substitutes that make in the main for good fellowship, friendly contacts, community of interests, and national unity.

Many features of the political life of America have been subjected to severe criticism. But the perpetually renewed conflict of the two great parties, marred as it is by the spoils system and seriously as it may fail to achieve its ostensible objects, provides at short intervals a topic of common interest to the whole people. And, though the parties are often accused of lacking any large constructive aims consistently pursued, they have this virtue in common, namely, they hold before the people the ideal of a great united Nation aspiring towards noble ends and progressively working out a magnificent destiny.

Class Warfare Not an Imminent Danger

In another respect the unity of the American Nation is far better assured than that of some others. The nations of Europe are threatened in various degrees by the class warfare proclaimed by so many cranks and half-baked social philosophers as the means to the universal brotherhood of man. Such class warfare has already shattered one great European State and laid its civilization in bloody ruins. And all the nations, America not excepted, have suffered some anxiety lest they share this fate. The danger has probably been grossly exaggerated; and in America it would seem to be decidedly less than in any other nation. The preaching of class warfare is in the main the expression of discontent with the material conditions of the hand-working classes. But in America the level of material prosperity throughout all classes is very high, in comparison with the conditions in every other country. Wages are high; it seems likely that the eight-hour day will soon be the rule in all industries; and multitudes of working men hold property in the forms of life-insurance policies, investments, land, or dwellings. The proletariat, strictly speaking, is of small proportions. It is roughly true to say that only the grossly incompetent, the inadaptable, and the very unfortunate, suffer serious hardships. The fact that among the native-born white population automobiles are distributed in

the proportion of one to about every six persons is striking evidence of the high level of the standard of living throughout the country.¹ Further, many American employers are realizing the fact that, not only humanity, but economic prosperity also can best be promoted by giving the workers in their industries both a direct financial interest in the success

¹ Lest any reader should regard this as the biased opinion of a hanger-on of the capitalist class, let me cite the testimony of a man who for many years was widely known as one of the most respected leaders of Socialism in America. Mr. John Spargo writes in a recent number of the *Outlook* (October 29, 1924) as follows: "The Socialism upon which I relied for the realization of certain great ideals, and for which I worked in the interest of those ideals, has proved a bruised and broken reed, ineffective and entirely impotent. Progress in the direction of the cherished ideals has not been halted, however. We have not slumped back into the evils of the worst phases of the capitalist era, but, on the contrary, have made, and are now making, quite remarkable progress toward the realization of the advantages of life. The increasing diffusion of opportunity is the most remarkable feature of our progress as a nation. In the United States to-day economic and cultural advantages to the degree essential to a high standard of living are the prerogatives of a privileged class to a less extent than ever before, and, equally important, to a far less extent than in any other country, with the possible exception of the Australasian Commonwealth. Do not misunderstand me. There are still glaring inequalities of status and opportunity to be removed when and as we can. We are a long way from the perfect social state. Everywhere there is challenge to further progress. My contention is simply that we are steadily progressing toward the goal of a genuine social democracy, a goal perhaps dimly perceived. Despite the absence of any Socialist movement worthy of the name, we are much nearer the ideal of social democracy than any nation of the Old World. Along lines peculiarly American, answering American needs, conforming to American conditions and experience, we are evolving a new type of socialization which I would call Socialism but for the fear that to do so would invite further confusion where too much already exists." Of the manual worker he writes, "There is no sense of belonging permanently to the class in which he finds himself, and, consequently, no such instinct of class loyalty as the European worker has. The intense class consciousness to which European Socialism has always appealed does not, and I think cannot, flourish in the soil of American conditions." Again, "In this country, on the other hand, with the exception of the largest cities, individual home ownership is common in practice, and the aspiration to own one's home is almost a universal instinct. Here it is inconceivable that our States and municipalities should go into the building and

of the concern in whose service they labor and some voice in the management, especially in the determination of the conditions of their work. There are also in process great improvements in the material surroundings of the industrial workers, both in the factory and the home. These developments will go far to prevent the accentuation of antagonism between capital and labor.

It is probable that another decade of unrestricted immigration, bringing vast numbers of Europeans slow to adapt themselves to American conditions, and depressing greatly the standards of living of the less skilled forms of labor, would have made the threat of class warfare a very real one. And it is possible that, after the lapse of another century, the increase of population may result in a pressure upon the means of subsistence that may have the same effect.

It seems, however, highly probable that the policy of restriction of immigration will be effectively maintained, and that the American people will learn to adapt their numbers to their resources before the pinch can become severe. Given those two conditions, there seems to be no reason why the standard

renting of houses on any large scale. We seek our solution of the problem, not in such extensions of governmental functions, but in private property and individual enterprise. In the average small town — and this is a nation of small towns — the ordinary worker who is reasonably industrious and thrifty can acquire his own home. Millions have done so. On the basis of private property and individual enterprise, we have approached much closer to a solution of the problem than England or any other country has yet done or is likely to do in the near future.”

of living should not continue to rise among the economically lower strata and the diffusion of property become nation wide. Under those conditions it would remain highly improbable that the national unity should be threatened or the national harmony disturbed by class warfare.

Centralization and National Unity

Like the contrary process of decentralizing devolution in the British Commonwealth, the centralizing unifying process in the United States has a certain momentum that may carry it beyond the point at which it ceases to bring advantages to the Nation. There are not wanting American voices which assert that this point has already been reached or passed; that too much power has already been placed in the hands of the Federal Government; that, in the eternal compromise between liberty and government, a fair balance was attained in the latter part of the nineteenth century, a balance which has been upset in favor of centralized government by the developments of the last quarter of a century. Thus one of the most distinguished of political philosophers¹ writes of the United States towards the close of the nineteenth century:

“We seemed to have found the solution in principle of the great problem of political civilization and

¹ Professor G. W. Burgess in his “Reconciliation of Government with Liberty”, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1915.

to be engaged now with the work of its application to details. But with the year 1898 came a turn in affairs, which has changed materially, if not completely, the course of our development. . . . We are further away today from the solution of the great problem of the reconciliation of Government with Liberty than we were twenty years ago. In principle we have too much Government and in practise too slack and irregular execution of the law. . . . It seems to me that we are swaying from the path of true progress; that path must lead ever to the better and more perfect reconciliation of Government and Individual Liberty, and . . . this signifies, in ultimate analysis, four things, viz: a true and correct organization of the sovereign power as the basis of all Government and Liberty, so as to give every element and every force within the state its proper value and open the way for its legitimate activity and for the exercise of its natural weight; second, a Government of conservative structure and limited powers, a Government which will not only be proof against the usurpation of a despot, but which cannot be adapted to further the rule of class interests; third, a fully rounded, well-defined sphere of Individual Immunity from governmental power such as will liberate the physical, intellectual, and moral capacity of the Individual, stimulate it to the fullest development and encourage its service to the advancement of civilization; and lastly, a learned, experienced, im-

partial, unprejudiced, upright organ for maintaining in detail, through its interpretations and judgments, the Constitutional balance between Government and Liberty. Down to the year 1898, we had all this in fair degree and in fuller measure than any other state of the world. It needed some readjustments, but it did not lend itself to an imperial policy abroad nor to a paternal programme at home. A School of Sociologists and Political Economists arose, who, impatient of the voluntary methods of religion, charity, and philanthropy, have sought to accomplish what they call social justice, the social uplift, by governmental force. There is no question that they have exercised a strong influence in directing the thought of the present, and they have taught the politicians that there is no vote-catcher in a system of universal suffrage comparable to the promise of forcing those who have to divide with those who have not or have less. The jingo and the Social Reformer have gotten together and have formed a political party which threatened to capture the Government and use it for the realization of their programme of Caesaristic paternalism, a danger which appears now to have been averted only by the other parties having themselves adopted this programme in a somewhat milder degree and form. All parties are now declaring themselves to be Progressives, and all mean in substance the same thing by this claim, viz: the increase of governmental power over the Constitutional Im-

munities of the Individual, the solution by force of the problems of the social relations heretofore regulated by influence, by religion, conscience, charity, and human feeling, the substitution of the club of the policeman for the crozier of the priest; the supersession of education, morals, and philanthropy by administrative ordinance.

“Now, all this may be necessary, but is it progress in civilization? It may be that the character of our people has so deteriorated during the last twenty-five years that the ominous change in the relation of Government to Liberty ought to be made, but let us consider before we do it whether there be not a better way, a more American way. . . . Let us also profoundly reflect what may be the effect of a vast advance in governmental power and activity. . . . A Government standing over all classes in the Society and independent of them all might be trusted to say how far force can be safely employed in requiring sacrifices from one class to another; but a changing, shifting Government, a Government representing either the property class, or the property-less class, especially a Government representing the property-less or small-property class, a Government representing the modern democracy under universal suffrage, a Government representing the class to be benefited by the confiscation and redistribution of wealth through governmental force, cannot be safely trusted with any such power. It would become a

temporary despotism, which would destroy property, use up accumulated wealth, make enterprise impossible, discourage intelligence and thrift, encourage idleness and sloth, and pauperize and barbarize the whole people.

“This is no idle prophecy. The whole history of the world’s political development sustains it. The history of that development shows beyond any question or cavil that a Republic with unlimited Government cannot stand, that a Republic which makes its Government the arbiter of business, is of all forms of state the most universally corrupt, and that a Republic, which undertakes to do its cultural work through governmental force, is of all forms of state the most demoralizing. If a state will have Government undertake those tasks which naturally belong, or have come through historical development to belong, within the sphere of Individual Liberty, then it must have a Government lifted so far above all class and party interests that it cannot be controlled or even influenced by any of them. But this is authority reaching from above downward and not from below upward. This is Monarchy in the original sense of *jure-divino* sovereignty. This is the reason for and the advantage of its existence. But, for us, this is not progress. It is for us retrogression of the most positive kind known to political history.

“In the face of this consideration, it is time, high time, for us to call a halt in our present course of in-

creasing the sphere of Government and decreasing that of Liberty, and inquire carefully whether what is happening is not the passing of the Republic, the passing of the Christian religion, and the return to Caesarism, the rule of the one by popular acclaim, the apotheosis of Government and the universal decline of the consciousness of, and the desire for, true Liberty. The world has made this circuit several times before. Are we making it again or is it only a step backward in order to get a better foothold for another advance in the true direction? Let us hope it is the latter and make it so by keeping always consciously before us as the goal of political civilization, the reconciliation of Government with Liberty, so that, however, the latter shall be seen to be the more ultimate, shall be seen to be both end and means, while the former is only means. This is fundamental in the profoundest sense and there can be no sound progress in political civilization without it.”¹

¹ Professor Burgess is not alone in deploring the increasing tendency to restrict the liberty of the individual. We have seen how Professor Turner describes the passing of the frontier spirit of individualism and speaks of the growth of a new nation, by which he means a profound change in the type of national organization. Doctor N. M. Butler speaks in the same sense with no uncertain voice. In the generation since the Civil War, he says, a new American revolution has been taking place. “It manifests itself in a carelessness for liberty, and even at times in a cynical contempt for liberty, accompanied with a violent intolerance, which are in amazing contradiction to the national temper and happenings of years gone by. It manifests itself in an impatient willingness to permit government to absorb a steadily increasing control over private life and occupation, and to build up at the national capital, with smaller replicas at the several state capitals, a huge, cumbrous and incompetent bureaucracy.” The *New York World* from which I cite, comments as follows, “He (Doctor Butler) means the Fifteenth Amendment, by which

Thus speaks the voice of the traditional individualism of America in face of the increase of power of the Federal Government. And it cannot be doubted that such warning is timely, that the dangers indicated by Professor Burgess are very real. But it is necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, the increasing unification of the nation, and, on the other hand, the increase of governmental powers. The latter is only one of many different ways in which

the Federal Government tried and failed to insure the suffrage to all Negroes. He means the Eighteenth Amendment by which the Federal Government is trying and failing to establish universal Prohibition. He means the proposed Twentieth Amendment, the so-called Child Labor Amendment, by which the Federal Government would obtain power to legislate about the labor of persons under eighteen years of age. It means the proposed subsidy by the Federal Government to the several States for support of the schools. In each case Doctor Butler approves the end and deplores the means; in each case, he says, the reformer, seeking a quick, uniform and desirable result, has nevertheless done great damage: he has 'cut those ties of local intimacy and interdependence' and is attempting to 'substitute a mechanically operated unit, however efficient, of a huge national machine.' The result is disastrous in many ways. By concentrating enormous power in Washington over the personal lives of individuals the country suffers, first of all, under a combination of despotism and lawlessness. The laws are passed by minorities, or even by majorities; they are ignored in spots, flouted in others, and the struggle to enforce them produces all kinds of Ku-Kluxery and lawless law enforcement. The removal of power over the intimate affairs of life from the home community to Washington degrades the whole political system. Things are decided by mass appeal and not by reasoned debate. The individual voter no longer feels that his vote counts, and in increasing numbers ceases to take the trouble to vote. Power has moved so far away that he no longer feels that he exercises any power. The Washington vampire sucks the life out of the States and local communities. Yet the State, the city and the county should be the real training-ground and testing-ground for statesmen. That's where political life should be keen and active. But the more Washington absorbs the power of the States the more they tend to become mere administrative shells. Who really pays any attention nowadays to a debate in the Legislature at Albany? . . . In the light of human experience, is Doctor Butler not right in saying that this whole tendency to concentrate and elaborate governmental power is destructive to liberty and deeply reactionary? Is he not right in thinking that, regardless of where the parties stand, and they stand everywhere, the decentralization of the Federal

the former manifests itself; and it is possible, and in my opinion proper, to approve and to strive to promote the former, while deprecating the latter. There is ground for the fear that centralization of governmental power may be carried to excess in respect to both legislative and executive functions. There is ground for the fear that American individualism is giving place to the tendency to seek in State and Federal legislation the remedy for all difficulties and

political power and the reduction of government at Washington is the paramount political issue of our time?"

I cite from another book, by an author who is by no means a severe critic of American life and is neither a socialist nor a revolutionary of any kind, but an orthodox patriot (Professor Durant Drake's "America Faces the Future", Macmillan Company, New York, 1922), the following disturbing picture of excessive governmental interference. "During the past few years permits for speeches in halls and out-of-doors have been repeatedly refused to people suspected of radical ideas — including Christian ministers of high reputation, professors in theological schools, editors of reputable journals, and labor leaders of unquestioned personal character. Meetings, gathered to listen to speakers obnoxious to the authorities, have been roughly broken up and the speakers forcibly ejected. Not only have the mails been closed to specific issues of various newspapers and journals, but the second-class mailing privilege has been refused altogether to certain periodicals — the result being, in some cases, to put an end to their publication. Books and pamphlets containing passages disapproved by the authorities have likewise been declared unmailable. Further, raids have been conducted by the Government against schools, clubs, workingmen's associations, political party headquarters: all persons on the premises have been indiscriminately arrested, regardless of the absence of specific evidence as to their beliefs or utterances. Property has been seized and held without warrant. Great numbers of people have been arrested and sent to jail without warrant. Spies and underground agents have been used by the wholesale to disclose to the Government the names of persons and organizations professing radical ideas. In many cases, the 'radical' ideas for which men have been jailed have been in reality no more radical than the ideas of the founders of our nation. . . . In the case of aliens in this country suspected of radical sympathies the procedure has been even more violent . . . the various Socialist and Communist parties such as exist unmolested in all countries of Europe . . . have lately been treated in this country by the majority in power as criminal organizations. . . . Worse than all this, bills have been passed by State legislatures that lay violent hands upon freedom of teaching," etc., etc.

evils. The output of new laws, many of them insufficiently debated and hastily passed, is enormous. But there cannot be too much unity of the national mind. The tendency to excess in legislation and in executive regulation is the consequence, not of too great unity, but of insufficient unity. If the Nation were more completely integrated, if its mind and will were more perfectly organized for deliberation and decision, it would not be liable to these excesses; it would recognize its needs more exactly and know better how to meet them; it would not be liable to have new laws thrust upon it by active minorities that owe their success to the supine indifference of the mass of the citizens.

Since the time when the thirteen colonies combined to throw off the sovereignty of the British Crown, the American people has made great progress in the scale of nationhood. But the journey is a long one; the goal of perfection is still distant. The great and rapid changes of the last half century in the distribution of population, in its ethnic composition, in industrial organization and commercial relations, these rapid changes have somewhat disturbed and distorted the course of national development; for they have created problems which required for their solution much experience and mature deliberation, yet which called urgently for immediate adjustments. The remedy is not to be found in further centralization of government and in new

floods of legislation. It can only be found by returning to the path of true progress, the path of increasingly efficient national organization founded in firm moral and political traditions.

The task before the Nation is, then, to perfect the processes of national deliberation, to render public opinion more instructed, more farseeing, more alive to the needs of the Nation as a whole, and to secure a more delicate responsiveness of government to that public opinion. To effect such changes would be to raise the national mind and will to a higher plane of organization and integration; and to do that would be to make firmer and more perfect the unity of the Nation.

These great ends cannot be promoted by further centralization of power in the Federal Government. There is danger that such further centralization may, by weakening the sense of political responsibility in all the parts of the Nation, actually lower it in the scale of development, substituting for true mental unity an external unity imposed and maintained by the machine-like operations of the bureaucracy.

I will not presume to forecast the particular changes by which progress in this direction may be effected. No doubt, the fundamental feature of such progress must be the further political education of the citizens in the principles of healthy national life. But I will venture to point to two changes, not impossible or improbable, that would make strongly

for such progress. One is the more definite alignment of the two great political parties along the only lines that can logically and permanently divide a whole people into two parties, the line of the party that would make progress slowly, and the line of the party that would seek to advance more rapidly. Such alignment would involve no constitutional changes. The other change is one that would involve changes of constitutional practice, if not actual amendment of the Constitution. Its essence would be to render the Chief Executive and his Cabinet more directly responsible to, and therefore more delicately responsive to, the public opinion of the whole Nation.

In spite of the danger of excessive centralization, some increase of the power of the Federal Government must necessarily follow from the increasing involvement of America in the affairs of the world at large; and this increasing participation in the affairs of the outer world, which was and is and will be inevitable, is perhaps the strongest of all influences making for national unity. Its importance requires some discussion of it in a separate chapter.

CHAPTER TEN

AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS

IN describing the influences that make for the unity of the American Nation, I reserved for discussion in this chapter one which probably is now and will be increasingly in the future by far the most powerful of all. I mean the intercourse, friendly and hostile, between America and other nations.

For nations — as for individuals — there is nothing that promotes self-consciousness, self-criticism, and self-knowledge so powerfully as intercourse with other nations — or individuals — of similar degree of culture and struggling with similar problems. Only through such intercourse can self-knowledge grow in extent, in detail, and in accuracy, until it renders possible true estimation of the acts and motives of self and others, and just recognition of the excellencies and defects of both.

And such self-knowledge is for nations, as for individuals, an essential condition of that self-control and self-direction which are the highest expressions of character, of will power, the manifestations of complete mental integration; in other words, the

best evidences, in both the nation and the individual, of complete integrity.

The mere desire to be a unified nation, no matter how strong and how widely diffused among the citizens, does not of itself suffice to insure integrity. The desire, in order to be effective, must operate under the guidance of true self-knowledge and under the sobering realization that a nation is not necessarily what it may desire and proclaim itself to be, but is rather what it shows itself to be in its national actions.

A man who has little self-knowledge is what we call naïve. He may have noble sentiments and fine ideals; he may energetically strive to make real his ideals; and yet, if he is naïve, if he does not understand his own motives, he is constantly in danger of acting and judging under the influence of motives quite other than his avowed and highly respectable desires. The understanding of one's own motives, with a corresponding power to judge accurately the motives of other men, is the most important part of self-knowledge. A man may know that he is weak or strong in respect to this, that, and the other capacity; that he has a fine voice, a good head for mathematics, a poor memory, and a refined aesthetic taste; but all this knowledge avails him little in the conduct of life, if he remains ignorant of the motives that prompt him to bring these various capacities into play.

All this is equally true of nations; and perhaps this kind of self-knowledge is more difficult, rarer, less developed, in nations than in individuals.

Further, and this is an equally important truth applicable to men and nations alike, intercourse between equals promotes not only self-knowledge, but also the sentiment of self-respect. In the intercourse between equals, each party, in learning to respect others, learns to respect himself. Each acquires standards of honor. Each learns that certain kinds of action involve the loss of the esteem of his fellows, while other kinds enhance his reputation, his standing, and his influence. Such self-respect then supplies a dominating motive for self-control and effort towards the better and higher goals of life in all possible relations. And nations, since all their actions are necessarily public, open to the censure or approval of the whole world, readily become even more sensitive than individuals to the appeal to motives of this class.

At the cruder level, this sensitiveness manifests itself as mere touchiness, quick resentment at any injury or aspersion or even implied criticism. At a higher level, it becomes a readiness to welcome criticism, to strive for self-improvement, to try to realize in the fullest degree the ideals that are upheld in common by all parties to the intercourse.

The development of a common moral standard among the nations and the maintenance of a world-

wide public opinion, alert and critical and impartial, ready and able to apply the accepted moral standards in all international affairs — these are the most urgent need of the world; they are the essential conditions of world-wide peace and the orderly progress of mankind. In the absence of such a standard and such opinion no international machinery, no Leagues of Nations, no arbitration treaties, no World Courts, Conferences, or Congresses, can effect the great ends for which they are designed.

But something more is needed. The prevalence of a high moral code and of a strong and active public opinion, even though world-wide, will not suffice, unless the nations, and especially the more powerful nations, are capable of applying the code, critically and impartially, in the estimation of their own actions and responsibilities, and are delicately sensitive and responsive to the public opinion of the world. Such responsiveness to public opinion does not mean a servile dependency upon the judgment and opinions of others, a yielding up of the right and duty of moral judgment and self-criticism. Here also the analogy between the nation and the individual is very close. It is the highest privilege and duty of each man to be a self-directing moral agent; yet no man can make a moral system for himself; and no man, having accepted the moral system of his time and place, can safely apply it to the conduct of his own life without constant regard to the moral judgment of his fellows.

In relation to every decision or choice of moral import, he not only has to ask, "Does this seem to me to be in accordance with the principles I hold in common with my fellow citizens?"; but also he must ask, "Will this decision or choice seem to be in such accord to those of my fellows whom I esteem most highly?" In other words, right conduct requires not only the acceptance of high moral principles, but also a critical self-judgment in applying them to the guidance of one's own conduct; and such judgment can be attained only by constant reference to the judgment and opinion of others.

The same is true in a higher degree of nations; and the difficulty of attaining and maintaining a high level of self-criticism is greater for them than for individuals. In any international dispute the great majority of the citizens of either party to the dispute are apt to find themselves in close agreement, their moral judgments being swayed or biased in the same direction by their common patriotism. Each citizen, finding then that his own first judgment coincides with that of all, or nearly all, of his fellows with whom he discusses the issue, is strongly confirmed in his opinion; it is therefore very difficult for him to maintain in any degree an open mind, to reserve his judgment or rectify his opinion. Hence arise those profound differences of moral judgment on particular issues, differences that divide nations in spite of their acceptance of a common code of morality,

differences that easily give rise to acute conflicts. Such are the differences that at the present time divide the world and prevent the assurance of peaceful development.

The Isolation of America

In the early days of the American republic, the War of Independence and the War of 1812 and the friendly contacts with France, then undergoing a similar revolution from monarchical to republican institutions, did much to strengthen the Federal Union and to develop the self-consciousness of the new Nation.

There followed a long period of isolation during which the foreign policy of America consisted in the assertion of "the Monroe Doctrine." "The Monroe Doctrine" was explicitly a warning to the rest of the world against all attempts to exert political influence on the American continent; but it implied also the reciprocal abstention by America from political action outside that continent. It is hardly possible to question the wisdom and the beneficent effects of that policy. Yet the maintenance of that policy throughout almost the whole of the nineteenth century has had also effects that are not wholly good. Especially, it has deprived the American Nation of a very important part of the education that every nation must have in order to become an adult nation, a fully responsible moral organism,

capable of playing its due part in the affairs of the world, in the development of our common world-wide civilization.

In consequence of the policy of isolation, formally expressed in the Monroe Doctrine, the American Nation has remained naïve and childish in all its foreign relations. It has consistently displayed a naïve self-righteousness, a childlike belief in the purity and nobility of all its aims and actions in relation to other States, and a primitive uncritical conviction of its moral superiority to all other States. At the same time it has naturally displayed a correlative childish impatience at all criticism coming from outside, a touchiness and petulance unbecoming to a great nation, and an incapacity to exert impartial moral judgment in international affairs. These faults are not, of course, peculiar to the American Nation; but it is, I think, indisputable that it has retained these defects, natural to childhood and adolescence, for an unduly long period of its development, owing in the main to its geographical and political isolation, its lack of international contacts and responsibilities.

The Passing of American Isolation

The Spanish War and the resulting responsibility for the Philippines and other overseas territories and populations have done much to change this condition, to give the Nation a wider outlook on the world and

some sense of the necessity of an enlightened foreign policy.

At the same time, these new responsibilities have done much to render the more educated Americans sympathetically appreciative of the problems and difficulties that confront other nations. And there can be no doubt that an educative influence of this sort was needed and still requires to be carried much further through the mass of the people. Reference to the problem of the Philippines may serve sufficiently to illustrate the point. Should America forthwith withdraw from all political control of the islands? The acceptance of the abstract principle of the right of peoples to independence and self-determination does not in itself answer this question. A closer consideration of the question reveals it to every intelligent person as a very difficult and delicate moral problem.

America Not Yet Fully Grown Up

The tardy participation of America in the World War at once illustrated the fact that the educative process was very incomplete and carried the process further. But the advance made was, perhaps, less than might have been expected. The wide acceptance of President Wilson's childlike utterances, of his demand for peace without victory, of his denial of any difference of moral status between the conflicting nations, illustrated the fact. It was further

illustrated by the unseemly haste with which America dissociated herself from those nations which she had assisted to win the War.¹ The common, the characteristic, national attitude was that of one who retires hastily, gathering her garments about her lest they be contaminated by contact with the sordid and filthy rags of the poor creatures whom she had charitably condescended to deliver from a perilous situation. America congratulates herself that her act of noble condescension was unsullied by participation in the spoils of war, naïvely overlooking the fact that, while other nations fought to prevent the domination of the world by Prussian militarism and bureaucracy, she gathered the wealth of all the world into her lap; and the bulk of the Nation seems utterly incapable of seeing that the collection of the debts legally incurred to her by other nations, while fighting her battles, involves a moral problem no less difficult than the economic one.²

It is this moral obtuseness that goes with the childlike naïvety of America in world affairs, combined with her enormous financial and economic and potential military power, which, in spite of the recognized moral fervor and elevation of the mass of

¹ The last straw broke the camel's back, and that last straw has, no doubt, continued ever since to claim that it did the trick.

² "Everybody shared the swollen and abnormal war prosperity before we entered the conflict, except the railways." Mr. A. J. Beveridge in "The State of the Nation", Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1924.

her citizens, renders her an object of profound distrust to other nations.

Only further experience in international affairs can educate the Nation out of this naïvety, can complete the process of growing up into a responsible adult, fair-minded, self-critical, tolerant towards the defects and sympathetic towards the difficulties of other nations. Unfortunately, the relative economic independence of America and her immensely strong economic position among the nations tend to perpetuate indifference to world affairs and to favor the maintenance of the policy of isolation. The wealth and power of America give her a well-nigh Godlike status among the nations, a status that is highly unfavorable to the development of moral self-criticism and self-knowledge.

It is necessary to hope that the spirit of self-criticism, which is now manifesting itself widely in the land, combining with the moral earnestness so widely diffused through the Nation, may gradually effect a great increase of national self-knowledge and a great refinement of judgment in all international affairs. Great and hopeful educative efforts are already being made; and they cannot fail to have good results.¹

The weaknesses of America in her relations with other nations, disturbing as they are to her more

¹ I refer to such things as the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, the Foreign Policy Association, and the recently instituted review, "Foreign Affairs."

discerning citizens and to her best friends in all countries, afford no ground for a gloomy view of the future, because they are the defects natural to youth and to inexperience in international affairs. If it were possible and probable that America should maintain in the future the same degree of isolation that she has enjoyed throughout the greater part of the last century, the outlook would be dark. It would seem only too probable that she would become in the international sphere a sanctimonious bully, feared and hated by all other nations. They would fear her great strength, ruthlessly used in threats and actions when they crossed her path; and they would be intensely angered by her assumption of moral superiority and by her lack of sympathetic understanding.

Fortunately, although many excellent citizens, especially in the western States, remain indifferent to the affairs of the outer world and still advocate the continuance of the old policy of isolation, it is no longer possible to maintain that isolation. The ever-increasing facilities of travel and communication, the vast currents of trade setting to and from her shores, the intimacy and scope of her financial relations, her responsibilities for her overseas possessions; all these factors combine to bring America into the full stream of world affairs, to secure the interest of an increasing number of her citizens in the conduct of her foreign relations, and to deepen their understanding both of their own and of other nations.

The Supreme Test of Democracy

The desire of so many Americans that the Nation may return to her former condition of relative isolation is vain. Nor, if it could be realized, would it be for the best interests of national development. The passages cited from Professor G.W. Burgess in the preceding chapter contain a partial statement of the grounds of this desire. It is clear that the conduct of complex and multitudinous foreign relations requires a powerful Federal Government that can speak with authority for the whole Nation; in so far, it makes for the further centralization of governmental power and the further subordination of the rights of the several States. And such centralization has, as Professor Burgess points out, its drawbacks and dangers. The conduct of foreign relations does require considerable sacrifice of the liberty of the individual. When the Nation goes to war, every citizen is pledged to devote all his energies, a large fraction of his wealth and, if need be, his life itself, to the service of the State. And, when the Federal Government enters into any treaty or understanding of any kind with other States, it speaks in the name of all the States and of all American citizens, pledging them all, both those who approve and those who dissent from its policy, to do or to abstain from doing certain things. It requires of them loyal adhesion to its declared policy and loyal

observance of its undertakings; and for those citizens who disapprove of the policy and who believe that these undertakings are wrong, or are harmful to the Nation, such loyalty is hard. Yet nothing less is required.

In this matter democracy faces its supreme test. If democratic nations cannot successfully conduct an honorable foreign policy, democracy fails, and there remains only the prospect of a return to various forms of autocracy.

What is required is not that the citizens of the democratic Nation shall blindly yield their judgment to the executive authority, or unthinkingly hold that their Nation, in its relations with others, can do no wrong. Rather, democracy demands that each citizen shall diligently inform himself as to the foreign relations and problems of the Nation, shall play his due part in determining national judgments and decisions, and shall loyally abide by the decisions reached through public opinion and the working of the Nation's political institutions. If he dissents from the policy pursued and the decisions taken, it is for him to work through constitutional channels to change the policy and to reach new and better decisions; but, pending such changes, he is bound to observe the policy and support the actions of his country.

This is the feature or aspect of national unity that is the most difficult of attainment by a democracy,

especially by one long accustomed to individualistic institutions and practices. The citizen of such a State must often find that a treaty has been made by a government controlled by a party of which he is not a member; he is then inclined to feel that the treaty is the work of that party, and is apt to throw the responsibility for it upon that party, or even upon the particular statesmen chiefly concerned in the negotiation of the treaty, disclaiming for himself and his party all responsibility. He is inclined to say, "Why should I (or my party) who have throughout disapproved of this policy — why should we observe the terms of a treaty that seems to us foolish and harmful to the best interests of the Nation?" It is necessary that every citizen shall realize that this is a disloyal and unpatriotic attitude. Loyalty and patriotism demand that each citizen shall cherish and sustain the honor of the Nation, shall be as sensitive to any valid reproach against it as to reproach against his own personal honor; and shall do his best to maintain the national engagements, even though it may seem to him that such maintenance must sacrifice in some degree the material interests of the Nation.

This is the crux of democracy, the greatest problem that confronts the nations of the world, now become, with few exceptions, political democracies. For example, it seems to many thinkers that future wars might best be averted by a series of treaties of

reciprocal guarantee between nations. Yet at present such treaties are impracticable; because no government can honestly pledge its people to take up arms at some future date on the occurrence of certain defined events. All governments of democratic nations know that such pledges would be of little value; because, when the time for redemption of the pledge should arrive, the people concerned might refuse to take up arms, and might frustrate the best-intentioned government by means of a general strike.

The same difficulty stands in the way of all treaty-making between democratic nations; for the essence of all treaties is some pledge or pledges of national action or abstention from action in the future. Yet how can the nations hope to live harmoniously together without the help of treaties. All sensible men, even the least nationalistically inclined, admit the necessity of treaties, if only treaties of arbitration. Yet, though treaties of arbitration are easily made, it remains supremely difficult to ensure that the nations entering into such treaties shall, when the crises arise, accept the arbitrament.

The difficulty we are discussing is not peculiar to America. It is common to all democratic nations. But the history and traditions of the American people make the difficulty peculiarly great for their Nation. Yet only when this difficulty shall have been over-

come, only when the national executive can pledge the Nation as confidently as a man of honor can pledge himself to a certain course of action, only then will the Nation have achieved complete unity and have solved the major problems of democracy.

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